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Foreword
In recent years the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights have built a solid judicial dialogue. This Joint Law Report 2019 is the
product of their cooperation.
On July 18, 2018, on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the American Convention on
Human Rights, the three regional human rights courts of the world met in the seat of the Inter-American Court
in San Jose, Costa Rica. Considering the benefits of institutional and jurisprudential dialogue, they adopted a
historic Declaration. The Declaration of San Jose highlighted the relevance of this cooperation. It established a
Permanent Forum of Institutional Dialogue that aimed to strengthen the protection of human rights and access
to international justice of the people under the jurisdiction of the three courts. The said Permanent Forum of
Institutional Dialogue will take place every two years.
On October 28 and 29, 2019, the African Court hosted the First International Human Rights Forum in Kampala,
Uganda, as stated in the Declaration of San Jose. The Forum was a unique opportunity for the three courts to
sit together and reflect on the human rights challenges faced by humanity. It was also a privileged occasion to
exchange points of views regarding procedural and substantial issues and to share conceptual and jurisprudential
standards of each Court for the common benefit. As result of the Forum, the three courts adopted the Kampala
Declaration.
The Joint Law Report 2019 is a product of the Declarations of San Jose and Kampala. It is a first effort to present,
in a single volume, a selection of the leading decisions delivered by each court in 2019. In addition to their
importance in their own right, some of these decisions also serve to illustrate how the courts are increasingly
having regard to each other’s approach to human rights protection.
The value of this first Joint Law Report 2019 cannot be overstated. On the one hand, there is a similarity in
the rights and freedoms protected by the respective treaties governing the work of the three courts. On the
other, there is an increasing similarity of issues brought before each of the courts in their respective continents.
Therefore, judicial dialogue may serve as a key instrument to enhance the protection of human and peoples’
rights and access to justice of the people under their jurisdictions.
The Report is divided in three sections corresponding to the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In every section, each Court’s
Registry has selected the cases that represent new standards or innovative developments in its year-2019
jurisprudence. We have kept the structure, format and quotations of each sections corresponding to the ones
used by each court. Therefore, they may vary from one section to the other.
We hope that this selection will assist in showing both the similarities and where the judicial approach differs.
Moreover, this Joint Law Report 2019 aims to be a useful tool for human rights legal practitioners in Africa,
Europe and Latin America.

Judge Sylvain Oré
President of the African Court of
Human and Peoples’ Rights

Judge Robert Spano
President of the European Court
of Human Rights

Judge Elizabeth Odio Benito
President of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF
THE AFRICAN COURT ON HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS
2019

Developments in the Case-Law of the African Court of Human and
Peoples´ Rights
Presentation
In July 2019, during its 52nd Ordinary Session, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African
Court) published the first volume of its Law Report1, grouping decisions adopted since its establishment in 2006.
The Court has made it a point to ensure the law report is published annually, and has since published a second
volume in November 2019, which includes decisions delivered in the years 2017 and 2018. The third volume
of the report is in preparation and will include decisions delivered during the year 2019. The African Court Law
Report brings the Court to the public through its case law and also enables the Court to receive feedback from
the public.
It was thus enlightening when the three main regional Courts (African, Inter-American and European), in the
Kampala Declaration adopted during the First International Human Rights Forum hosted by the African Court
in October 2019, called for a joint publication of the leading judgments of the three Courts. It is my hope that
through this publication, the three regional courts will not only strengthen their already good relationship, but will
further reinforce, through their jurisprudence, the notion of universality and interdependency of human rights, as
well as learn from the specificity of each region.
This tripartite joint publication will be an annual digest featuring the judgments, with short commentaries, of
landmark decisions of the three courts. It is a complement rather than a substitute to the annual editions of the
African Court Law Reports.
This inaugural edition of the publication features landmark decisions of the African Court delivered during the year
2019, and from these decisions can be discerned the centrality of the Court in human rights dispute resolutions
on the continent. The judgments deal with a wide range of human rights issues shaping the socio-economic and
political landscape of the continent, including issues of access to the Court, its jurisdiction and the admissibility of
cases before it; fair trial rights, especially the right to be tried by an impartial tribunal; freedom of movement; right
to liberty; right to life and compatibility of mandatory death penalty; legal personality and the right to nationality;
the right to participate in government, and related citizenship rights; the right to reparation, including the concept
of loss of future opportunities.
Since its operationalization in 2006, the Court has, through its decisions, charted a viable path for the protection
of human and peoples’ rights on the continent. The Court has brought about renewed hope and optimism within
the African human rights system, and positions itself firmly as a veritable instrument in the quest for regional
integration, peace, unity, good governance, respect for human rights and development.
The present chapter on the African Court’s case law for the year 2019 features the above stated contribution of
the Court to the realization of human rights but also good governance and the rule of law as they feature in the
objectives of the African Union. The chapter also presents the contribution of the Court to the global discourse
on human rights and offers an opportunity for jurisprudential cooperation and exchange of judicial law making
knowledge with the sister courts in the Americas and Europe.
Dr. Robert Eno
Registrar
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights
1
See African Court Law Report, Volume 1 (2006-2016) https://en.african-court.org/index.php/publications/african-court-law-report
(accessed 12 August 2020).
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Right to life and mandatory death penalty (article 4 of the African Charter)
Ally Rajabu and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania
Application No. 007/2015

Judgment of 28 November 2019 (merits and reparations)

1.

Facts

The Applicants, Ally Rajabu, Angaja Kazeni alias Oria, Geofrey Stanley alias Babu, Emmanuel Michael alias Atuu
and Julius Petro are nationals of Tanzania who were sentenced to death for murder. They filed an Application
before the Court on 26 March 2015 alleging the violation of certain fair trial rights during the proceedings before
domestic courts.

2.

Alleged violations

The Applicants alleged that the provision in the Penal Code of Tanzania on the mandatory imposition of the death
penalty in cases of murder and the imposition of that penalty by domestic courts constituted a violation of their
right to life guaranteed by Article 4 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Charter or
the Charter). They further alleged that their execution by hanging as ordered by domestic courts violates their
right to dignity protected under Article 5 of the Charter.
On 18 March 2016, the Court issued an Order for Provisional Measures in the matter enjoining the Respondent
State not to implement the death sentence until this Application is concluded on the merits.

3.

Submissions of the Parties and findings of the Court

The Rajabu judgment is of a critical importance in the case law of the African Court but also generally in the
African human rights system as it was the first time the Court determined whether the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty is a violation of the right to life under Article 4 of the Charter. It was therefore the first judicial
pronouncement at the continental level on the t right to life and the exception thereto in relation to the imposition
of the death penalty under Article 4 of the Charter. The case therefore provided the Court with an opportunity to
not only rule on that specific issue but also to set out the standards that are applicable to the implied exceptions
to the right to life under Article 4 of the Charter as they relate to imposition of the death penalty.
i. Assessing reasonableness of time taken to conclude proceedings should involve
consideration of facts and law, and scheduling constraints of the domestic judicial
system in cases involving imposition of the death sentence, Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter
The Applicants alleged that the time of over four (4) years that it took the Court of Appeal to complete the review
process violated their right to be tried within a reasonable time. The Respondent State averred rather that the
delay was attributable to the Applicants who failed to file a copy of the review application.
It is worth recalling that, in matters such as Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso2, and Armand Guehi v.
United Republic of Tanzania3, the Court had dealt with the issue of reasonable time in adjudicating cases in
2

Beneficiaries of late Norbert Zongo, Abdoulaye Nikiema alias Ablasse, Ernest Zongo, Blaise Ilboudo and Mouvement Burkinabe

des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 219.be des Droits de l’Homme et des Peuples v. Burkina
Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 219.
3
Armand Guehi v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (2018) 2 AfCLR 477.
8

domestic courts; and set out a general benchmark of assessment on a case-by-case basis with a wide range of
factors to be considered including the situation of the applicants, the duty of judicial authorities of the Respondent
State to act in an expedited manner, and circumstances of the case at hand.4
One such leading case is that of the Guehi v. Tanzania where the Applicant had remained in custody for one (1)
year, ten (10) months and six (6) days, during the investigation of his trial for murder, due to errors in proceedings.
The Court found that in circumstances where the Applicant was in custody and did not impede the process, the
Respondent State bore an obligation to ensure that the matter was handled with due diligence and expeditiously.
Moreover, the Court noted that the delay was not caused by the complexity of the case. Finally, it noted that even
after charging the Applicant afresh, the Respondent State’s courts adjourned the matter on numerous occasions
and it still took about two (2) years and six (6) months, before the trial actually started and the Court therefore
decided that the length of the proceedings cannot be considered as reasonable5.
In the Rajabu case, the Court examined the allegation against the complexity of the matter and the behaviour
of the Parties. On the first factor, the Court considered that the delay related to a review process which only
involved the Court of Appeal examining issues that had been adjudicated twice by the High Court and the Court
of Appeal itself, both in fact and in law, and therefore did not require so much time for completion.6 The Court thus
found that the complexity of the case was not a determinant in assessing reasonableness7.
On the second factor, that is the Parties’ behaviour, the Court stated the issue as being that of who was responsible
for the delay of the review proceedings. The Court first found that the Applicants did not provide the required
documentation on time and did not prove failure and lack of due diligence on the part of the Respondent State.
8
Considering that the review was completed within a year of the filing of the proper documents, the Court found
that the Court of Appeal needed some minimum time to give an ultimate ruling in a case of death penalty; and
also that scheduling constraints in the domestic judicial system should be considered9.
The Court therefore found that the Respondent State did not violate the Applicants’ right to be heard within a
reasonable time protected under Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter.
ii. Mandatory imposition of death penalty constitutes “arbitrary” deprivation of life, in
breach of fairness and due process, as it takes away the inherent discretion of the judicial
officer, Article 4 of the Charter (joint reading with Articles 7(1) and 26 of the Charter)
The Applicants alleged that by providing in Section 197 of its Penal Code for the mandatory imposition of the
death penalty, the Respondent State violated their right to life. The Respondent State submitted that the provision
for the death penalty in its laws is in line with international norms, which do not prohibit the imposition of that
sentence.
The Court first set out that being raised as a violation of Article 4 of the Charter, the Applicants’ claim pertained
to whether the mandatory imposition of the death penalty under Section 197 of the Tanzanian Penal Code
constituted an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life10. On the arbitrary nature of the imposition of the death
penalty, the Court relied on the jurisprudence of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights to
4
See Guehi (merits and reparations), §§ 122-124. See also Alex Thomas v. Tanzanie (merits) (2015) 1 AfCLR 465, § 104; Wilfred
Onyango Nganyi and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2016) 1 AfCLR 507, § 155; and Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina
Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 219, §§ 92-97, 152.
5
See Guehi, idem.
6
Ally Rajabu and Others v. United Republic of Tanzania, AfCHPR, Application No. 007/2015, Judgment of 28 November 2019
(merits and reparations), § 67.
Ibid.
7
8
Ibid., §§ 68-71.
9
Ibid., § 72.
10
Ibid., §§ 96-97.
9

establish three criteria for assessment: first, the sentence must be provided for by law; second, it must be
imposed by a competent court; and finally, it must abide by due process11.
Having established that the death penalty is provided for in the Respondent State’s Penal Code; and that both
the High Court and Court of Appeal were competent to impose the sentence, the Court proceeded to examine
whether the imposition as provided was in compliance with due process. On that point, the Court referred to
a joint reading of Articles 1, 7(1) and 26 of the African Charter to find that due process encompasses not only
procedural rights but also any rights related to the sentencing process, especially the discretion of courts to
take into account particular circumstances of the accused12. The Court found that mandatory imposition of the
death penalty is automatic and mechanical as applied by the High Court in the case of the Applicants;13 that
as such the provision of the sentence and its imposition do not permit consideration of mitigating evidence;
applies to accused persons without distinction; takes away the discretion inherent in the judicial officer; and does
not consider proportionality between the facts and the penalty14. The Court found as a consequence that the
mandatory provision and imposition of the death sentence under the Respondent State’s Penal Code does not
uphold fairness and due process as guaranteed under Article 7(1) of the Charter15.
In light of this finding, the Court further found that lack of mention of the death penalty in Article 4 of the Charter
and the strongly worded provision for the right to life therein are to the effect that the failure of the mandatory
death sentence to pass the test of fairness renders the mandatory death penalty conflicting with the right to
life under Article 4.16 Against the abolition of the death penalty in some circumstances by the Second Optional
Protocol to the ICCPR; the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; the Maputo Protocol and
Women’s Rights in Africa,17 the Court held that the mandatory death sentence for murder in Section 197 of the
Tanzanian Penal Code constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of the right to life and therefore that the Respondent
State has violated Article 4 of the Charter18.
iii. Execution of the death sentence by hanging is a breach of the right to dignity as
a consequence of the arbitrary imposition of the sentence, Article 5 of the Charter
The Applicants alleged that the execution of the death penalty by hanging violates the right to dignity. The
Respondent State submitted that the death penalty is not abolished in international law.
The Court found that methods of implementing the death penalty amount to torture; and inhuman and degrading
treatment given the suffering inherent thereto; that due to the arbitrary nature of the mandatory imposition of
the death penalty, its execution by hanging is consequently and inevitably in violation of the right to dignity in
respect of the prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment19. The Court therefore found that the
Respondent State has violated Article 5 of the Charter.

11
See lnterights and Others (on behalf of Bosch) v. Botswana, §§ 42-48. See lntemational Pen and Others (on
behalf of Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria, Communications 137/94, 139/94, 154/96, 161/97 (2000) AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998), §§
1-10, § 103. See Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, Communication 223/98 (2000) AHRLR 293 (ACHPR 2000), § 20.
12
Rajabu, op. cit., § 107
13
Ibid., § 108
14
Ibid., § 109
15
Ibid., § 111.
16
Ibid., § 112.
17
See Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (which has authority in customary international law, and has inspired
subsequent binding international human rights instruments); Articles 1 and 2 of the Second Optional Protocol to the lnternational Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (which abolishes the death penalty in peacetime), Articles 5(3) and 30(e) of the African Charter on the Rights
and Welfare of the Child, and 4(2)(j) of Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa
(both instruments place restrictions on the application of the death penalty).
18
Rajabu, op. cit., § 114.
19
Ibid., §§ 118-119.
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The African Court has developed a consistent case law on the breach of Article 1 of the Charter as a result of a
violation of any substantive provision of the Charter. The Court has stressed in particular the two-fold aspect of
the obligation arising from Article 1 that is an obligation of both means and result20.
In the Rajabu case, the Applicants alleged that by not amending its law to remove the mandatory death sentence,
the Respondent State had allowed its courts to impose the sentence, therefore violating its obligation in Article 1
of the Charter to give effect to the right to life protected in Article 4 of the Charter. The Respondent State averred
that the death sentence is allowed in international law.
The Court restated its case law that violations of substantive provisions of the Charter will amount to a consequent
violation of Article 1. The Court found that, the Respondent State having enacted its Penal Code or amended it
subsequent to the entry into force of the African Charter, the Respondent State was under the duty to bring the
Code in line with the Charter upon ratification.21 The Court therefore found that the failure to do so and its finding
of violations of Article 4 and 5 of the Charter amount to a violation of Article 1.
v. The mandatory imposition of the death penalty inherently causes moral prejudice, which
warrants reparations even when the sentence is not carried out, Article 27 of the Protocol
The Applicants prayed the Court to grant them damages for the moral prejudice that ensued from their trial and
imprisonment. The Court dismissed the prayer on the ground that it did not make any finding to the effect that
their incarceration was unlawful. 22
The Court made the same finding with respect to anguish due to trial and imprisonment. However, in light of its
finding that the mandatory imposition of the death penalty violates the right to life, the Court found that since
moral prejudice is presumed in cases of human rights violation23; the mandatory imposition of the death penalty
caused moral prejudice; particularly since the death penalty is one of the most severe punishment with the
gravest psychological consequences as the sentenced persons are bound to lose their ultimate entitlement that
is life;24 that the prejudice was effective from the date of the judgment of the High Court sentencing the Applicants
to death; that eight (8) years elapsed until the present Judgment25; that the waiting added to the psychological
tension experienced by the Applicants who lived for that long with the uncertainty as to when they would be
executed.26
As a consequence of these findings, the Court awarded each of the Applicants the amount of Tanzanian Shillings
Four Million (TZS 4,000,000) as moral damages.
vi. Reparation should be limited to the mandatory nature of the death penalty and translate into
setting aside and substituting the sentence, Article 27 of the Protocol
The Applicants prayed the Court to quash their conviction, set aside the sentence and order their release. The
Court dismissed the prayers for the conviction to be quashed on the ground that its findings did not affect the
20
See Guehi, op. cit., §§ 149-150. See also Kennedy Owino Onyachi and Another v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2017)
2 AfCLR 65, §§ 158-159; Thomas, op. cit., § 135.
21
Rajabu, op. cit., §§ 124-125.
22
Ibid., § 145
23
Ibid., §§ 146.
24
Ibid., § 147.
25
Ibid., § 148.
26
Idem.
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Applicants’ conviction27.
With respect to the prayer that the sentence should be set aside, the Court found that, given its finding that the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty violated the right to life protected in Article 4 of the Charter; however,
in light of its further finding that its decision in the present Judgment did not affect the Applicants’ conviction, their
sentencing is affected only to the extent of the mandatory nature of the penalty, therefore a remedy is warranted
only in so far as their sentence is concerned28.
The Court therefore ordered the Respondent State to set aside the sentence and replace it with any other
sentence that it will deem appropriate within its internal processes. This order is to be implemented within one
(1) year of the notification of the Judgment.
The Court dismissed the Applicants’ prayer for release on the same ground stated above in relation to the
prayers for the conviction to be quashed29.
vii. Guarantee of non-repetition in a case of mandatory imposition of the death penalty requires a
systemic measure, Article 27 of the Protocol
The Applicants prayed the Court to order the Respondent State to guarantee non-repetition of the violations. The
Court found that its finding that the death penalty meted against the Applicants should be set aside amounts to
a guarantee of non-repetition since it will inevitably require a change in the law30.
The Court therefore made a consequential order that the Respondent State undertakes the necessary measures
to repeal from its Penal Code the provision for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty in cases of murder.
This order is to be implemented within one (1) year of the notification of the Judgment31.
viii.
Publication of a judgment is warranted where the pronouncement is systemic in nature
and involves the right to life as a supreme right in the Charter, Article 4 of the Charter, Article 27 of
the Protocol
Although the Applicants did not pray for the publication of the Judgment, the Court recalled that it can order
publication suo motu where it deems this necessary.32 The Court found that the violation of the right to life by
provision for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty is established beyond the case of the Applicants; and
is therefore systemic in nature;33 that the finding bears on a supreme right in the Charter that is life; that an order
for publication is therefore warranted for these reasons.34
The Court therefore ordered the Respondent State to publish the Judgment on the websites of the Judiciary and
the Ministry of Constitutional and Legal Affairs and avail it for at least one (1) year after the date of publication.
This order is to be implemented within three (3) months of the notification of the Judgment.
Justice Blaise Tchikaya appended a separate opinion to this judgment. In his opinion, he took the view that
the distinction adopted by the Court between the death penalty and the mandatory death penalty is irrelevant,
27
Ibid., § 156-160.
28
Ibid., § 158.
29
Ibid., § 159.
30
Ibid., § 163.
31
Idem.
32
See Guehi, op. cit., § 194; Reverend Christopher R. Mtikila v. United Republic of Tanzania (reparations) (2014) 1 AfCLR 72, §§
45 and 46(5); and Norbert Zongo and Others v. Burkina Faso (reparations) (2015) 1 AfCLR 258, § 98.
33
Rajabu, op. cit., § 166.
34
Idem.
12

relative and insufficient. He advances that such a distinction sounds like there is higher death penalty, which
would apply to higher offences. In the opinion of the Judge, a single regime should apply to both the mandatory
and non-mandatory death penalties because the current state of international law does not distinguish between
the two types of death penalties. He invokes the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and Protocol 13 to the
European Convention on Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and takes the view that the African Court adopted
a restrictive reading of Article 4 of the African Charter, which provides for the right to life.
The Judge advances that the African Court should have sufficiently considered the “quasi total trend against
the death penalty” in Africa as exemplified by over twenty (20) countries being de facto abolitionist and many
others having moratorium in force. Furthermore, Article 4 of the Charter which proclaims an absolute right to life
does not make any mention of the death penalty. The Judge took the opinion that, therefore, by ordering the
Respondent State to take remedial measures only with respect to the mandatory death penalty leaves loopholes
for a breach of an absolute right to life under Article 4 of the Charter.

Right to legal personality and nationality (article 5 of the African Charter)
Robert John Penessis v. United Republic of Tanzania
Application No. 013/2015
Judgment of 28 November 2019

1.

Facts

The Applicant, Robert John Penessis, is an individual who claimed to be a Tanzanian citizen. On 8 January
2010, he was arrested and subjected to legal proceedings for illegal entry and presence in the territory of the
Respondent State. He was subsequently sentenced on 17 January 2011, to a fine of Eighty Thousand Tanzanian
Shillings (TZS 80,000) or, in default, to two (2) years in prison, a sentence subsequently upheld by both the High
Court and the Court of Appeal of the Respondent State. The Applicant maintained that he is Tanzanian by birth
just like his parents.

2.

Alleged violations

The Applicant alleged that the Respondent State violated his right to nationality, his right to freedom of movement
and his right not to be unlawfully detained which are all protected by the Tanzanian Constitution, Article 59(1)
of the Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Convention and Articles 1 to 4 of the 1949 Geneva Convention. He
further alleged the violation of Articles 1 and 12(1) and (2) of the African Charter.

3.

Submissions of the Parties and finding of the Court
i. An application filed by means of a simple letter is admissible so long as it contains sufficient
information for its processing and examination

The Respondent State argued that the document originally filed by the Applicant is not an Application within the
meaning of the Protocol as it was a mere letter from the Applicant’s grandmother, Georgia J Penessis to the
Court, asking for directions as to how to pursue her complaints; that it did not contain all the requirements of a
standard Application and especially that since it did not contain any undertaking to pursue the matter before the
Court, it was incomplete and thus the Court has no jurisdiction to admit or hear this Application.
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The Applicant disputed the Respondent State’s assertion and argued that the grievances raised by his
grandmother and the information given in the letter have the force of an application because all the
necessary information is contained therein.
The Court at the outset noted that the question of the form of the letter and its content relate to the issue
of admissibility and not of jurisdiction. On this basis, the Court observed that in so far as the form or
modality of seizure is concerned, it has adopted a flexible approach in its previous jurisprudence. ln this
regard, it recalled the case of Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania35, where it decided
to admit an application filed via email and communicated as such. According to the Court, the question
of whether a particular application qualifies as a proper one depends on the specific conditions of each
applicant and the circumstances surrounding its filing. In this regard, the most important thing is that the
application offers sufficient details to the Respondent State to understand the content of the Applicant’s
grievances and for the Court to consider the matter. On this basis, the Court found that the letter sent
by the Applicant’s grandmother fulfilled the requirements of an application.
ii. Nationality is an implied right from the right to “recognition of legal status”, Article 5 of the Charter
Here is the fundamental issue arising in this case, for the first time the Court determined that there is a right to
nationality under Article 5 of the Charter even though the said provision does not expressly provide for the right.
This finding of the Court constitutes a new development but also a departure from its precedent in the Anudo
case36.
It is worth noting that the Court mainly drew from the interpretation previously adopted by the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights in the matter of Open Society Justice Initiative v. Côte d’Ivoire37. The Court’s
pronouncement in Penessis is aligned to a law development based on recent consensus within the African
Union on the right to nationality38.
iii. The evidentiary standard of “he who alleges bears the onus of proof” applies in context in
establishing nationality – onus is borne by both parties where evidence is likely to be controlled by
Respondent State, general principle of law
On the onus of proof, the Court noted that the general rule is that anyone who alleges a fact shall prove it.
However, recalling its jurisprudence in the matter of Kennedy Owino and Another v. Tanzania39, the Court
observed that this rule cannot be applied rigidly in human rights cases, especially when “the means to verify the
allegation are likely to be controlled by the State”. It held that, in such instances, the onus of proof should be
borne by both parties.
In view of this, the Court observed that the Applicant who alleges that he holds a certain nationality bears the
onus of proof. Once he has discharged the duty prima facie, the burden shifts to the Respondent State to prove
otherwise. In determining nationality, a person whose nationality is being questioned only needs to provide a
minimum level of justification of a link with the concerned State. Once this is done, it is incumbent on the latter to
prove the contrary beyond reasonable doubt, failing which, a link of nationality is presumably established.
35
Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 248.
36
Idem.
37
Communication 318/06, Open Society Justice Initiative v. Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, §§ 95-97
38
See Draft Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Specific Aspects of the Right to Nationality and
the Eradication of Statelessness in Africa https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/35139-wd-pa22527_e_originalexplanatory_memorandum.pdf (accessed 12 August 2020).
39
Kennedy Owino Onyachi & Charles John Mwanini Njoka v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 65.
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Relying on these principles, the Court noted that the Applicant provided a copy of his birth certificate showing
that he was born in Tanzania and an emergency temporary travel document was issued to him, pending issuance
of his passport. These two documents were provided by the authorities of the Respondent State. The Court
observed that, according to the Respondent State’s 1995 Citizenship Act, at the time of the Applicant’s birth, that
is, 1968, a person could acquire Tanzanian nationality by birth if that person was born in the United Republic of
Tanzania after Union Day, provided either of his parents is Tanzanian.
In this vein, the Court observed that Anastasia Pennesis who claimed to be the Applicant’s mother appeared
before the Court and testified that her son, the Applicant, was born in Buguma Estate, Tanzania, in 1968, where
the family has property. The Court further noted that the same name of Anastasia Penessis is on the copy of the
birth certificate indicated as the mother of the Applicant and recognized as Tanzanian. This, and the fact that the
birth certificate clearly shows that the Applicant was born in Tanzania, in the opinion of the Court, established a
presumption that the Applicant is a Tanzanian by birth and it was for the Respondent State to refute this presumption.
The Court then proceeded to examine the Respondent State’s contention that the said birth certificate was
fraudulent and that the Applicant had British and South African passports, which the Respondent State adduced
copies thereof. The Court noted that these passports bore different names and the Respondent State did not
provide compelling evidence to substantiate its averment that both passports belong to the Applicant. The Court
also noted that the Applicant refused to acknowledge those passports as his.
The Court observed that all the documents tendered by the Parties are copies or certified copies and that neither
of them adduced original documents. In the circumstances, the Court held that the Respondent State, as a
depositary and guarantor of public authority and custodian of the civil status registry, had the necessary means
to correctly establish whether the Applicant was a Tanzanian, South African or a British citizen. The Respondent
State could also have obtained and produced concrete evidence but which it failed to, to support its assertion that
the Applicant held other nationalities, which, according to Tanzanian law, would have meant that the Applicant
had renounced his Tanzanian nationality. In view of this, the Court concluded that that the Applicant’s right to
Tanzanian nationality has been violated, contrary to Article 5 of the Charter and Article 15 of UDHR.
iv. The breach of the right to liberty is consequential to that of the right to nationality and to resident
status, Article 6 of the Charter
On the Applicant’s allegation that the Respondent State violated his right to liberty by unlawfully imprisoning him,
the Court noted that the Applicant was initially detained on the basis of the Respondent State’s criminal laws
for having allegedly entered and stayed in its territory unlawfully. The Applicant’s conviction for the same was
premised on the assumption that he was not a Tanzanian national.
However, the Court recalling its earlier finding that the Respondent State has not provided evidence to
substantiate that the Applicant is not a Tanzanian before or at the time of his arrest or conviction, it held that
his arrest, conviction and detention were unlawful. The Court stressed that the Applicant remained in prison
notwithstanding that he fully served the two (2) years’ imprisonment from by 2012 in default of the fine to be paid
following his conviction. The Court also emphasised that his alleged refusal to cooperate for the purpose of his
expulsion is not a reasonable justification for the Respondent State continuing to keep him in prison indefinitely.
Accordingly, the Court held that the Applicant’s arrest and indefinite detention on the ground that he was not a
national of Tanzania was a violation his right to liberty. As the Applicant was presumably a Tanzanian by birth,
restriction of his liberty on such ground was not compatible with Article 6 of the Charter.
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v. Freedom of movement is breached as a consequence of the established violation of the rights to
liberty and nationality, Article 12 of the Charter
The Applicant asserted that as a national of the Respondent State, he was entitled to fully enjoy his rights and
should not have been arrested or unlawfully detained. He averred further that his conviction and sentence to two
(2) years in prison, that is, from 2010 to 2012 and his continued detention to this date, are illegal and in violation
of his right to freedom of movement protected under Article 12 of the African Charter.
The Court, applying the same reasoning it used to find a violation of the Applicant’s right to liberty, noted that
the Applicant is presumed to be a national of the Respondent State and as such, was considered to have
been “lawfully present” in the territory of the Respondent state within the terms of Article 12 of the Charter.
Consequently, the Applicant had the right to exercise his right to freedom of movement and his arrest, conviction,
sentencing, imprisonment and subsequent continued detention even after having served the two (2) years prison
sentence were unjustified and thus, contravene the Applicant’s right to freedom of movement.
vi. Moral prejudice is presumed and warrants damages where breach of liberty is established as a
consequence of deprivation of nationality
The Court noted that Article 27(1) of the Protocol provides that “If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of a human and peoples’ rights, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation, including the payment
of fair compensation or reparation”.
The Court derives its power to grant reparations from Article 27(1) of the Protocol. While the Court requires
documentary evidence in support of claims for material prejudice, it has used its long standing precedent that
moral prejudice is presumed once a human rights violation is established.
The Applicant contended that having been illegally detained for a period of one hundred and two (102) months,
he requested United States Dollars one hundred and thirteen thousand three hundred and thirty-three dollars
(US$113,333) for moral damages.
The Respondent State, for its part, contended that a link between the alleged violation and the prejudice suffered
must be established and that the Applicant bears the burden of proof in this regard.
The Court observed that the Applicant‘s illegal detention since 2010 not only a breached his right to liberty
and freedom of movement but also undoubtedly disrupted his normal life and jeopardized his social status;
thereby, causing the Applicant serious physical deterioration and moral anguish. This according to the Court
was warranted granting the Applicant’s prayer for reparation pursuant to Article 27(1) of the Protocol for the moral
prejudice suffered during his illegal detention. The Court thus, awarded him the amount of ten million Tanzanian
Shillings (TZS 10,000,000) as fair compensation for the moral damage he suffered from 2012 to the date of
the judgment, and three hundred thousand Tanzanian Shillings (TZS 300,000) for every month he remains in
detention after the judgment is notified to the Respondent State until the date he is released.
vii. Prejudice to close family members is presumed as indirect victims and warrants an award for
moral damages
The Applicant also indicated that his mother suffered as an indirect victim as a result of her son’s absence on
account of the unlawful detention and accordingly, requested the Court to grant United States Dollars two hundred
and sixty-one thousand one hundred and eleven dollars (US$261,111) to his mother, Anastasia Penessis, as an
indirect victim.
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For the Respondent State, the Applicant did not provide any evidence of a relationship between him and any
indirect victim, and also did not provide any evidence showing that indirect victims suffered as a result of his
detention.
The Court observed that according to its established jurisprudence, members of an Applicant’s family who
suffered either physically or psychologically from the prejudice suffered by the victim are also considered as
“victims” and may also be entitled to reparation.
The Court noted that in the natural order of family relationships, it is reasonable to presume that a mother
would suffer psychologically as a result of the [unlawful] arrest and [unlawful] long detention of her son. The
Applicant’s unlawful and prolonged detention presumably had adverse consequences on his mother’s social and
psychological condition. Accordingly, the Court granted the Applicant’s prayers for reparation for his mother as an
indirect victim and awarded her Tanzanian Shillings Five Million (TZS 5,000,000) as moral damages.
viii.
Undue and excessive detention as a consequence of breach of nationality, and liberty
constitutes “exceptional circumstances” which requires no proof and warrants immediate release
Citing the unlawful nature of his detention, the Applicant prayed the Court to order his release. The Respondent
State submitted that the Applicant’s detention was in accordance with the law as it was based on a Court Order
and an expulsion Order issued by the competent authority.
The Court indicated that a measure such as the release of the Applicant may be ordered only in exceptional
or compelling circumstances. ln the instant case, the Court noted that the fact that the Applicant was still in
detention more than six (6) years after the end of his prison term is not disputed by the Respondent State. For
the Court, this unlawful detention constituted proof of the existence of compelling circumstances. As a result, it
granted the Applicant’s request and ordered the Respondent State to immediately release him from prison.
This position of the Court builds on its precedent in the case of Alex Thomas v. Tanzania40. The Court developed
its precedent further as it is applied in circumstances where due to the breach of the right to nationality, and liberty
are the constitutive elements of “exceptional circumstances” and detention could be remedied only by immediately
releasing the Applicant from prison. In this regard, it underlined that the existence of such circumstances must
be determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account mainly the proportionality between the reparation
sought and the extent of the violation established.

Right to be tried by an impartial tribunal, Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter
Alfred Agbesi Woyome v. Republic of Ghana
Application No. 001/2017
Judgment of 28 June 2019 (Merits and Reparations)

1.

Facts

The Applicant, Alfred Agbesi Woyome, is a national of the Republic of Ghana. He is also a business man, a Board
chairman and Director in three (3) companies, namely, Waterville Holding (BVl) company, Austro-lnvestment
Company and M-Powapak Gmb Company.
The Application arose arising from engineering financial services the Applicant alleged to have provided to the
40

Thomas (merits) op. cit., § 157; Mgosi Mwita Makungu v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2018) 2 AfCLR 550, § 84.
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Respondent State pursuant to an agreement for securing funds for the rehabilitation of the Accra and Kumasi
Sports Stadia for the Confederation of the African Cup of Nations Tournament of 2008. According to the Applicant,
the Respondent State did not abide by the terms of the agreement regarding the services to be provided and
his attempts to have his rights upheld in domestic courts led the latter to further allege violations his rights
guaranteed in the Charter.

2.

Alleged violations

The Applicant alleged that the Review Bench of the Supreme Court of the Respondent State, violated his rights
protected by the Charter namely: the Right to non-discrimination, guaranteed under Article 2, the right to equality
before the law and equal protection of the law, guaranteed under Article 3; and the right to have one’s cause
heard, guaranteed under Article 7.
With respect in particular to the right to be tried by a competent tribunal, the Applicant alleged the violation of the
right to be heard by a competent tribunal occasioned by the Review Bench of the Supreme Court not referring the
matter back to High Court as ordered by the Ordinary Bench of the Supreme Court. The Applicant further alleged
the violation of his right to be tried by an impartial tribunal on two grounds namely: a) Whether the participation
of eight Judges at both the Ordinary and Review Benches cast doubt on the impartiality of the Supreme Court
and; b) Whether some remarks made by a Judge (Justice Samuel Dotse) in a Concurring Opinion to a decision
delivered by the Ordinary Bench and his subsequent participation in a Review Bench that considered the matter
called into question the impartiality of the whole Review Bench of the Supreme Court. Finally, he alleged that
his rights to non-discrimination and to equality before the law and equal protection of the Iaw were violated as
a result of Justice Dotse’s remarks and by the Supreme Court truncating the proceedings and not referring the
matter to the High Court.
This judgment is important since it is the first time the Court was explicitly considering the issue of the impartiality
regarding judicial officers and judicial bodies within the meaning of Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter.

3.

Submissions of the Parties and findings of the Court
i. Composition of the Bench, taken alone, does not cast reasonable doubt on impartiality of the
Supreme Court, Article 7(1) of the Charter

The Court dealt with the novel issue of right to be tried by a competent tribunal and the right to be heard by an
impartial tribunal as provided under Article 7 of the Charter.
The Court determined whether the Applicant’s right to be heard by a competent tribunal was violated as a result
of the decision of the Review Bench of the Supreme Court hearing the matter rather than referring it to the High
Court and held that the Applicant’s right to be heard by a competent tribunal, guaranteed under Article 7(1) of the
Charter was not violated by the Respondent State. On the latter, the Court examined two aspects of the right to
be tried by an impartial Court namely:
i.
Whether the participation of eight judges at both the Ordinary and Review Benches cast doubt
on the impartiality of the Supreme Court and;
ii.
Whether the remarks made by Justice Dotse called into question the impartiality of the Review
Bench of the Supreme Court.
The Court determined whether the composition of the Review Bench, the majority members who were also
part of the Ordinary Bench, cast doubt on the impartiality of the Review Bench to the extent that one could not
reasonably expect a fair decision. It held that the mere fact that a judge or some of the judges participated in the
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proceedings at the Ordinary Bench did not necessarily imply the absence of impartiality even if this may give rise
to an apprehension on the side of one of the parties.
The Court noted the provisions of the Constitution of Ghana, together with the practice and jurisprudence, on the
composition of a Bench for a review process and observed that judges of the Supreme Court who were part of
the Ordinary Bench may form part of the Review Bench as long as the criteria for the minimum number of Judges
for a Review Bench is observed. The Court further held that there is a presumption of impartiality of judges and
of courts and he who alleges that a Judge or a Court is not impartial bears the onus of proof and must provide
evidence in that regard. After examining the composition of the Review Bench, the Court found that there was no
irregularity or a breach of law in so far as the composition of the Review Bench was concerned. The Court held
that the fact that a number of Judges were empanelled on the Ordinary Bench and subsequently on the Review
Bench of the Supreme Court to hear the matter did not raise any reasonable doubt per se as to the impartiality
of the Review Bench.
On the personal bias of judges, the Court noted that there was no evidence on record showing that the judges
on the Review Bench were predisposed or had preconceived bias against the Applicant, which would lead to a
reasonable conclusion that they would not render a fair decision. ln fact, the Ordinary Bench unanimously rendered
the decision, which was interpreted by the Applicant to be in his favour, that his matter should be examined by the
High Court. These same Judges subsequently sat on the Review Bench. Therefore, the Applicant’s contention
that the Review Bench was partial is based on a misapprehension that was neither justified nor objective.
The Court concluded that the composition of the Review Bench of the Supreme Court by judges who were part
of the Ordinary Bench does not call into question the impartiality of the Review Bench.
In the matter of Ingabire Victoire Uhumoza v. Republic of Republic of Rwanda41, the Court examined the Applicants
allegation that her right to be tried by a neutral and impartial court under Article 7 of the right to a fair trial was
violated. The Applicant contended that the fact that the Judges of the Supreme Court and the High Court did not
react to the national prosecution authorities’ intimidation of a defence witness, in the person of one Habimana
Michel, and also that the Court considered the said acts of intimidation as having had no impact on the content
of the witness’s testimony, is proof of their partiality. The Applicant further argued that, at the Supreme Court, her
counsel mounted a strong protest denouncing the abuses and excesses of the prosecution authorities vis-à-vis
a defence witness. The Respondent State submitted that this allegation was unfounded, since all the guarantees
provided by law had been observed. The Court dismissed this allegation on the ground that, the Applicant had
not adduced sufficient evidence to support the claim42.
The difference between the Woyome and Ingabire cases is that in Woyome, the Court was able to assess the
Applicant’s allegations on the right to be heard by a competent tribunal based on the evidence adduced. The
Court considered whether the remarks of a single judge made in a concurring opinion called into question his
impartiality and whether this action marred the impartiality of the entire review bench at which the judge also sat.
In doing so the Court was able to develop its jurisprudence for the first time on this issue.
ii. Public statement (remarks) by a sitting Judge alone cannot call into question the impartiality of
the entire bench, unless proven beyond objective assessment of facts, or by the Applicant
On the remarks made by Justice Dotse allegedly calling into question the impartiality of the entire Review Bench,
the Court held that although the statement were unfortunate, and went beyond what can be considered as an
appropriate judicial comment it however did not give an impression of the judge’s preconceived opinions and
41
(merits) (2017) 2 AfCLR 165.
42
Alfres Agbesi Woyome v. Republic of Ghana, AfCHPR, Application No. 001/2017, Judgment of 28 June 2019 (merits and reparations), § 100-105
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did not reveal bias.43 The Court found that the remarks were made by the judge based on his assessment of
the facts of the matter. The Court was also of the opinion that a single judge’s remarks cannot be considered
sufficient to taint the entire Bench. Furthermore, the Applicant did not illustrate how the judge’s statements later
influenced the decision of the Review Bench. The Court concluded that the Respondent State has not violated
the Applicant’s right to be heard by an impartial tribunal guaranteed under Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter.
Judges Gérard Niyungeko dissented on this position. Justice Niyungeko was of the opinion that the Court should
have found that there has been a violation in this respect, not only because of the perception of the judge’s
partiality in the circumstances but also because of the perceived partiality on the whole Review Bench of which
he was a member. ln any event, what is at stake is not the actual partiality of the Judge - which is not established
in this case - but the perception of bias that his words may have generated in the eyes not only of the party
concerned, but also of any reasonable observer44. He concluded that the court should have found a violation of
the Applicant’s right to be heard by an impartial court within the meaning of Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter.
With regard to the issue of the impartiality of the Supreme Court sitting as the Review Bench, Justice Niyungeko
argued that what is at issue is not the impartiality of all the other Judges, rather the perception of impartiality of
the Bench of the Court arising from the perception of partiality of one of its members. lt is generally accepted that
the perception of partiality of a member of a court will also affect indirectly the perception of impartiality of the
Bench in its entirety. He argued that it follows from this principle that, where a judge has expressed an opinion
that might influence decision-making by the judicial body, this possess a problem of impartiality, not just of the
judge concerned, but of the judicial body as a whole.
He concluded that the Court should have found that the Applicant’s right to be tried by an impartial tribunal within
the meaning of Article 7(1) (d) of the Charter had been violated and the Applicant should have been awarded
reparations in connection to the violations established.

Freedom of movement, Article 12 of the Charter – Right to political
participation, Article 13 of the Charter – in relation to the arbitrary
revocation of passport
Kennedy Gihana & Others v. Republic of Rwanda
Application No. 017/2015
Judgment of 28 November 2019

1.

Facts

Messrs Kennedy Alfred Nurudiin Gihana (First Applicant), Kayumba Nyamwasa (Second Applicant), Bamporiki
Abdallah Seif (Third Applicant), Frank Ntwali (Fourth Applicant), Safari Stanley (Fifth Applicant), Dr. Etienne
Mutabazi (Sixth Applicant) and Epimaque Ntamushobora (Seventh Applicant), all of Rwandese origin were
residing in the Republic of South Africa when they filed the Application against the Respondent State. They had
learnt of the invalidation, by the Respondent State, of their passports and those of other Rwandan nationals
when one of them was informed upon applying for a visa to travel to the United States of America, that his name
appeared on a list of 14 May 2012, indicating the invalidity of the passports held by all persons included on the
said list. The Applicants were neither officially notified of the invalidation of their passports by the Respondent
state nor given the opportunity to appeal against the decision on the invalidation45.
43
Ibid, § 129.
44
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Gérard Niyungeko in the Woyome Judgment on the merits and reparations, §§ 7-13.
45
Kennedy Gihana & Others v. Republic of Rwanda, AfCHPR, Application No. 017/2015, Judgment of 28 November 2019 (merits
and reparations), §§ 1-4.
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2.

Alleged violations

The Applicants alleged that the invalidation of their passports was an arbitrary deprivation of their nationality, it
had rendered them stateless and had a significant impact on the enjoyment of a number of universally accepted
fundamental human rights specifically, the right to: (i) participation in political life; (ii) freedom of movement; (iii)
citizenship; (iv) liberty; (v) family life; and (vi) work46.

3.

Submissions of Parties and findings of the Court

This judgment builds on the jurisprudence of the Court on the rights not to be arbitrarily deprived of one’s
nationality in the matters of Anudo Ochieng Anudo v. United Republic of Tanzania47 and Robert John Penessis
v. United Republic of Tanzania48; and the right to political participation in the cases of Rev. Christopher R. Mtikila
and Tanganyika Law Society and Legal and Human Rights Centre v. United Republic of Tanzania49 and APDH
v. Republic of Côte d’Ivoire50.
i. Personal jurisdiction of the Court is not ousted by alleged criminal status of the Applicants –
genocide convicts – as long as rights in the Charter are invoked, Article 3 of the Protocol
The Respondent State raised an objection that the Court lacked personal jurisdiction with regard to Kayumba
Nyamwasa (Second Applicant) and Safari Stanley (Fifth Applicant) because they were convicted in Rwanda for
genocide-related crimes and crimes of threatening state security, respectively.
The Applicants claimed that their convictions had no relevance to the Application and that any person “even if a
convict in a proper court of justice has right of standing to petition”.
The Court developed its jurisprudence as regards personal jurisdiction, by determining that so long as the State
has deposited the Declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the Court to consider applications by individuals, and
it did so without reservation, individuals will have standing before the Court regardless of their status and the
nature of the crimes they are alleged to have committed or to have been convicted of51. The Court therefore,
found that it had personal jurisdiction to deal with the claims by all seven (7) Applicants.
ii. Reference to other unidentified persons in the Application does not render the Application
inadmissible in respect identified Applicants, Article 56(1) of the Charter
The Respondent State argued that the Application should be declared inadmissible because it did not meet the
requirement of Article 56(1) of the Charter and Rule 40(1) of the Rules on the identification of the Applicants. It also
argued that the Application is inadmissible because the Applicants state that the passports of other “unidentified”
Rwandans were also invalidated.
The Court noted that the Application had been filed by seven (7) Applicants, Kennedy Alfred Nurudiin Gihana,
Kayumba Nyamwasa, Bamporiki Abdallah Seif, Frank Ntwali, Safari Stanley, Dr. Etienne Mutabazi and Epimaque
Ntamushobora, who are clearly identifiable. And that any reference to ‘other Rwandans’ does not negate this fact
as they are not before this Court and are not part of this Application. The Court therefore found that the seven (7)
Applicants were properly identified in accordance with Article 56(1) of the Charter and Rule 40(1) of the Rules.
46
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iii. The alleged criminal status – genocide convict – of the Applicants does not form ground for
determination of “compatibility with the Constitutive Act of the African Union” as it is not the subject
matter of the Application, Article 56(2) of the Charter
The Respondent State averred that the allegations raised in the Application were not compatible with the
Constitutive Act of the African Union because two Applicants were convicted of crimes that are contrary to the
principles set out in Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act as required under Article 56(2) of the Charter and should
therefore be dismissed.
The Court noted that even though, according to the Respondent State the First and Fifth Applicants were alleged
to have been convicted of crimes which touch on some of the principles in Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act as
aforementioned, the Court is not called upon to decide on the legality or otherwise of such conviction.
The Court considered that the provision in Article 56(2) of the Charter addresses the nature of an application
and not the applicant’s status. The prayer for reinstatement of passports does not require the Court to make a
decision that would undermine the principles laid down in Article 4(o) of the Constitutive Act or any part thereof.
On the contrary, this would be in accordance with the Court’s obligation to protect the rights allegedly violated as
it required to do, in accordance with Article 3(h) of the Constitutive Act.
iv. Fear for one’s life, and material impossibility to seek legal representation due to non-voluntary
exile form justifiable exemption to exhaust local remedies, Article 56(5) of the Charter
The Respondent State contended that the Application should be dismissed because the Applicants had not
exhausted local remedies. It also argued that Rwandan law does oblige not personal presence in civil matters
and that the Applicants could have mandated a counsel or any other person to file a claim in the domestic courts
on their behalf.
The Court reiterated its holding in the Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina case, that “a remedy can be considered to be
available or accessible when it may be used by the Applicant without impediment”52.
The Court noted that, the Second and Fifth Applicants faced charges of serious crimes and fled from the
Respondent State’s territory. They had indicated that they feared for their security. Furthermore, since all the
Applicants were outside the Respondent State’s territory and their travel documents having been invalidated
without formal notification, it is reasonable, in view of the manner in which the Applicants learnt of the invalidation
of their passports, it was reasonable for them to have been apprehensive about their security and fear for their
lives. The serious nature of the crimes relating to the two Applicants may also have resulted in difficulties in
all the Applicants designating Counsel to file a claim on their behalf before the domestic courts regarding the
invalidation of their passports. In the circumstances of the Applicants’ case the Court therefore finds that the local
remedies were not available for the Applicants to utilize.
v. Revocation of passport does not amount to deprivation of nationality, but may impede full
enjoyment of civic and citizenship rights
On the Applicants’ allegation that the arbitrary revocation of their passports was an arbitrary deprivation of their
nationality,53 after finding that the Respondent State had arbitrarily revoked the Applicants’ passports54, the Court
made a distinction between nationality, which is a status, and a passport;which is one of the forms of proof of
52
53
54

Gihana (merits and reparations), § 96.
Ibid., § 79.
Ibid., § 92.
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nationality.
The Court found that the Respondent State arbitrarily deprived the Applicants of their passports since it did not
offer them an opportunity to be heard before the State’s action in this regard. The Court then determined that
irrespective of the arbitrariness of the revocation of their passports, this cannot be tantamount to revocation,
invalidation or deprivation of their nationality. Such an action may however have a direct consequence in the
exercise of certain rights and freedoms but in itself it does not deprive an individual of the status of being a
national of a particular country nor render him stateless. The Court concluded therefore that the revocation of a
passport was not tantamount to a revocation of nationality, rather it impedes the full and effective enjoyment of
some civic and citizenship rights55.
vi. Arbitrary revocation of passport led to breach of freedom of movement, Article 12(2) of the Charter
and right to political participation, Article 13(1) of the Charter
Having already determined that the revocation of a passport was not tantamount to a revocation of nationality
but rather impeded the full and effective enjoyment of some civic and citizenship rights56, the Court concluded
that the Allegation relating to the Applicants being rendered stateless was moot and consequently dismissed it.
On the Applicants’ allegation relating to violation of the right to freedom of movement,57 the Court determined
that by arbitrarily revoking the Applicants’ passports, the Respondent State deprived them of their traveling
documents and consequently prevented them from returning to their country and traveling from their country of
residence to other countries. The Applicants could therefore not exercise their right to freedom of movement58.
The Applicants’ alleged that the arbitrary revocation of their passports consequently violated their right to freely
participate in the government of their country or their right to political participation59, The Court noted that the
rights set out in Article 13(1) of the Charter are optimally exercised when a State’s citizens are in the territory of
that State and in some instances, they can be exercised outside the territory of that state60. The Court determined
that the arbitrary revocation of the Applicants’ passports prevented them from returning to the Respondent State
thus severely restricting their right to freely participate in the government of their country. This therefore resulted
in a violation of the Applicants’ rights to freely participate in the government of their country or their right to
political participation.
vii. Principle of consequential violation applies where both the main and derived violations are
established
Regarding the allegations of violations of the rights to liberty, work and family life protected under Articles 6, 15
and 18(1) of the Charter respectively, as a consequence of the arbitrary revocation of the Applicants’ passports,
the Court held that the claims were not established and thus dismissed them61.

55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Ibid., §§ 97-98.
Ibid., §§ 97-98
Ibid., § 103
Ibid., §§ 108 and 109.
Ibid., § 110.
Ibid., §§ 114-115.
Ibid., §§ 116-132.
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viii.
Moral prejudice is established where the violations affected the Applicants’ connection
with their country of origin, Article 27(1) of the Protocol
The Court noted that in line with Article 27(1) of the Protocol which provides that “If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of a human and peoples’ rights, it shall make appropriate orders to remedy the violation,
including the payment of fair compensation or reparation”, and having found that the Respondent State violated
the Applicants’ rights to freedom of movement and to freely participate in the government of their country and
that these violations had adversely affected the connections that the Applicants had with their country of origin
and thus caused them emotional anguish and despair, occasioning them moral prejudice, the Court determined
that the Applicants were entitled to reparation.
Consequently, the Court ordered the Respondent State to reinstate the Applicants’ passports within three (3)
months of the notification of the judgment, as a measure of restitution and awarded each Applicant, Rwandan
Francs four hundred and sixty five thousand (RWF 465, 000) as fair compensation for the moral prejudice
suffered.

Right to reparation and loss of future opportunity, general principle
of law, articles 1 and 7 of the African Charter; Article 27 of the Court
Protocol
Sébastien Germain Ajavon v. Republic of Benin
Application No.034 /2017
Judgements on merits (28 March 2019) and reparations (28 November 2019)

1.

Facts

The matter brought before the Court by Sébastien Germain Ajavon against the Republic of Benin arose as
a result of legal proceedings brought against the Applicant by the Respondent State for international drug
trafficking in cocaine. He was tried and released on the benefit of the doubt by the Court of First Instance of
Cotonou in November 2016, and was tried again in October 2018 for the same offence by the Cour de répression
des infractions économiques et du terrorisme (CRIET) - Court for the suppression of economic offences and
terrorism - and sentenced to twenty (20) years’ imprisonment and a fine.

2.

Alleged violations

The Applicant alleged that the judicial proceedings against him caused damage to his property, his honour and
reputation as a businessman and politician. He claimed that all these proceedings violated his right to a fair trial,
in this case the right to be presumed innocent, the right to have his cause heard by a competent court and the
right not to be tried twice in the same matter.

3.

Submissions of the Parties and findings of the Court
i. The political environment and circumstances surrounding the case may render existing local
remedies ineffective or exempt the Applicant from pursuing the remedies, Article 56(5) of the Charter

As regards the Respondent State’s objection to the admissibility of the application for non-exhaustion of local
remedies, the Court first noted that, at the domestic level, “there were several remedies available (appeal to
the Constitutional Court, the remedy provided for in Article 206 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the remedy
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before the administrative courts) which the Applicant could have exhausted”62 before submitting the application.
However, the Court noted that in the context of this case there were several obstacles to the exercise of these
local remedies.
First, the Court considered that the appeal lodged by the Public Prosecutor against the judgement of the Court of
First Instance, which was never notified to the Applicant, had placed him “in a situation of confusion which did not
allow him to exercise the remedy provided for in Article 206 of the Beninese Criminal Procedure Code, which had
consequently become unavailable”63. The Court went on to note that the administrative appeals brought by the
complainant “have not given rise to any judicial decision”. Lastly, it noted that the appeal against the judgement
handed down by CRIET “has never been lodged”. The Court therefore concluded that these particular facts
rendered the local remedies inaccessible and ineffective for the Applicant, who was thus exempted from the
requirement to exhaust them.
Considered as its ability to redress a situation presented by victim, the effectiveness of a remedy has already
been examined by the Court in the Norbert Zongo case. In the latter case, the Court relied on a presumption
of effectiveness (... “no one can doubt a priori ...” the Court said)64, In the Ajavon case, the Court held that the
presumption of effectiveness was not applicable to the situation in question of the Republic of Benin. On the other
hand, the ineffectiveness of the remedies, although existing and available, has been proven and justified through
the three concrete obstacles mentioned above that have prevented the Applicant from exercising domestic
remedies as required by Article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 40(5) of the Rules of Court.
Similarly, in Lohé Issa Konaté, the Court held that while “the five (5) day period available to the Applicant to
make his statement of appeal, however brief, did not constitute an obstacle to the lodging of the appeal”65, the
Applicant could not expect anything from it “in the case of an application for annulment of the laws ... under which
he had been convicted”66, since the appeal only allowed for the annulment of the judgment for misapplication or
misinterpretation of the law, but not for the annulment of the law itself.
Following the case law in Lohé Issa Konaté, the Ajavon judgment of 29 March 2019 is a restatement of the
Court’s case law that the effectiveness of a remedy cannot be presumed, rather it must be based on a textual
(Lohé Issa Konaté) or factual (Ajavon) analysis.
ii. The principle of “non bis in idem” is implied under Article 7(1) of the Charter based on a comparative
interpretation using Article 14(7) of the ICCPR, and Article 3 of the Protocol
In its judgment on the merits of the Ajavon case, the Court ruled on the alleged violation of the principle of non
bis in idem, which is not enshrined in the African Charter. In such circumstances and when the alleged right is not
within the scope of the Charter, the Court applies Articles 3 and 7 of the Protocol, which extend its jurisdiction to
the interpretation and application of any other human rights instrument ratified by the state concerned.
As in several previous cases,67 the Court found, on the one hand, that the proceedings before the CRIET involved
the same parties as those who appeared before the Court of First Instance of Cotonou and, on the other hand, that
the CRIET essentially judged the facts and grievances before the said Court of First Instance, before overturning
“ the judgment in its entirety”. However, the Court went further and held that the term idem of the non bis in idem
62
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Sébastien Germain Ajavon v. Republic of Benin, AfCHPR, Application No. 013/2017, Judgment of 29 March 2019 (merits), §
Ibid., § 113.
Norbert Zongo v. Burkina Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 219, §§ 68 and 69.
Lohé Issa Konaté v. Burkina Faso (merits) (2014) 1 AfCLR 314, § 107.
Ibid., § 111.
Guehi (merits and reparations), § 38. See also Nganyi & 9 Others (merits), §§ 164-167.
25

principle “relates not only to the identity of the parties and the facts68, but also to the authority of res judicata”69. It
is on the basis of this assessment that the Court concluded that the proceedings before CRIET failed to respect
the prohibition of being tried twice for the same facts, guaranteed in Article 14(7) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights to which the Respondent is also a party.
iii. Media propaganda on accusation of drug trafficking tarnished the image and reputation of the
Applicant, causing economic loss, Article 27 of the Protocol
The Court also found that “the media propaganda on the drug trafficking case and the resumption of the trial by
CRIET” which “was not competent to hear the case”70 had damaged the image and reputation of the Applicant.
The Applicant having lost the confidence of his business partners, the Applicant’s company’s shares were
devalued, the turnover of his numerous companies declined and he lost the opportunity to continue ongoing
business projects.
iv. Reparation is warranted for economic loss assessed on the basis of “reasonable probability” that
Applicant incurred future loss, Article 27(1) of the Protocol
In Sébastien Germain Ajavon case (reparations) , the Court first defined loss of opportunity as “the deprivation
of a potentiality having the character of reasonable probability”71 and that it is not necessary for the probability
to have a “certain character”. On the basis of this definition, the Court held that even if, at the time of the facts in
question, no sale of petroleum products had commenced, there was a real likelihood that the investment in the
oil sector would be made and the Applicant who had “a reasonable expectation of realizing the expected profits”72
was entitled to a “lump-sum” monetary award “which cannot be equal to the benefit that would have been derived
if the missed event had occurred”73 and therefore “cannot be equal to the entire expected gain”74.
The Court also decided that the assessment of the lump sum to be awarded to the Applicant as compensation
for the loss of business opportunity must take into account the circumstances of the case, inter alia, the “financial
capacity of the Applicant to acquire and sell the volumes estimated in the business plan, his knowledge of the
business world, his experience as a businessman having enabled him to develop commercial strategies within
the framework of the companies that made his reputation, the uncertainties inherent in any commercial activity,
fairness and reasonable proportionality”75.
v. Reparation for breach of non bis in idem principle demands status quo ante, annulment of the
Applicant’s sentencing with full effects
In the Sébastien Germain Ajavon (reparations), the Court concluded that the direct consequence of the violation
of the principle of non bis in idem and/or the lack of jurisdiction of the CRIET was the annulment of the decision
rendered by the CRIET.76 On the basis of this conclusion, the Court ordered the Respondent State to take all
necessary measures to set aside the CRIET’s judgment so as to erase all its consequences. This is the first
time that the Court has expressly ordered the Respondent State to set aside a decision delivered by its national
court77.
68
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Reasonable time to file an Application (article 56(6) of the Charter)
Livinus Daudi Manyuka v. United Republic of Tanzania
Application No. 020/2015
Ruling (jurisdiction and admissibility) of 28 November 2019

1.

Facts of the matter

The Applicant was convicted and sentenced to twenty (20) years in prison for the offence of robbery and violence.
He appealed, first to the High Court and second, to the Court of Appeal, against both his conviction and sentence
but his appeals were dismissed. In the course of his appeal to the High Court, his sentence of twenty (20) years
imprisonment was enhanced to thirty (30) years.

2.

Alleged violations

The Applicant alleged that he had been unlawfully imprisoned since the offence for which he was convicted was
non-existent at the time. This, he averred, was contrary to article 2 of the the Charter. The Applicant also alleged
that he had suffered a violation of his freedom of movement and association as a result of his imprisonment.

3.

Submissions of the Parties and findings of the Court

As a preliminary matter, the Respondent State argued that the period of five (5) years and six (6) months that the
Applicant took to file his Application before the African Court, after the Court of Appeal dismissed his appeal, was
unreasonable within the meaning of Rule 40(6) of the Rules (Article 56(6) of the Charter). The Applicant, for his
part, argued that the Application should be admissible given the circumstances of the matter and his situation as
a lay, indigent and incarcerated person.
In dealing with the Respondent State’s preliminary objection, the Court recalled that Article 56(6) of the Charter
does not set a time limit for filing cases before the Court and that it simply requires that an Application be filed
within a “reasonable time from the date local remedies were exhausted or from the date set by the Court as being
the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter...”.
Reiterating its earlier jurisprudence, the Court noted that the reasonableness of a time limit of seizure will depend
on the particular circumstances of each case and should be determined on a case by case basis. The Court also
pointed out that a non-exhaustive list of circumstances that the it considers in determining the reasonableness
of time, before the filing of an application, includes the following: imprisonment, being lay without the benefit of
legal assistance, indigence, illiteracy, lack of awareness of the existence of the Court, intimidation and fear of
reprisals and the use of extraordinary remedies.
i. Evidentiary standards in relation to determination of reasonableness of time to file an application
after exhaustion local remedies, Article 56(6) of the Charter
In the present case, the Court noted that the Applicant had indicated that he was “an indigent incarcerated
person operating without legal assistance or legal representation …” The Applicant had also stated that he is a
peasant. The Court observed, however, that aside from the blanket assertion of indigence the Applicant did not
attempted to adduce evidence explaining why it took him five (5) years and Six (6) months to file his Application.
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ii. Requirement to exhaust local remedies imposes onus to justify delay beyond mere factual status
of Applicant, Article 56(6) of the Charter
The Court noted that the Applicant had legal representation in pursuing his appeals both before the High Court
and the Court of Appeal. According to the Court, in the absence of any clear and compelling justification for the
lapse of five (5) years and Six (6) months before the filing of the Application, the period it took the Applicant to file
his case before the Court was unreasonable within meaning of Article 56(6) of the Charter.
In this ruling, the Court took the position that an applicant cannot simply plead the fact of being lay, indigent and
incarcerated as justifying the delay in filing an application without leading evidence in support of the same.
In the end, the Court held that the Application was not filed within a reasonable time within the meaning of Article
56(6) of the Charter. The Application was thus found inadmissible and dismissed. This ruling further develops the
jurisprudence of the Court in relation to the factors that must be considered in determining whether an application
has been filed within reasonable time after the exhaustion of domestic remedies. It builds on prior determinations
by the Court and represents the most recent development in a line of authorities including Godfred Anthony and
Ifunda Kisite v. United Republic of Tanzania78, Amiri Ramadhani v. United Republic of Tanzania79, Christopher
Jonas v. United Republic of Tanzania80 and Werema Wangoko v. United Republic of Tanzania81.
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DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE
EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Developments in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights1
Presentation
In 2019 the European Court of Human Rights (“the Court”) heard and determined roughly 40,000 cases. The
following chapter summarises the most important developments in the Court’s case-law including fourteen Grand
Chamber judgments and its first Advisory Opinion pursuant to Protocol No. 16, as well as other important leading
judgments decided by one of its Chambers.
I would like to highlight three important developments for the purposes of this foreword.
One of the main events for the Court in 2019 was the first advisory opinion issued under Protocol No. 16, in
response to a request from the French Court of Cassation. The case concerned the situation of a child born
abroad by gestational surrogacy, conceived from the biological father’s gametes. The father’s parentage was
recognised under French law following an earlier judgment delivered by the Court. Question marks remained
over the status of the intended mother. The advisory opinion stated that the right to respect for the child’s private
life required domestic law to provide for the possibility of recognizing the legal parent-child relationship with the
intended mother. Such recognition could be achieved by means of adoption. A few months after the advisory
opinion, the Court of Cassation, sitting as a full court, finally opted for allowing foreign birth certificates to be
registered in France in order to establish the parent-child relationship between such children and their intended
mothers. It thus went even further than the opinion. This is an excellent example of the dialogue-based approach
established under Protocol No. 16. It is also worth noting that the request was received on 12 October 2018 and
the opinion delivered on 10 April 2019, an indication of the Court’s determination to deal with such requests as
expeditiously as possible.
The second major legal development in 2019 concerned the execution of judgments. The success of the
Convention system relies on the complete enforcement of the Court’s judgments. The role of the Committee of
Ministers, which is enshrined in the Convention in order to guarantee the effectiveness of the execution process, is
therefore vital. Put simply, the Court’s authority and the credibility of the whole Convention system is undermined
when a judgment is not executed. Awareness of the crucial importance of the execution of judgments led to
the introduction by Protocol No. 14 of infringement proceedings under Article 46 § 4 of the Convention. That
provision was applied for the first time in 2019, where the Court was invited to determine whether Azerbaijan had
refused to comply with a judgment delivered in 2014. The case concerned an imprisoned political opponent, Ilgar
Mammadov. The question was whether the respondent State had failed in its obligations by refusing to release
that political opponent following the Court’s finding of a violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 § 3.
The Court considered that the State in question had indeed failed in its obligation to comply with a judgment
previously delivered by the Court.
The Court took up another of the challenges currently facing Council of Europe Member States in 2019. Over
the last few years it has received many applications concerning the situation of migrants in Europe. Three major
judgments were delivered in 2019 concerning different aspects of this difficult issue: first of all, the confinement of
1
This contribution is largely based on the Jurisconsult’s overview of the most interesting cases adjudicated in 2019 which forms
part of the Court’s Annual Report and can be downloaded in full (in English and French) at: www.echr.coe.int (Case-Law/Case- Law
Analysis/Overview of the Court’s case-law in 2019).
The complete Annual Report is available at: www.echr.coe.int (The Court/Annual reports).
The Court’s judgments, decisions and advisory opinions are available in multiple languages at: https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
For publication updates follow the Court’s Twitter account at https://twitter.com/ECHR_CEDH
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migrants in an airport transit zone (Z.A. v. Russia); secondly, “chain refoulements” in the case of Ilias and Ahmed
v. Hungary; and lastly, the situation of unaccompanied children, in the case of H.A. v. Greece. In these different
cases the Court was careful, firstly, to protect the case-law acquis in the sphere of refugee law, and secondly, to
map the way forward for the States’ migration policy.
I am delighted that the Court is participating in this first annual case-law review of the three regional human rights
courts.
Marialena Tsirli
Registrar of the European Court of Human Rights
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Summary

In 2019, the Grand Chamber delivered fourteen judgments and its first advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 to
the Convention. It defined the States’ obligations under the Convention with regard to traffic accidents (Nicolae
Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC]), the monitoring of psychiatric inpatients at risk of suicide (Fernandes de
Oliveira v. Portugal [GC]) and the therapeutic treatment of detainees placed in a psychiatric institution (Rooman
v. Belgium [GC]).
It ruled on the specific case of criminal investigations with a transnational dimension, entailing an obligation on
States to cooperate (Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC]).
The Grand Chamber developed the case-law on asylum-seekers with regard to two scenarios: where such
individuals were in a transit zone located at the land border between two member States of the Council of Europe
and subsequently expelled to a State that was not their country of origin (Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC]), and
where they were confined in an airport transit zone (Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC]).
It reiterated the case-law principles governing video-surveillance in the workplace and employees’ right to respect
for their private life (López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC]). Having examined the placement of a vulnerable
child in a foster family and subsequent adoption, it pointed out the procedural guarantees and respective interests
that the national authorities are required to take into consideration in order to be able to take decisions in line with
Convention standards (Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC]).
In its first advisory opinion, the Court examined the questions raised with regard to the private life of a child who
was born as the result of a surrogacy agreement performed abroad and the recognition of a legal relationship
between that child and the intended mother, with whom there was no genetic link (request no. P16-2018-001).
The Grand Chamber also clarified the interpretation of essential concepts governing the right not to be tried or
punished twice, as defined in Article 4 §§ 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 7 (Mihalache v. Romania [GC]).
Lastly, in an inter-State case, the Grand Chamber ruled on the issue of granting just satisfaction (Georgia v.
Russia (I)). For the first time, it was also called upon to determine whether a State had respected its obligation
under Article 46 of the Convention to abide by a final judgment against it (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC]).
This year the Court delivered other important leading judgments: with regard to admissibility, it ruled on
the calculation of the six-month time-limit (Akif Hasanov v. Azerbaijan), the loss of victim status (Porchet v.
Switzerland (dec.)) and its jurisdiction ratione loci (Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, applying the principles set out in
the Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey judgment).
With regard to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, the Court emphasised the national
authorities’ obligations to ensure protection of the life of a victim of abduction (Olewnik- Cieplińska and Olewnik
v. Poland); this obligation also applied where a European arrest warrant had been issued against a person
suspected of terrorist offences (Romeo Castaño v. Belgium).
The Court also ruled on the scope of the right to speedy judicial review of the lawfulness of detention, safeguarded
by Article 5 § 4 (Aboya Boa Jean v. Malta), and on whether a reduction of sentence is capable of affording
“compensation” within the meaning of Article 5 § 5.
The case-law was also developed with regard to oral communication, in person and in police premises, between
a lawyer and his detained client (Altay v. Turkey (no. 2)).
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Other judgments of jurisprudential interest concerned the principle that punishment should only be applied to
the offender, in the context of one company’s merger into another (Carrefour France v. France (dec.)), defence
access to voluminous data gathered by the prosecution during a criminal investigation (Sigurður Einarsson and
Others v. Iceland) and the Article 7 compatibility of the national judicial interpretation of criminal- law provisions
(Parmak and Bakır v. Turkey).
With regard to respect for private life, the Court also gave judgment on the scope of the right to one’s image,
reputation or honour (Vučina v. Croatia (dec.)) and the obligation to submit to a paternity test (Mifsud v. Malta).
The Court also addressed, in the context of anti-terrorism, the powers granted to the authorities to stop, search
and question passengers at border checks (Beghal v. the United Kingdom) and requests for escorted prison
leave to attend a relative’s funeral (Guimon v. France).
The Court ruled on the impact of housing-benefit reform on vulnerable social-housing tenants (J.D. and A v. the
United Kingdom).
The Court’s case-law also had regard to the interaction between the Convention and European Union law. In
particular, the Court ruled in cases concerning the European arrest warrant (Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus
and Turkey [GC] and Romeo Castaño v. Belgium) and referred to the European Union’s positive law in the field
of competition (Carrefour France v. France (dec.)).
In several cases the Court also took into account the interaction between the Convention and international
law. In particular, it referred to the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Extradition and the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC]) and
to the reports of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (CPT) and of the UN Human Rights Committee (Romeo Castaño v. Belgium). In addition, it
consolidated its case-law in the light of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities and the
United Nations’ work in this area, and also in the light of Recommendation Rec (2004)10 of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe concerning the protection of the human rights and dignity of persons with
mental disorder (Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], Rooman v. Belgium [GC]). It also relied on the work of
the UN International Law Commission (Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC]) and took account of the findings of
international organisations with regard to the situation of migrants (Khan v. France).
The Court further developed its case-law on States’ positive obligations under the Convention, particularly with
regard to protection of the right to life (Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania
[GC] and Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland) and to respect for private life in the workplace (López
Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC]).
Finally, the Court ruled on the scope of the margin of appreciation to be granted to the States Parties to the
Convention (request no. P16-2018-001, López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC], Beghal v. the United Kingdom
and J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom).
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II.
1.

ADMISSIBILITY2
Six-month period (Article 35 § 1 of the Convention3)

In Akif Hasanov v. Azerbaijan4, the Court established that the six-month rule for filing an application could require
an additional obligation of diligence from an applicant.
The applicant was convicted in administrative proceedings for minor hooliganism and lodged an appeal in
November 2007. The time-limit for deciding that appeal was three days and the appeal court adopted the appeal
decision in December 2007. However, the appeal court sent the decision in August 2009. In January 2010 the
applicant applied to the Court. The Court found that the applicant’s unexplained inactivity for more than two years
breached the six-month time-limit and declared the application inadmissible.
This case is noteworthy for the examination of when the six-month time-limit begins to run, in circumstances
where an applicant, being entitled in domestic law to wait to be served with a copy of the final domestic decision,
remains passively awaiting that decision for an evidently excessive period of time before introducing his
application to the Court.
According to the Court’s well-established case-law, the six-month time-limit starts running from the date of service
of the copy of the decision when an applicant is entitled by domestic law to be served automatically with a copy
of the final domestic decision5.
In the present case, the applicant was entitled to be served with the final decision. However, given the evident
and excessive delay in its service, the Court held that the applicant could not be relieved of his own, individual
obligation to undertake basic steps and to seek information from the relevant authorities about the outcome of
his appeal. Thus, the Court considered that the applicant’s unexplained inactivity for more than two years fell foul
of a major purpose of the six-month rule under Article 35 § 1.
The Court therefore introduced a certain duty of diligence in the case of an evidently excessive delay of delivery,
although it is worth noting the particular circumstances of the case: the final decision was due to be delivered
within a short period of time (three days); the delay in delivery was comparably lengthy (over eighteen months);
and the applicant had not shown that he had, in the meantime, made any relevant enquiries about it, with the
result that he introduced his application to the Court more than two years after the final domestic decision.

2
See also, under Article 2 (Right to life – effective investigation) below, Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC],
no. 36925/07, and Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, no. 8351/17, July 2019, and, under Article 5 § 5 (Right to compensation), Porchet v.
Switzerland (dec.), no. 36391/16, 8 October 2019.
3
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Treaty Series No. 005); a.k.a. the European Convention on Human Rights; hereinafter “the Convention”.
4
Akif Hasanov v. Azerbaijan, no. 7268/10, 19 September 2019.
5
See, for instance, Worm v. Austria, 29 August 1997, § 33, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997-V.
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III.

“CORE” RIGHTS

1.

Right to life (Article 2)

a. Obligation to protect life
Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC]6 concerned substantive obligations under Article 2 owed to a voluntary
psychiatric patient as well as the length of proceedings (procedural limb).
The applicant’s adult son, A.J., had a history of serious mental illness and of addiction to alcohol and prescription
drugs. On several occasions he was hospitalized on a voluntary basis in a psychiatric hospital (“the HSC”).
During his last stay, following a suicide attempt with prescription drugs, his initial restrictive regime was relaxed;
he was then allowed home, only to be subsequently readmitted due to excessive alcohol intake. Two days later,
A.J. left the HSC without permission, jumped in front of a train and died. The applicant complained under Article
2 of a failure to protect her son and under Article 6 of the length of her civil action against the HSC. The Court
found no violation of Article 2 as regards the substantive aspect and a violation as regards the procedural aspect.
1.
The judgment clarified the content of the State’s positive obligations as regards the care of
psychiatric patients at risk of suicide in hospital.
The State has a positive obligation to put in place an effective regulatory framework compelling
hospitals to adopt appropriate measures to protect their patients’ lives. Moreover, there is a
positive obligation to take preventive operational measures to protect individuals from criminal
acts of others and from themselves (Osman v. the United Kingdom7), an obligation already held
applicable to detainees8 and involuntary psychiatric patients9.
The relevant factors to assess the suicide risk of a detainee which could trigger the need to
take preventive measures were a history of mental-health problems, the gravity of the mental
illness, previous attempts to commit suicide or self-harm, suicidal thoughts or threats and signs
of physical or mental distress.
The Court considered that both obligations were applicable to the case in question and, further,
that both had been complied with. It noted in particular as follows:
a.
The manner in which the regulatory framework had been implemented did not violate
Article 2. The Court agreed that the approach of the HSC – restricting patients’ rights as little
as possible due to a therapeutic desire to create an open regime – was in line with international
standards10 developed in recent years, and it endorsed the view expressed in Hiller11 that a more
intrusive regime could have violated Articles 3, 5 or 8. It also found the three surveillance measures
(a regular daily timetable with monitoring of presence at key times; a more restrictive regime if
6
Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14, 31 January 2019.
7
Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII.
8
Keenan v. the United Kingdom, no. 27229/95, ECHR 2001-III; and Renolde v. France, no. 5608/05, ECHR 2008 (extracts).
9
Hiller v. Austria, no. 1967/14, 22 November 2016.
10
UN General Assembly Resolution 46/119 on the protection of persons with mental illness and the improvement of mental health
care, 17 December 1991, UN Doc. A/RES/46/119; the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), 2515 UNTS 3, as
well as CRPD Committee Guidelines and statement of the OHCHR on Article 14 of the CRPD; UN Human Rights Committee General
Comment No. 35 on Article 9 of the ICCPR; and Report of 2 April 2015 of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the enjoyment of the
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.
11
Hiller, cited above, §§ 54-55.
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required; an emergency procedure if necessary) in the HSC for voluntary patients to be adequate.
Finally, the applicant had been able to have recourse to a judicial system.
b.
As regards the application of the Osman operational obligation in this context, two aspects
are worth noting. Firstly, the Court confirmed for the first time that the positive obligation to take
preventive operational measures extends to voluntary patients. The Court reached this finding
by noting that all psychiatric patients are vulnerable, with any form of hospitalisation involving
a certain level of necessary restraint, and nuanced its findings by adding that “the Court, in its
own assessment, may apply a stricter standard of scrutiny” in the case of involuntary patients.
Secondly, the Court applied the Osman test by measuring the care and decisions of the HSC
against the five factors noted above. The Court found that it had not been established that the
HSC knew or ought to have known that there was an immediate risk to A.J.’s life in the days before
his death. In particular, the Court accepted that, while a risk of suicide could not be excluded
in patients such as A.J., whose psychopathological conditions were based on a multiplicity of
diagnoses, the immediacy of the risk could vary and the Court endorsed the approach of the
HSC, which was to vary the monitoring regime in place in accordance with these changes based
on a philosophy which optimised patient freedom, patient responsibility and thus their chances of
discharge. There being therefore no established “real and immediate risk”, it was not necessary
to examine the second limb of the Osman test, namely whether or not preventive measures had
been required.
2.
The applicant also complained, originally under Article 6 § 1, that her civil action against the
hospital was excessively long. The Court recharacterised this complaint under the procedural limb of
Article 2, finding a violation on the basis of the excessive length of the proceedings alone. As to whether
it must be shown that that delay impacted on the effectiveness of the proceedings before it can constitute
a violation of the procedural limb of Article 212, the Court relied on paragraph 219 of Lopes de Sousa
Fernandes [GC]13. The Court found that the applicant’s civil action was excessively long – a strong indicator
of defective proceedings – and that the Government had not provided “convincing and plausible” reasons
to justify the delay. The Court also stressed the importance of avoiding delay (the passage of time affecting
witness memory and the importance of ensuring deficiencies are remedied quickly and thereby avoided in
the future).
In Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland14 the Court applied the principles developed in Osman v. the
United Kingdom15 in the context of a kidnapping.
Mr. Olewnik was brutally kidnapped in 2001. He was detained and ill-treated for over two years and
subsequently murdered, probably in September 2003, following the handover of a ransom. His body
was discovered in 2006. A number of gang members were ultimately convicted in 2010. The investigation
into the crime, including allegations against certain investigating police officers, was still continuing. The
applicants, the father and brother of the deceased, mainly complained under the substantive limb of Article
2 that Mr. Olewnik’s death had resulted from the authorities’ failure to investigate effectively his kidnapping
and thus to protect his life.
The Court found a violation of the substantive limb (failure to investigate adequately the kidnapping and
protect his life) of Article 2 as well as of its procedural limb (failure to investigate after his death).
12
See Mustafa Tunç and Fecire Tunç v. Turkey [GC] no. 24014/05, § 31, 14 April 2015; and, for example, Sarbyanova-Pashaliyska
and Pashaliyska v. Bulgaria, no. 3524/14, §§ 41-44, 12 January 2017.
13
Lopes de Sousa Fernandes [GC], no. 56080/13, 19 December 2017.
14
Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, no. 20147/15, 5 September 2019.
15
Osman v. the United Kingdom, 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII.
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In this judgment the Court applied for the first time the principles of the Osman judgment to the circumstances
surrounding the death of an individual following his or her kidnapping.
The Osman principles identify the actual and constructive knowledge (“that the authorities knew or ought
to have known at the time, of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified individual
or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party”) that can give rise to a positive obligation on the State
“to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to
avoid that risk” (Osman, § 116). The two issues to be resolved in the present case were therefore whether
the kidnapping and prolonged abduction gave rise to a “real and immediate risk” and, if so, whether the
authorities demonstrated the commitment necessary to find Mr. Olewnik and to identify the perpetrators
as swiftly as possible to safeguard his life.
a.
The Court noted that, in cases of kidnapping for ransom, it had to be assumed that the
life and health of the victim was at risk. Statistics showed the serious nature of kidnappings in
Poland, and abundant blood samples had been found in Mr. Olewnik’s home. In addition, that risk
assessment was not necessarily dependent on whether or not the kidnappers had communicated
their intention to harm the person held. Moreover, the immediacy of the risk to the victim, to be
understood as referring mainly to the gravity of the situation and the particular vulnerability of the
victim of kidnapping, did not diminish with time: on the contrary, it endured for years and thereby
increased the victim’s torment and the risk to his health and life, therefore the risk had remained
imminent throughout the entire period of imprisonment.
The authorities therefore knew or should have known of the existence of a real and immediate
risk to the health and life of Mr. Olewnik from the moment of his disappearance and throughout
his abduction.
b.
When examining whether the authorities fulfilled the positive obligation under Article 2 to
protect Mr. Olewnik’s life by doing all that could reasonably be expected of them, the Court was
assisted by extensive evidence regarding the investigations and by the fact that investigative errors
had been well documented. In particular, the Parliamentary Inquiry Committee had conducted an
“impressive investigation” into the actions of the police, prosecutors and other public authorities,
concluding that “visible sluggishness, errors, recklessness and a lack of professionalism” resulted
in the failure to discover the perpetrators and ultimately in Mr. Olewnik’s death. Such was the scale
of the deficiencies that the Committee explored the hypothesis that public officials had cooperated
with the kidnapping gang and some policing mistakes were the subject of criminal prosecution.
The Court found that the facts clearly indicated that the domestic authorities failed to respond with
the level of commitment required in a case of kidnapping and prolonged abduction and that there
had clearly been a link between the long list of omissions and errors perpetuated over the years
and the failure to advance the investigation while Mr. Olewnik had still been alive.
The State had therefore breached the obligation to safeguard the life of the victim and thus violated
Article 2 under its substantive limb.
The Court’s finding in the applicants’ favour was facilitated by the particularly serious facts
c.
of the present case. Indeed, the Court reiterated that its conclusions had taken into account the
“particularly high risk factors” in the case and the “particularly large” extent to which the domestic
system had malfunctioned.
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b. Effective investigation16
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC]17 dealt with the investigation into the murder of three Cypriot
nationals of Turkish Cypriot origin in the part of Cyprus controlled by the Cypriot government in January 2005.
The suspects fled to the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”). Parallel investigations were
conducted by Cypriot and “TRNC” authorities. The Cypriot authorities identified eight suspects, issued domestic
and European arrest warrants and sent Red Notice requests to Interpol. The “TRNC” authorities arrested all
suspects by the end of January 2005 but released them weeks later.
The Cypriot authorities refused to surrender the case file to the “TRNC” authorities, seeking rather to obtain
the suspects’ surrender from the “TRNC” through mediation (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus –
UNFICYP) and then through extradition requests (to the Turkish embassy in Athens), which were returned without
reply. Since then both investigations were at an impasse. The applicants, the victims’ relatives, complained under
Articles 2 and 13 of the failure of both Turkey and Cyprus to cooperate in the investigation.
The Court found that Cyprus had not breached Article 2 (procedural limb) because it had used all means
reasonably available to obtain the suspects’ surrender/extradition from Turkey and it had not been under an
obligation to submit its case file or to transfer the proceedings to the “TRNC” or to Turkey. However, it found that
Turkey had violated Article 2 (procedural limb) due to its failure to cooperate with Cyprus and, in particular, for
not providing a reasoned reply to the extradition requests submitted by its authorities.
In this judgment, the Court developed novel principles concerning the duty of Contracting States to cooperate in
the context of transnational criminal investigations.
1.
The Court clarified its case-law on the issue of jurisdiction (Article 1) and compatibility ratione
loci of an Article 2 complaint (procedural limb) where the death occurs outside the jurisdiction of the
respondent State. Although the deaths occurred in territory controlled by and under the jurisdiction of
Cyprus, the Court found that there was a jurisdictional link to Turkey, on two grounds:
a.
The Court established that the institution of investigation/proceedings concerning a death
which occurred outside the jurisdiction of that State is sufficient to establish a jurisdictional link for
the purposes of Article 1 between that State and the victim’s relatives who later brought Convention
proceedings. The Court interestingly drew in this connection on Article 2 cases in which it had
already followed a similar approach18. The Court also relied mutatis mutandis on the approach
previously followed in an Article 6 case concerning a civil action19, emphasising the separate and
detachable nature of the procedural obligation arising out of Article 2, capable of binding a State
even when the death had occurred outside its jurisdiction.
The Court also clarified that, if no investigation or proceedings were instituted in respect
b.
of a death outside a respondent State’s jurisdiction, the Court would have to determine whether
a jurisdictional link could in any event be established. Although the procedural obligation under
Article 2 would in principle only be triggered for the State under whose jurisdiction the deceased
was to be found, “special features” in a given case would justify a departure from this approach,
according to the principles laid down in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia20.
16
See also, under Article 2 (Right to life – Obligation to protect life) above, Fernandes de Oliveira v. Portugal [GC], no. 78103/14,
31 January 2019, and Olewnik-Cieplińska and Olewnik v. Poland, no. 20147/15, 5 September 2019.
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], no. 36925/07, 29 January 2019.
17
18
Aliyeva and Aliyev v. Azerbaijan, no. 35587/08, §§ 56-57, 31 July 2014; and Gray v. Germany, no. 49278/09, 22 May 2014.
Markovic and Others v. Italy [GC], no. 1398/03, §§ 54-56, ECHR 2006-XIV.
19
20
Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, §§ 243-44, ECHR 2010 (extracts).
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Each of these two grounds was sufficient for the Court to establish a jurisdictional link to Turkey,
engaging therefore its procedural obligation to investigate: the “TRNC” authorities had instituted
a criminal investigation under its domestic law; and “special features” existed related to the
situation in Cyprus, based on the fact that the murder suspects were known to have fled to the
part of Cypriot territory which was under the effective control of Turkey, namely the “TRNC”, thus
preventing Cyprus from fulfilling its Convention obligations.
2.
In this judgment, the Court found for the first time a violation of Article 2 under its procedural limb
on the sole basis of a failure to cooperate with another State. The Court found that, where an effective
investigation requires the involvement of more than one Contracting State, the Convention’s special
character as collective enforcement treaty entailed an obligation on the States to cooperate effectively
with each other to elucidate the circumstances of the killing and to bring perpetrators to justice. The Court
also stated that Article 2 may require from both States a two-way obligation to cooperate, implying at
the same time an obligation to seek assistance and an obligation to afford assistance. This obligation to
cooperate could only be one of means, not of result, meaning that the States concerned must take whatever
reasonable steps they can to cooperate with each other, exhausting in good faith the possibilities available
to them under the applicable international instruments on mutual legal assistance and cooperation in
criminal matters. Article 2 will only be breached in respect of a State required to seek cooperation if it
has failed to trigger the proper mechanisms for cooperation under the relevant international treaties; and
in respect of the requested State, if it has failed to respond properly or has not been able to invoke a
legitimate ground for refusing the cooperation requested under those instruments.
Applying these principles to the specific context of extradition, the Court noted that the obligation to
cooperate under Article 2 should be read in the light of the European Convention on Extradition21 (in
particular Article 18 thereof) and should therefore entail for a State an obligation to examine and provide
a reasoned reply to any extradition request from another Contracting State regarding suspects wanted for
murder or unlawful killings who are known to be present in its territory or within its jurisdiction.
3.
Lastly, the Court took into account a special feature of the present case: the duty to cooperate
involved a Contracting State and a de facto entity under the effective control of another Contracting State.
In such a situation, and in the absence of formal diplomatic relations between the two Contracting States
involved, the Court might be required to examine the informal or ad hoc channels of cooperation used by
the States concerned outside the cooperation mechanisms foreseen by the relevant international treaties,
while at the same time being guided by the provisions of those treaties as an expression of the norms
and principles applied in international law. Therefore the Court examined whether Cyprus and Turkey had
taken all reasonable steps to cooperate with one another within the framework of the UNFICYP mediation,
as well as in the light of the provisions of the European Convention on Extradition and the European
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters22, irrespective of whether those treaties applied to
the specific circumstances of the case.
As to the extent of the cooperation required under Article 2 with de facto entities, the Court considered
that supplying the whole investigation file to the “TRNC” with the possibility that the evidence would be
used for the purposes of trying the suspects there would go beyond mere cooperation between police or
prosecuting authorities23 and would amount in substance to the transfer of the criminal case by Cyprus
to the “TRNC” courts. In such a situation, the duty to cooperate could not have required Cyprus to waive
21
22
23

European Convention on Extradition, ETS 24.
European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, ETS 30.
Contrast Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 177 and 345, ECHR 2004-VII.
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its criminal jurisdiction over a murder committed in its controlled area in favour of the courts of a de facto
entity set up within its territory. However, the Court did not address in those findings the more general
issue of cooperation in criminal matters with de facto or unrecognised entities and its lawfulness under
international law, in particular with regard to the principle of non-recognition (as codified in Article 41 § 2 of
the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts)24.
In Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC]25, the Court set out the procedural obligations in the context of
a car accident causing life-threatening injuries.
The applicant had been in a car accident on a public road and sustained life-threatening injuries. A criminal
investigation was initiated and discontinued three times, on the last occasion because it was time-barred.
The applicant was a civil party to those criminal proceedings. In the Convention proceedings he mainly
complained under Articles 3, 6 and 13 of the conduct of the criminal investigation and the manner in which
the investigating authorities had treated him. The Court examined those complaints also under Articles 2
and 8.
Concerning the conduct of the investigation, the Court found that the complaints under Articles 3 and
8 were incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention and that Article 2 applied but had not been
breached.
The judgment is noteworthy because it clarifies whether, in this context, the State’s procedural obligations
are to be drawn from Articles 2, 3 or 8. The Court’s findings were informed by two key elements: the
incident was unintentional and there was no suggestion of a failure by the State to adopt an adequate
legal framework to ensure safety and reduce risk on the roads. The complaints under Articles 3 and 8 were
therefore declared incompatible ratione materiae.
The Court explained that Article 2 would apply to a non-fatal road accident if “the activity involved was
dangerous by its very nature and put the life of the applicant at real or imminent risk ... or if the injuries
the applicant had suffered were seriously life-threatening”. The injury was to be assessed in terms of the
“the seriousness and after-effects” of the injuries. As to the risk assessment, the Court emphasised the
importance of an adequate regulatory framework to ensure road safety. The less evident the risk from
the activity, the more significant the level of injuries became. In the present case, irrespective of whether
driving could be considered a particularly dangerous activity, the applicant’s injuries were considered
sufficiently severe as to amount to a serious danger to his life so that Article 2 applied.
As to the content of the procedural obligation under Article 2, the Court reiterated that, in circumstances of
life-threatening injuries inflicted unintentionally, the obligation only required that the legal system afford a
remedy in the civil courts, although domestic law could provide recourse to a criminal investigation in such
circumstances. Where it was “not clearly established from the outset” that death resulted from an accident
or other non-intentional act and where the hypothesis of unlawful killing was at least arguable on the facts,
Article 2 required that a criminal investigation, attaining a minimum level of effectiveness, be conducted
(as soon as the authorities become aware of the incident) to shed some light on the circumstances of
death or the life-threatening injuries. Once it was established by that initial investigation that the death or
24
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its 53rd Session (2001), UN Doc. A/56/10.
25
Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, 25 June 2019. See also under Article 3 (Applicability and Inhuman
or degrading treatment), Article 6 § 1 (Reasonable time) and Article 8 (Right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and
correspondence) below.
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life-threatening injury was not intentional, the civil remedy would be regarded as sufficient.
In the present case, a criminal investigation had been initiated and was found by the Court not to be
deficient. Therefore, it could not be said that the legal system had failed to deal adequately with the
applicant’s case so that there had been no violation of Article 2.
In Romeo Castaño v. Belgium26 the Court dealt with the scope of a State’s procedural obligation to
cooperate with another State investigating a murder committed within the latter’s jurisdiction.
The applicants’ father was killed in a terrorist attack carried out by ETA in Spain in 1981. Three persons
were later convicted and sentenced. A fourth, N.J.E., escaped justice and was living in Belgium. The
Belgian courts on two occasions refused to execute European arrest warrants (EAWs) issued by the
Spanish authorities in respect of N.J.E. Relying on reports of the CPT (2012) and the UN Human Rights
Committee (2015), the Belgian courts expressed doubts as to whether the requesting State’s regime of
incommunicado detention applied to persons suspected of terrorism-related offences was compatible
with the protection of N.J.E.’s human rights. The applicants alleged in the Convention proceedings that
Belgium was in breach of its obligations under Article 2 by preventing Spain from prosecuting N.J.E. The
Court agreed.
The judgment is noteworthy for the following reasons:
Firstly, the Court decided whether the applicants came within the jurisdiction of Belgium ratione loci. The
respondent State had argued that there was no jurisdictional link between it and the murder of their father.
Belgium had never opened an investigation of its own motion into the murder, and the fact that N.J.E. had
fled to Belgium and lived there was not sufficient to create such a link. The Court disagreed and observed
that although the Article 2 procedural obligation attached in principle to the State within whose jurisdiction
the death occurred, the existence of “special features” could create a procedural obligation for a third
Contracting State, even if that State had not itself initiated an investigation into the death.27 In the present
case, the following special features were present: N.J.E. had fled to Belgium and lived there; Belgium and
Spain had undertaken to cooperate with each other on criminal matters within the framework of the EAW;
and Spain, acting within that framework, had requested Belgium to surrender N.J.E. For the Court, those
“special features” meant that Belgium assumed a procedural obligation under Article 2 to cooperate with
the Spanish authorities in the investigation of N.J.E.’s involvement in the murder of the applicants’ father
on their territory.
Secondly, as to the scope of Belgium’s procedural obligation to cooperate, the Court drew heavily on
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC],28 including the following principle: the procedural
obligation to cooperate will only be breached in respect of a State required to seek cooperation if it has
failed to trigger the proper mechanisms for cooperation under the relevant international treaties; and,
in respect of the requested State, if it has failed to respond properly or has not been able to invoke a
legitimate ground for refusing the cooperation requested under those instruments.
Thirdly, the Court addressed the two highlighted issues in the context of the Council Framework Decision
of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member
States – the relevant instrument of cooperation in the instant case. Examining each of the issues, it found
26
Romeo Castaño v. Belgium, no. 8351/17, 9 July 2019.
27
See Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, no. 25965/04, §§ 243-44, ECHR 2010 (extracts); as confirmed in Güzelyurtlu and Others v.
Cyprus and Turkey [GC], no. 36925/07, § 190, 29 January 2019.
28
Güzelyurtlu and Others v. Cyprus and Turkey [GC], no. 36925/07, §§ 232-236, 29 January 2019.
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that Belgium had responded properly to Spain’s request for cooperation. Importantly, it observed that the
Belgian courts had not applied “automatically and mechanically” the mutual-trust principle underpinning
the EAW system.29 Those courts had reflected on the possible risk that N.J.E.’s Article 3 rights would be
breached if she were to be held in incommunicado detention following her surrender to Spain, and had
concluded that such a risk existed. Accepting that Article 3 considerations could constitute a “legitimate
ground” for refusing a request for cooperation, the Court examined whether there was a sufficient factual
basis to justify the domestic courts’ perceived risk of ill-treatment. It observed that the Belgian courts failed
to apprise themselves of the situation in Spain in 2016 regarding the placement of terrorist suspects in
incommunicado detention. In its view, the courts should have used the most up-to-date information, rather
than relying on the 2012 CPT and the 2015 UNHRC reports. Furthermore, it was significant that Belgium,
like other countries, had in the past, and without hesitation, surrendered suspected ETA members to Spain
within the framework of the EAW system. Importantly, Belgium had failed to seek further information from
Spain regarding the conditions under which N.J.E. would be detained if surrendered. Such information
would have allowed the Belgian authorities better to assess whether there was a real risk that N.J.E.’s
Article 3 rights would be infringed in the event of her surrender.
2.

Prohibition of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment and punishment (Article 3)

a. Applicability
In Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC]30 the applicant sustained life-threatening injuries following a car
accident. The judgment clarified whether, in this context, the State’s procedural obligations are to be drawn from
Articles 2, 3 or 8.
The Court declared the complaints under Articles 3 and 8 incompatible ratione materiae because the incident
was unintentional and there was no suggestion of a failure by the State to adopt an adequate legal framework to
ensure safety and reduce risk on the roads.
The Court found that an injury following an accident which was the result of mere chance or negligence could
not amount to “treatment” to which the individual had been “subjected”. More particularly, Article 3 treatment
is “in essence, albeit not exclusively, characterised by an intention to harm, humiliate or debase an individual,
by a display of disrespect for or diminution of his or her human dignity, or by the creation of feelings of fear,
anguish or inferiority capable of breaking his or her moral and physical resistance”. No such elements featured
in the applicant’s case. Accordingly, while intention would generally be only one of the elements relevant to
the assessment of the applicability of Article 3, a lack of intention in an accident context would render Article 3
inapplicable. Considering this approach to be the correct one, the Court distanced itself from previous cases
where Article 3 had been applied to accidents due to the severity of the injury sustained.31
b. Inhuman or degrading treatment
In Nicolae VirgiliuTănase v. Romania [GC]32, the applicant complained of, inter alia, the manner in which the
29
See, in this connection, Avotiņš v. Latvia [GC], no. 17502/07, § 116, 23 May 2016; and Pirozzi v. Belgium, no. 21055/11, § 62,
17 April 2018
30
Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC], no. 41720/13, 25 June 2019. See also under Article 2 (Effective investigation) above,
and Article 3 (Inhuman or degrading treatment), Article 6 § 1 (Reasonable time) and Article 8 (Right to respect for one’s private and family
life, home and correspondence) below.
31
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investigating authorities had treated him during the criminal investigation in a car accident causing life-threatening
injuries.
The Court rejected this complaint as manifestly ill-founded. In order to examine whether the investigation
constituted inhuman treatment, the Court took into account the principles mainly developed in respect of relatives
of disappeared persons33.
In Tomov and Others v. Russia34, the Court clarified the criteria to be met for a transport of prisoners to comply
with Article 3.
The applicants complained of the inhuman and degrading conditions in which they had been transported by
road and rail and of the lack of effective means of redress for their complaints. The Court had already found in
more than fifty judgments against Russia that it had breached Article 3 as regards prisoners’ transport conditions
(acute lack of space, inadequate sleeping arrangements, lengthy journeys, restricted access to sanitary facilities,
faulty heating and ventilation, etc.). In many of these cases the Court had also found a breach of Article 13 due
to the absence of an effective remedy.
In the present case, the Court again found a violation of Articles 3 and 13. Referring to Muršić v. Croatia [GC]35,
the Court outlined the approach it would take in its consideration of transport-of-prisoners cases, thereby sending
a signal to Russia on how to bring its domestic law into line with Article 3 standards.
A strong presumption of a violation would arise when detainees were transported in conveyances offering less
than 0.5 m2 of space per person. In the case of overnight travel by rail, detainees had to have their own place
to sleep. The Court also set out a number of aggravating considerations, including low ceiling height, restricted
access to toilets and to drinking water or food during long trips, and sleep deprivation. It further set out a number
of circumstances which, of themselves, would not give rise to a violation of Article 3. For example, a short or
occasional transfer (for instance, one or two transfers, not exceeding thirty minutes each) may not reach the
threshold of severity under Article 3 but more than one or two transfers would constitute a “continuing situation”
and their overall effect had to be assessed.
c. Degrading treatment36
Rooman v. Belgium [GC]37 concerned a mentally ill person, who was sentenced to a term of imprisonment and
detained in a psychiatric institution where the personnel could not communicate with him in his native language
(namely German, the only one of Belgium’s three official languages that he spoke). Relying on Articles 3 and 5,
the applicant complained of not having received the appropriate psychiatric treatment due to the unavailability
of German-speaking therapists.
The judgment contains a comprehensive review of the Court’s case-law under Article 3 on the medical treatment
of ill and vulnerable detainees. The Court also clarified the relationship between Articles 3 and 5 as regards
the assessment of the adequacy of the medical treatment. As regards communicating with foreign detainees
undergoing treatment for mental-health issues, the Court clarified its case-law on the linguistic element with a
33
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view to assessing whether the appropriate psychiatric care had been provided.
Khan v. France38 concerned the obligation to protect unaccompanied foreign minors exposed to degrading living
conditions.
The applicant, an unaccompanied Afghan aged between 11 and 12, spent almost seven months in conditions
of squalor in the Calais region while hoping to reach England. During this period, he lived in makeshift huts in
deplorable conditions alongside thousands of other migrants trying to cross the English Channel. These shanty
towns in the Calais region lacked among other things adequate shelter, security, food, basic hygiene and access
to healthcare. Non-governmental organisations made a successful application to a children’s judge on behalf
of the applicant (and other minors) to require the French authorities to take the applicant into care. According
to the authorities, it proved impossible to enforce this measure since the applicant did not contact them and he
could not be located. The applicant eventually succeeded in reaching England. In the Convention proceedings
he contended that the authorities had not done everything that could reasonably be expected of them to ensure
his welfare. The Court agreed and found a violation of Article 3.
The following aspects of the judgment are noteworthy:
The authorities were not aware of the applicant’s plight prior to the decision of the children’s judge because the
applicant had not sought asylum and had not been in immigration detention awaiting expulsion. The applicant’s
situation therefore differed from that of the applicant in Rahimi v. Greece,39 who was also an unaccompanied
foreign minor.40 In the instant case, the Court stressed the extreme vulnerability of the applicant, a child living
for months in precarious conditions and at all times exposed to the threat of physical, including sexual, violence.
The authorities had not made sufficient efforts to identify unaccompanied minors in the makeshift encampments,
although their presence there was well documented. As in other cases concerning migrants the Court referred
to the findings of domestic bodies (such as the Defender of Rights and the National Consultative Commission
on Human Rights) and international bodies (such as the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the
Council of Europe on Migration and Refugees and UNICEF)41.
Furthermore, the Court was not persuaded that the authorities had reacted decisively to the decision of the
children’s judge. It accepted the difficulties which faced them in identifying and locating the applicant and further
accepted that those difficulties had been compounded by the applicant’s lack of cooperation. However, the Court
emphasised the fact that a vulnerable child had been exposed to degrading, dangerous and precarious living
conditions over several months. Even if the respondent State had not created those conditions, it nevertheless
had an obligation to protect the applicant from being subjected to them.
d. Inhuman or degrading punishment
Marcello Viola v. Italy (no. 2)42 concerned a life prisoner required to cooperate with the authorities in their fight
against Mafia crime to obtain a review of his sentence and a possibility of release.
The applicant was convicted for Mafia-related crimes, including active leadership of a Mafia clan, kidnapping
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and murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment. He alleged under Article 3 that his life sentence was neither de
jure nor de facto reducible since the so-called “ergastolo ostativo” regime was applied to him on account of the
offences of which he was convicted. He argued that other categories of life prisoners had the prospect of release
when after serving twenty-six years of their sentence, and benefited from a possibility of release in advance of
that term by demonstrating their suitability for reintegration into society. The applicant claimed that he could only
enjoy a review of his sentence – and a prospect of release – if he succeeded in rebutting the statutory presumption
that he no longer had any links with the Mafia and was therefore no longer to be considered dangerous. To do
that, he contended, he had to cooperate with the authorities by becoming an informant, thereby putting his and
his family’s lives at risk of reprisals.
The Court found a violation of Article 3 because the sentencing regime amounted to an excessive curtailment of
the applicant’s right to a review of his life sentence with the possibility of release.
It had due regard to the reasons which led the legislator to place the onus on offenders such as the applicant
to prove that they had broken their links with the Mafia. According to the Government, the very nature of Mafia
membership justified the requirement that a prisoner cooperated with the authorities in the fight against Mafiarelated crime to prove his or her rehabilitation, and the prisoner had a choice in the matter.
However, the Court was not persuaded that the choice between cooperating and refusing to cooperate could
be considered voluntary. It referred to the applicant’s fears for his and his family’s security if he were to provide
assistance to the authorities. In addition, prisoners’ decisions to collaborate could in reality be nothing more than
an opportunistic move on their part to secure a sentence review, rather than signifying a genuine resolve to put
an end to their ties with the Mafia. The Court was particularly concerned by the fact that the law did not afford
prisoners such as the applicant other ways of proving that they had severed for good their links with the Mafia. It
noted that the applicant had successfully followed the reintegration-into-society programme offered by the prison
that, had he been an ordinary life prisoner, would have entitled him to a five-year reduction of his sentence.
However, by refusing to cooperate with the authorities, the progress the applicant had made in prison could not
be taken into consideration, with the result that he was denied the possibility of demonstrating that his continued
imprisonment was no longer justified on legitimate penological grounds.
Importantly, the Court stressed that Article 3 required a prospect of release but not a right to be released if the
prisoner was deemed at the close of the review to still be a danger to society.
e. Expulsion
Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC]43 concerned the short-term confinement of asylum-seekers in a land border
transit zone and their subsequent removal to a presumed-safe third country without examining their asylum
claims on the merits.
The applicants, Bangladeshi nationals, arrived in the transit zone situated on the land border between Hungary
and Serbia and applied for asylum. Although their expulsion was ordered on the same day, they spent twentythree days in the transit zone pending examination of their asylum claims. The domestic authorities rejected their
asylum requests as inadmissible because they considered Serbia to be a safe third country that could examine
their asylum requests on the merits. The applicants were escorted out of the transit zone and crossed the border
back to Serbia, without physical coercion. The Court found a violation of Article 3 as regards their expulsion to
Serbia and no violation of this provision as regards their conditions of confinement in the transit zone.
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The judgment is noteworthy because the Court, drawing on M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC]44, clarified
the nature of the duty of the expelling State when removing an asylum-seeker to a third country without an
examination on the merits of the asylum claim.
The Court observed that, where a Contracting State seeks to remove an asylum-seeker to a third country without
examining the asylum request on the merits, the State’s duty not to expose the individual to a real risk of
treatment contrary to Article 3 differs from that in cases of return to the country of origin. In the latter situation the
expelling authorities examine whether the asylum claim is well founded and, accordingly, the alleged risks in the
country of origin. In the former situation, the main issue is the adequacy of the asylum procedure in the receiving
third country.
A State removing asylum-seekers to a third country may legitimately choose not to deal with the merits of asylum
requests; however, in that case, it cannot know whether those persons risk treatment contrary to Article 3 in
the country of origin or are simply economic migrants not in need of protection. Therefore, in all such cases,
regardless of whether the receiving third country is a member State of the European Union or a State Party to the
Convention, it is the duty of the removing State to examine thoroughly whether or not there is a real risk of the
asylum-seekers being denied access, in the receiving third country, to an adequate asylum procedure protecting
them against refoulement, namely, against being removed to their country of origin without a proper evaluation
of the risks they face from the standpoint of Article 3. If it is established that the existing guarantees in this regard
are insufficient, Article 3 gives rise to a duty not to remove the asylum-seekers to the third country.
The Court clarified how to determine whether the removing State had fulfilled the procedural obligation to assess
the asylum procedures of a receiving third State:
(a) Whether the authorities of the removing State had taken into account the available general
information about the receiving third country and its asylum system in an adequate manner and of
their own initiative; and
(b) whether the applicants had been given a sufficient opportunity to demonstrate that the receiving
State was not a safe third country in their particular case. Any presumption that a particular country is
“safe” must be sufficiently supported by the above analysis.
The Court specified that it does not assess whether there was an arguable claim about Article 3 risks in the country
of origin. The Court thus distanced itself from its approach in certain previous cases where it had mentioned that
the applicants’ claim about risks in their countries of origin were arguable, even though the removing State in
those cases had not examined them on the merits.
The Court found that Hungary had failed to discharge its procedural obligation under Article 3, having regard
to the fact that there was an insufficient basis for the decision to establish a general presumption concerning
Serbia as a safe third country; that the expulsion decisions disregarded the authoritative findings of the UNHCR
as to a real risk of a denial of access to an effective asylum procedure in Serbia and of a summary removal
from Serbia to North Macedonia and onward to Greece; and that the Hungarian authorities had exacerbated the
risks facing the applicants by inducing them to enter Serbia illegally instead of negotiating an orderly return with
relevant guarantees.
The Court also clarified an important issue concerning the scope of cases before it in referral proceedings by
finding that complaints that had not been rejected as inadmissible or declared admissible by the Chamber were
considered to fall within the scope of the case before the Grand Chamber.
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3.

Right to liberty and security (Article 5)

a. Deprivation of liberty (Article 5 § 1)
Ilias and Ahmed v. Hungary [GC]45 concerned the short-term confinement of asylum-seekers in a land border
transit zone before being removed to a third country46.
The applicants spent twenty-three days in the transit zone on the land border between Hungary and Serbia,
pending examination of their asylum claims. The zone measured 110 m2 and was fully guarded at all times.
Inside it, the applicants could spend time outdoors, communicate with other asylum-seekers and receive visits.
The Court declared the applicants’ complaints under Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 incompatible ratione materiae with the
Convention.
The judgment is noteworthy because the Court examined for the first time the applicability of Article 5 to the
confinement of asylum-seekers in a transit zone on the land border between two member States of the Council
of Europe.
The Court examined whether the confinement of the applicants amounted to a restriction on liberty of movement
or to a deprivation of liberty. It set down the factors to be taken into account: (a) the applicants’ individual situation
and their choices; (b) the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose; (c) the relevant
duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection enjoyed by the applicants; and (d)
the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on or experienced by the applicants. The Court found
that Article 5 did not apply because the applicants’ confinement did not exceed the maximum duration set by
domestic law or what was strictly necessary to verify whether their wish to enter Hungary to seek asylum could
be granted. Furthermore, while their freedom of movement had been restricted significantly (similar to certain
types of light-regime detention facilities), their liberty had not been limited unnecessarily or to an extent or in a
manner unconnected to the examination of their asylum claims.
The Court distinguished cases concerning confinement in airport transit zones47 from the present case where it
was possible to walk to the border and cross into Serbia, a country bound by the Geneva Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees. The applicants’ fears about deficiencies in Serbia’s asylum procedures were not
sufficient to render their stay involuntary. The Convention could not be read as linking the applicability of Article
5 to a separate issue concerning the authorities’ compliance with Article 3. In sum, the relevant factors did not
point to a de facto deprivation of liberty and it was possible for the applicants, without a direct threat to their life or
health, to return to Serbia. Article 5 could not be seen applicable in a land border transit zone where individuals
awaited the outcome of their asylum claims because the authorities had not complied with their separate duties
under Article 3.
In Z.A. and Others v. Russia [GC]48 the Court examined whether the confinement of asylum-seekers in an airport
transit zone amounted to a deprivation of liberty.
Travelling independently from each other, the four applicants entered Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport. While
they did not arrive there because of a direct and immediate danger to their life or health, their arrival was
nonetheless involuntary – either because they had been denied entry into a third country or because they had
45
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been deported to Russia. After being denied entry into Russia, they unsuccessfully applied for refugee status.
In the meantime, they were held in the international transit zone of the airport for periods ranging from five
months to one year and ten months, even though domestic rules granted asylum-seekers the right to be placed
in temporary accommodation facilities. Although the applicants were largely left to their own devices within the
transit zone, the size of the area and the manner in which it was controlled by the border guards meant that their
freedom of movement was significantly restricted.
The Court considered that, on account of the absence of a legal basis, the applicants’ lengthy confinement in the
airport transit area amounted to a de facto deprivation of liberty. It found a violation of Article 5 § 1 and of Article
3 on account of the authorities’ failure to take care of their essential needs while so detained.
The judgment is noteworthy for the manner in which it addressed the applicability of, and compliance with, Article
5 § 1 in the context of confinement of foreigners in airport transit zones.
1.
As a preliminary consideration, the Court stressed that the right to have one’s liberty restricted
only in accordance with the law and the right to humane conditions if detained under State control are
minimum guarantees which should be available to those under the jurisdiction of all member States,
despite the mounting “migration crisis” in Europe.
2.
Drawing upon its case-law concerning confinement in airport transit zones49, the Court set out
four factors to be taken into consideration when assessing whether a measure of confinement of asylumseekers amounts to a restriction on liberty of movement or to a deprivation of liberty, whether in an airport
transit zone or in reception centres for the identification and registration of migrants. These factors are as
follows:
a.
The applicants’ individual situation and their choices (whether they had requested
admission to the State voluntarily and whether they faced a direct and immediate danger to their
life or health);
b.
the applicable legal regime of the respective country and its purpose (absent other
significant factors, the situation of individuals applying for entry and waiting for a short period for
the verification of their right to enter cannot be described as a deprivation of liberty, since in such
cases the State authorities have undertaken vis-à-vis the individuals no other steps than reacting
to their wish to enter by carrying out the necessary verifications;)
c.
the relevant duration, especially in the light of the purpose and the procedural protection
enjoyed by the applicants and
d.
the nature and degree of the actual restrictions imposed on, or experienced by, the
applicants.
The Court found that the applicants had been deprived of their liberty within the meaning of Article 5
having regard to the lack of any domestic legal provisions fixing the maximum duration of their stay; the
largely irregular character of their stay in the airport transit zone; the excessive duration of such stay and
considerable delays in the domestic examination of their asylum claims; the characteristics of the area in
which they had been held; the control to which they had been subjected during the relevant period of time;
and the fact that the applicants had had no practical possibility of leaving the zone.
3.
As regards the merits of the complaint, the Court indicated how to comply with the lawfulness
requirement of Article 5. This requirement may be considered generally satisfied by a domestic legal regime
that provides, for example, for no more than the name of the authority competent to order deprivation of
49
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liberty in a transit zone, the form of the order, its possible grounds and limits, the maximum duration of
confinement and, as required by Article 5 § 4, the applicable avenue of judicial appeal. The Court further
specified that Article 5 § 1 (f) does not prevent States from enacting domestic law provisions formulating
the grounds on which such confinement can be ordered with due regard to the practical realities of a
massive influx of asylum-seekers. In particular, deprivation of liberty in a transit zone for a limited period
is not prohibited if such a confinement is generally necessary to ensure the asylum-seekers’ presence
pending the examination of their asylum claims or, if there is a need to examine the admissibility of asylum
applications speedily and if, to that end, a structure and adapted procedures have been put in place in the
transit zone.
In the present case, the Court found a violation of Article 5 § 1 due to the absence of any legal basis for
the applicants’ lengthy confinement in the transit zone.
b. Persons of unsound mind (Article 5 § 1 (e))
Rooman v. Belgium [GC]50 concerned the applicant’s deprivation of liberty in a psychiatric institute. The applicant,
a German-speaking Belgian national, was sentenced for serious sexual and other offences. While in prison,
he committed further offences and his detention in a psychiatric institution was ordered. Since 2004 he had
therefore been detained in a “social protection facility” (“EDS”) in the French-speaking region of Belgium: medical
reports attested to a psychotic and paranoid personality representing a danger to society. He complained, under
Articles 3 and 5, of the failure to provide him with the necessary psychiatric treatment in the EDS. The Chamber
found that the applicant’s detention without appropriate treatment due to the unavailability of German-speaking
therapists for thirteen years (apart from some short periods) violated Article 3. However, it also found that this
lack of treatment did not sever the link with the aim of his detention or render his detention unlawful, thus finding
no violation of Article 5.
Further to the delivery of the Chamber judgment, in August 2017 fresh efforts were made to provide the applicant
with treatment in German. The Grand Chamber found a violation of Articles 3 and 5 given the lack of treatment
prior to August 2017 and no violation of those Articles as regards the care proposed since then.
1.
The principal issue was whether Article 5 § 1 (e) had, in addition to its social role of ensuring
the protection of society, a therapeutic one which required appropriate treatment to ensure the detention
remained lawful. In its earlier judgments51, the Court had found that a right to appropriate treatment could
not be derived from Article 5 § 1 (e). Later, beginning with Aerts v. Belgium52, the case-law began to
recognise a link between the lawfulness of a deprivation of liberty and the conditions of its execution53.
This led to a series of judgments against Belgium54 where the Court found the psychiatric wings of Belgian
prisons inappropriate for the lengthy detention of mentally ill persons as they did not receive appropriate
care and treatment for their conditions and were thus deprived of any realistic prospect of rehabilitation.
That deficiency severed the necessary link with the purpose, and thus the lawfulness, of the detention,
leading to a violation of Article 5 § 1.
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The Court confirmed in the present case that, in the light of these case-law developments and current
international standards55, the deprivation of liberty contemplated by Article 5 § 1 (e) can be considered to
have a dual function: as well as the social function of protection it also has a therapeutic one so that the
administration of “appropriate and individualised treatment” to such a detainee has become a condition of
the lawfulness of that detention. The presence of “appropriate and individualised treatment” is therefore
the “essential part” of a decision as to whether a detaining facility is an appropriate one for such detention.
2.
The Court also clarified the relationship between Articles 3 and 5 as regards the assessment of
the adequacy of medical treatment for mentally ill detainees. The question of a continued link between
the purpose of detention and the conditions in which it is carried out (Article 5 § 1 (e)) and the question of
whether those conditions attain a particular threshold of gravity (Article 3) were considered by the Court
to be of “differing intensity”. Accordingly, a finding of no violation of Article 3 does not automatically lead to
no violation of Article 5 § 1.
3.
The applicant had not been receptive to the treatment plan offered since August 2017 and domestic
law prohibited its imposition. Drawing on Recommendation Rec (2004)1056, the Court confirmed that this
did not imply that treatment was to be imposed. Rather, treatment was to be proposed, providing the
applicant with a choice of treatment. Considering the significant efforts made by the authorities to provide
the applicant with coherent and adapted treatment, the short period during which they had an opportunity
to implement these treatment measures and the fact that the applicant had not always been receptive to
them, the Court concluded that the treatment available since August 2017 corresponded to the therapeutic
aim of the applicant’s compulsory confinement.
4.
Finally, it was accepted that the applicant had not received treatment because it was not available
in German. The Court emphasised that the Convention did not guarantee detainees the right to treatment
in their own language. As regards Article 3, the question was whether, “in parallel with other factors,
necessary and reasonable steps were taken to guarantee communication that would facilitate the effective
administration of appropriate treatment”. However, it was accepted that as regards psychiatric treatment
“the purely linguistic element could prove to be decisive as to the availability or the administration
of appropriate treatment, but only where other factors [did] not make it possible to offset the lack of
communication”. In the context of Article 5, the Social Protection Board (which had committed the applicant
to compulsory confinement) had confirmed his right to speak, be understood and to receive treatment in
German, a national language in Belgium, so the finding of a violation of Article 5 in the present case could
be confined to those very particular facts.
c. Speediness of review (Article 5 § 4)
Aboya Boa Jean v. Malta57 provided an answer to the question whether procedural irregularities in the review of
lawfulness automatically result in a violation of Article 5 § 4.
The applicant was in immigration detention awaiting examination of his asylum application58. Under Maltese law
an automatic review of the lawfulness of immigration detention had to take place within seven working days of
an individual’s placement in detention, and the review period could be extended by a further seven working days.
In the applicant’s case, and contrary to domestic-law requirements, the automatic review was only carried out
after twenty-five calendar days because of difficulties in convening the Immigration Appeals Board within the first
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seven working days and also because of the applicant’s request for an adjournment on the twentieth calendar
day following his detention, which was within the maximum domestic time-limit of seven plus seven working days.
The applicant complained that the Article 5 § 4 procedure had not been speedy because of the breach of the
statutory deadline obliging the Board to carry out an automatic review of the lawfulness of his detention. The
Court disagreed and found no violation of Article 5 § 4.
The judgment is noteworthy as regards the treatment of the nature and scope of Article 5 § 4 proceedings. The
Court observed that the forms of judicial review which satisfy the requirements of Article 5 § 4 may vary from one
domain to another “and will depend on the type of deprivation of liberty in issue”. Importantly, it pointed out that
a system of automatic periodic review of the lawfulness of detention by a court may ensure compliance with the
requirements of Article 5 § 4.
One such requirement was that a review must be speedy. The question whether the periods of time which elapse
between automatic periodic reviews complied with the speediness requirement had to be determined in the light
of the circumstances of each case, bearing in mind the nature of the detention59.
The Court then addressed the impact of the procedural irregularities on the Article 5 § 4 proceedings. It stressed
that although a deprivation of liberty may be unlawful under Article 5 § 1 because it was not “in accordance with
a procedure prescribed by law”, breaches of mandatory procedural requirements did not of themselves give rise
to a breach of Article 5 § 4. The decisive question in the applicant’s case was whether the review satisfied the
speediness test. The Court observed that while detention which is not compliant with domestic law induces a
violation of Article 5 § 1, a breach of time-limits for automatic reviews does not necessarily amount to a violation
of Article 5 § 4, if the proceedings were nonetheless decided speedily. The Court considered that (despite
certain irregularities) the time which elapsed until the first review, i.e. twenty running days – which due to a
postponement became twenty-five running days – was not unreasonable.
d. Right to compensation (Article 5 § 5)
In Porchet v. Switzerland (dec.)60 the Court clarified its case-law on the concept of compensation (“réparation”)
within the meaning of Article 5 § 5 and whether a reduction in sentence can be regarded as “compensation”.
The applicant was arrested for endangering life and driving a vehicle without a licence. He was placed in pretrial detention in premises intended for police custody and was held there for eighteen days instead of the fortyeight hours authorised by law. The applicant was subsequently sentenced to thirty-five months’ imprisonment,
part of which was suspended. In order to compensate for the sixteen days of detention in a police custody cell,
the Criminal Court granted him a reduction in sentence of eight days. The applicant claimed that he had a right
under Article 5 § 5 to monetary compensation for his detention, which had been in breach of Article 5 § 1 of the
Convention.
The Court declared the application incompatible ratione personae with the Convention.
This decision is noteworthy because the Court made clear that the concept of “compensation” within the meaning
of Article 5 § 5 is not to be understood solely in financial terms.
While the existing case-law was relatively sparse, some aspects were of relevance to this case:
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The Commission had previously found that, although the right to compensation under Article 5 § 5 was
primarily financial, it could be broader in scope.61 Moreover, Article 5 § 5 did not guarantee a right to a
certain amount of compensation62.
Applying, by analogy, its case-law concerning compliance with the reasonable-time requirement from
the standpoint of Article 6 § 163 and Article 5 § 364 and the case-law concerning conditions of detention
contrary to Article 365, the Court noted that a reduction in sentence could constitute compensation
within the meaning of Article 5 § 5 if it was explicitly granted to afford redress for the violation in
question and had a measurable and proportionate impact on the sentence served by the person
concerned66.
Accordingly, the Court held that the applicant could no longer claim to be a victim of a violation of
Article 5 § 5 because the national authorities had acknowledged the violation and had afforded redress
comparable to just satisfaction as provided for under Article 41.

IV.

PROCEDURAL RIGHTS

1.

Right to a fair hearing in civil proceedings (Article 6 § 1)

a. Applicability
In Altay v. Turkey (no. 2)67 the Court ruled that oral communication between lawyers and their clients falls within
the notion of “private life” and is a “civil” right.
The applicant was serving a life sentence. Since September 2005 he had had to conduct his consultations with
his lawyer in the presence of a prison officer. The measure was imposed by a court when it was discovered
that the lawyer had acted in a manner incompatible with the standards of her profession by trying to send the
applicant reading material which did not relate to his defence rights. The applicant alleged that the restriction
of the privacy of his consultations with his lawyer was incompatible with his rights under Article 8 and that the
domestic proceedings in which he had attempted to challenge this measure had not complied with the fairness
requirements of Article 6 § 1 since, among other things, he had not been afforded an oral hearing. The Court
agreed on both counts.
The judgment is noteworthy because the Court ruled for the first time that oral communication between individuals
and their lawyers in the context of legal assistance falls within the scope of private life since the purpose of such
interaction is to allow individuals to make informed decisions about their lives.
It is also noteworthy that the Court’s view of the nature of the lawyer-client relationship weighed heavily in its
assessment of whether the applicant could rely on the civil limb of Article 6 to complain of the fairness of the
proceedings which he brought to challenge the restriction. The Government argued that the restriction on the
consultation with his lawyer was a preventive measure imposed in the interests of maintaining order and security
61
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within the prison and was therefore of a public-law nature. However, the Court found that the substance of the
right in question, concerning the applicant’s ability to converse in private with his lawyer, is of a predominately
personal and individual character, bringing the present dispute closer to the civil sphere. Since a restriction on
either party’s ability to confer in full confidentiality with each other would frustrate much of the usefulness of the
exercise of this right, the Court concluded that private-law aspects of the dispute predominate over public-law
ones.
This conclusion on the applicability of the civil limb of Article 6 can be viewed as complementary to the case-law
in which the Court has held in respect of proceedings instituted in the prison context that some restrictions on
prisoners’ rights fall within the sphere of “civil rights”68.
The Court’s reasoning on the merits of the Article 6 complaint contains a review of the case-law on the right to
an oral hearing in the context of civil proceedings. In the present case, it found that there were no exceptional
circumstances which justified dispensing with an oral hearing in the impugned proceedings.
b. Reasonable time
In Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC]69 the Court set out the procedural obligations on a State following a
car accident which caused life-threatening injuries70.
The Court ruled, inter alia, that the length of the investigation did not exceed the reasonable-time requirement
under Article 6.
The Court found that the criminal investigation had not been deficient. Therefore, it could not be said that the
legal system failed to deal adequately with the applicant’s case, thus not violating Article 2. Interestingly, and
having found that the length of the investigation (over eight years) had not affected its effectiveness71, the Court
examined this length issue separately under Article 672, finding that it did not give rise to a violation of the
reasonable-time requirement contained therein.
2.

Presumption of innocence (Article 6 § 2)

In Carrefour v. France (dec.)73, the Court ruled on the principle that punishment should only be applied to the
offender in relation to the merger of one company into another.
Proceedings were brought against a subsidiary of the applicant company for anti-competitive practices. While
the proceedings were under way, the applicant company took over its subsidiary as a going concern with all
assets and liabilities, without liquidating the business before. The applicant company thus replaced the merged
company in respect of all its pending contracts and became the employer of its staff. Subsequently, in the
competition proceedings, the applicant company was ordered to pay a civil fine of 60,000 euros in respect of
acts imputable to its former subsidiary, whose business it had continued. The applicant company appealed,
arguing that this fine breached the principle that punishment should only be applied to the offender. The Court of
68
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Cassation dismissed its appeal, because, as the merger had resulted in the economic and functional continuity
of the former company, a judgment against the surviving company in respect of infringements committed in
the context of the merged company’s activity was not incompatible with that principle. The Court dismissed the
application as manifestly ill-founded.
The decision is noteworthy as it was the first time that the Court had examined, in the light of the principle that
punishment should only be applied to the offender, the specific situation of a merger of one company into the
other, with the economic and functional continuity of the merged company.
The Court had previously dealt with this principle when examining the compatibility with Article 6 § 2 of a judgment
against heirs who had been given fines of a criminal nature for acts of tax fraud that had been imputed to the
deceased.74 Under Article 7, refusing to pierce the corporate veil of legal personality, the Court has relied on
that principle to find against the confiscation of the applicant companies’ property for acts engaging the criminal
liability of their directors75.
In the present case, the Court found that the imposition of a civil fine on the applicant company had not breached
the principle that punishment should only be applied to the offender.
The Court observed that in the event of the merger of one company into another, the business of the merged
company passed to the surviving company and its shareholders became shareholders of the latter. The economic
activity that had formerly been carried on by the merged company, and which had constituted its core business,
was thus continued by the company benefiting from the operation. As a result of the continuity from one company
to another, the merged company was not really “another” in relation to the surviving company.
Therefore, the situation brought about by the merger of one company into the other, entailing the economic and
functional continuity of the merged company, constitutes an exception to the principle that punishment should
only be applied to the offender.
The Court emphasised that an unconditional application of the principle in this context could render nugatory
the economic liability of legal entities, which would be able to evade any pecuniary sanctions merely through
operations such as mergers. The choice made in French law was therefore driven by the imperative of ensuring
the effectiveness of pecuniary sanctions, which would be negated by the systematic application to legal entities
of the principle that punishment should only be applied to the offender. The Court further noted that the approach
of EU law in the field of competition law was similar, being driven by the same concerns: to avoid companies
evading the Commission’s sanctions by the mere fact that they had taken on a new identity following legal or
organisational changes; and to ensure the effective implementation of the competition rules.
3.

Defence rights (Article 6 § 3)

In Sigurður Einarsson and Others v. Iceland76 the defence had been denied access to a mass of data and
involvement in its electronic sifting by the prosecution when the latter was gathering relevant information for
investigation.
The applicants occupied senior positions in a bank that collapsed due to the 2008 banking crisis in Iceland. They
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were convicted for breach of trust or market manipulation. Their defence was given access to the documents
included in the investigation file, as well as to the material selected from that file and presented to the trial court.
However, the defence had not been given access to the vast amount of data collected indiscriminately by the
prosecution and not included in the investigation file, comprising the particular category of data “tagged” as a
result of searches using the Clearwell e-Discovery system. Furthermore, the defence had been unable to have
a say in the prosecution’s electronic sifting of that data and had been denied the possibility of carrying out a
Clearwell search in order to identify evidence that could potentially be exculpatory.
The judgment is noteworthy in three respects:
- Firstly, it clarifies the content of the right to have adequate facilities for the preparation of the defence with
regard to a vast volume of unprocessed material collected indiscriminately by the prosecution and a priori not
relevant to the case. For the Court, the data in question were more akin to any other evidence which might
have existed but had not been collected by the prosecution at all than to evidence of which the prosecution
had knowledge but which it refused to disclose to the defence. Since the prosecution had not been aware of
the content of the mass of data, and to that extent it had not held any advantage over the defence, the denial
of access to such raw data was not a situation of withholding evidence or “non-disclosure” in the classic sense.
- Secondly, regarding the processing or sifting of such raw material by the prosecution, the Court specified the
nature of the procedural safeguards which should guard against the concealment of information of relevance
to the defence. The Court stressed that a possibility of a review by a court was an important safeguard in
determining whether access to data should be ensured. Also, an important safeguard in a sifting process would
be to ensure that the defence was provided with an opportunity to be involved in the laying-down of the criteria
for determining what might be relevant to the case. In particular, concerning access to the intermediate results
of such sifting, for instance to the “tagged” data in question in the instant case, it would have been appropriate
for the defence to have been afforded the possibility of conducting a search for potentially exculpatory evidence
and any refusal to allow the defence to have further searches of the “tagged” documents carried out would in
principle raise an issue under Article 6 § 3 (b).
- Finally, the Court took into account the following factors when assessing the overall fairness of the proceedings
in issue:
whether the applicants had pointed to any specific issue which could have been clarified by further
searches;
whether the applicants had formally sought a court order for access to the mass of data collected by
the prosecution or for further searches to be carried out and
whether they had suggested further investigative measures – such as a fresh search using specific
keywords.
4.

Other rights in criminal proceedings

a. No punishment without law (Article 7)
Parmak and Bakır v. Turkey77 concerned the retroactive application of more lenient changes to substantive
criminal law and whether a broad interpretation of domestic law was “reasonably foreseeable”.
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In 2006 the applicants were convicted of membership of a terrorist organisation (they had met each other,
disseminated flyers and possessed illegal periodicals and a manifesto). They were convicted under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act (Law no. 3713), which was in force at the time of the impugned activities in 2002. This
Law described “terrorism” as any act committed by means of pressure, force and violence, terror, intimidation,
oppression or threat, with one or more of the listed political or ideological aims. The domestic courts also took
into account the amended 2003 version of the Law, which narrowed the definition of “terrorism” by including
the use of force and violence as well as other cumulative conditions. The domestic courts found that “force and
violence” should be interpreted broadly and include situations where violence, although not used in the ordinary
physical sense, was adopted as the goal of an organisation, as in the applicants’ case. This requirement of “force
and violence” was therefore found to be satisfied in their case because the texts which they had disseminated/
possessed were so objectionable as to amount to “moral coercion” of the public. The Court found a violation of
Article 7.
The judgment is noteworthy because the Court has, for the first time, indicated that the principle recognised in
Scoppola v. Italy (no. 2) [GC]78 – the need to apply retroactively an intervening and more lenient criminal penalty
– extends to intervening favourable changes to substantive law. In the present case, the Turkish courts had taken
into account the new 2003 Law, in conjunction with its original version from 2002, so the Court mainly assessed
the compatibility with Article 7 of the domestic courts’ interpretation of those provisions.
This assessment is interesting because of the manner in which the Court examined whether the domestic courts’
broad interpretation of domestic law was “reasonably foreseeable” for the purposes of Article 7 § 1. The Court
applied a two-tier test.
Firstly, the Court examined whether the interpretation was the “resultant development of a perceptible line of
case-law”. There had been no comparable case in which an association had been deemed to be a terrorist
organisation on the sole basis of the nature of its written declarations and in the absence of violent acts. Nor were
there any examples of domestic case-law that used the concept of “moral coercion” in the context of terrorist
offences.
Secondly, it assessed whether the “application of the law in broader circumstances was nevertheless consistent
with the essence of the offence” of membership of a terrorist organisation and whether the text reasonably
implied the concept of “moral coercion”. That the use of violence as a necessary element of terrorism in the
2003 version of the Law was singled out supported the conclusion that actual violence or the intent to use such
violence was central to the definition of the offence. Moreover, the Turkish Court of Cassation had clarified that,
when assessing whether an organisation could be classified as terrorist, the domestic courts should examine
thoroughly the nature of the organisation, its purpose, whether it had adopted an action plan or similar operational
measures and whether it had resorted to violence, or there was a credible threat to use violence, in pursuing that
action plan. However, while the domestic courts had held that the organisation in question had not engaged in
any violent acts or armed attacks, they had not examined whether it had adopted an action plan or any concrete
preparatory steps for such a purpose. They had therefore failed to demonstrate that the cumulative elements of
the offence of membership of a terrorist organisation were present in the applicants’ cases. The applicants had
been convicted because of the political ideas expressed in some of the documents found to be the product of
their organisation.
b. Right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention)
In Mihalache v. Romania [GC]79 the Court set out the criteria for determining whether a decision constitutes an
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“acquittal” or a “conviction” and whether it is “final ”.
The prosecution discontinued the criminal proceedings against the applicant for refusal to undergo biological
testing to determine his blood alcohol level and imposed an administrative fine instead. The applicant did not
contest that decision within the twenty-day time-limit laid down in domestic law and paid the fine. A few months
later, considering that the administrative fine had been inappropriate, the higher-ranking prosecutor’s office set
aside the decision. The applicant was then sentenced to a suspended term of one year’s imprisonment. In the
Convention proceedings he complained that he had been tried and convicted twice for the same offence, in breach
of Article 4 § 1 of Protocol No. 7. He also submitted that the reopening of the proceedings against him had not
been in conformity with the criteria set out in Article 4 § 2. The Court found a breach of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7.
The judgment is noteworthy in four respects:
1.
The Court has, for the first time, defined the scope of the expression “acquitted or convicted” and
laid down general criteria in this regard.
Firstly, judicial intervention is unnecessary for a decision to be regarded as an “acquittal” or a “conviction”.
Whereas the French version of Article 4 of Protocol No. 7 provides that the person must have been “acquitté
ou condamné par un jugement”, the English version requires the person to have been “finally acquitted
or convicted”. The Court observed that it matters whether the decision has been given by an authority
participating in the administration of justice in the national legal system concerned, and whether that authority
is competent under domestic law to establish and punish the unlawful behaviour of which an individual has
been accused. The fact that the decision does not take the form of a judgment cannot call into question the
accused’s acquittal or conviction, since such a procedural and formal aspect cannot have a bearing on the
effects of the decision.
Secondly, to determine whether a decision constitutes an “acquittal” or a “conviction”, the Court will consider
the actual content of the decision and assess its effects on the applicant’s situation, in particular, whether
his or her “criminal” responsibility has been established following an assessment of the circumstances of
the case by an authority vested by domestic law with decision-making power, enabling it to examine the
merits of a case.The finding that there has been a determination as to the merits of a case will depend on
the progress of the proceedings. In this respect, the Court may take into account these factors:
Whether a criminal investigation has been initiated after an accusation has been
brought against the person in question;
whether the victim has been interviewed;
whether the evidence has been gathered and examined by the competent authority;
whether a reasoned decision has been given on the basis of that evidence; and
whether a penalty has been ordered as a result of the behaviour attributed to the
person concerned.
2.
The Court also clarified the criteria to determine whether a decision is “final”. It must be ascertained
whether the decision is subject to an “ordinary remedy”, meaning a remedy with a clear scope and procedure,
available to the parties within a specified time-limit and thus satisfying the principle of legal certainty.
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In the instant case, the Court did not question the possibility for a higher-ranking prosecutor’s office to
examine of its own motion the merits of decisions taken by a lower-level prosecutor’s office. However, a
possibility to reopen the proceedings and reconsider the merits of a decision without being bound by any
time-limit did not constitute an “ordinary remedy”. Only the remedy allowing the applicant to challenge the
fine within twenty days was an “ordinary” one. Since the applicant did not avail himself of that remedy, the
decision imposing a fine on him had become “final” on the expiry of the twenty-day time-limit, well before
the higher-ranking prosecutor’s office exercised its discretion to reopen the criminal proceedings.
3.
The Court also clarified that the conditions, which permit the reopening of a case as set out in
Article 4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7, are alternative and not cumulative.
4.
Finally, the Court fleshed out the concept of “fundamental defect” within the meaning of Article
4 § 2 of Protocol No. 7. Only a serious violation of a procedural rule severely undermining the integrity
of the previous proceedings can serve as the basis for reopening them to the detriment of the accused.
Consequently, in such cases, a mere reassessment of the evidence on file by the public prosecutor or the
higher-level court would not fulfil that criterion. However, in situations where a reopening of proceedings
might work to the advantage of the accused, the nature of the defect must be assessed primarily to
ascertain whether there has been a violation of the defence rights and therefore an impediment to the
proper administration of justice.
c. Right to an effective remedy (Article 13)80
Ulemek v. Croatia81 concerned the relationship between preventive and compensatory remedies for conditions
of detention that breach Article 3.
The applicant served his prison sentence in Zagreb Prison and Glina State Prison. The circumstances of detention
in each facility differed in terms of the prison regime applicable and the conditions of detention. As to the conditions
of detention in Zagreb Prison, the applicant did not avail himself of the preventive remedy before the prison
administration and/or the sentence-execution judge (which the Court had already found to be effective). As to
the conditions in Glina State Prison, the applicant did use that remedy but, once his complaints were dismissed,
he failed to complain to the Constitutional Court, which remedy the Court had already found to be an additional
required step in the process of exhausting the preventive remedy for conditions of detention in Croatia. However,
after his release from Glina State Prison, the applicant began a civil action for damages for allegedly inadequate
conditions in both facilities. When that action was unsuccessful, he complained to the Constitutional Court which
examined the overall period of his confinement in the two detention facilities and dismissed his complaint on the
merits. The applicant mainly complained under Articles 3 and 13 of the inadequate conditions of his detention in
both prisons and of a lack of an effective remedy in that regard.
The Court examined the relationship between preventive and compensatory remedies for inadequate conditions
and explored whether using the preventive remedy could or should condition access to the compensatory one.
In so doing, the judgment provided a useful overview of the Court’s case-law on remedies for conditions of
detention.
1.
When examining the exhaustion of domestic remedies as well as the complaint under Article 13,
the Court distinguished between cases where the domestic system provided for an effective preventive
remedy (where the use of a compensatory remedy after release was sufficient) and cases where both
80
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remedies existed. In this latter respect, the Court reasoned as follows:
86. [F]rom the perspective of the State’s duty under Article 13, the prospect of future redress cannot
legitimise particularly severe suffering in breach of Article 3 and unacceptably weaken the legal obligation
on the State to bring its standards of detention into line with the Convention requirements ... Thus, given
the close affinity of Articles 13 and 35 § 1 of the Convention, it would be unreasonable to accept that
once a preventive remedy has been established from the perspective of Article 13 – as a remedy found
by the Court to be the most appropriate avenue to address the complaints of inadequate conditions of
detention – an applicant could be dispensed from the obligation to use that remedy before bringing his
or her complaint to the Court...
85. Thus, normally, before bringing their complaints to the Court concerning the conditions of their
detention, applicants are first required to use properly the available and effective preventive remedy and
then, if appropriate, the relevant compensatory remedy.
The Court accepted that there might be instances in which an otherwise effective preventive remedy
would be futile in view of the brevity of the detention in inadequate conditions so that the only viable option
would be a compensatory remedy, although the compensatory remedy should normally be used within six
months of the end of the allegedly inadequate conditions of detention.
In the present case, and given that the Constitutional Court (the highest court in the State), had examined
the merits of the applicant’s complaints of inadequate conditions of detention for the overall period of his
confinement, the Court did not consider that his complaints could be dismissed for a failure to exhaust
domestic remedies. It also found his complaint under Article 13 to be manifestly ill-founded, confirming its
case-law as to the existence of effective preventive and compensatory remedies for inadequate conditions
of detention in Croatia.
2.
As to the extent to which the above principles indicate the manner in which preventive and
compensatory remedies for inadequate prison conditions could or should be organised within the meaning
of Article 13, and are to be exhausted for the purposes of Article 35 § 1, the Court observed that the abovenoted findings were without prejudice to the possibility for domestic legal systems to provide for different
arrangements as regards the use of remedies (namely, a State might not condition the compensatory
remedy on exhaustion of the preventive one) and to provide for a longer statutory time-limit for the use
of the compensatory remedy, in which case the remedy is assessed according to the relevant domestic
arrangements and time-limits.

V.

OTHER RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

1.

Right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence (Article 8)

a. Applicability
Nicolae Virgiliu Tănase v. Romania [GC]82 clarified whether, in the context of a car accident causing life-threatening
injuries, the State’s procedural obligations are to be drawn from Articles 2, 3 or 8. The Court’s findings were
informed by two key elements: the incident was unintentional and there was no suggestion of a failure by the
State to adopt an adequate legal framework to ensure safety and reduce risk on the roads.
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As to Article 8, the Court reiterated that the positive obligations on a State to protect the physical and psychological
integrity of an individual in the sphere of relations between private individuals were subject to a threshold
requirement (Denisov v. Ukraine [GC]83) and, further, that private life did not extend to activities which are of an
essentially public nature (Friend and Others v. the United Kingdom (dec.)84). It outlined the particular elements of
this case which rendered Article 8 inapplicable: driving was an essentially public activity; any risk was minimised
by traffic regulations ensuring safety; and it did not concern a situation (such as violent acts or healthcare) where
the State’s positive obligation to protect physical or psychological integrity had been previously engaged. There
was therefore no “particular aspect of human interaction or contact” which could attract the application of Article
8. The complaint under Article 8 was thus declared incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.
b. Private life
The first request for an advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 to the Convention concerned the private life of a
child born of surrogacy abroad and the recognition of the legal relationship between that child and the intended
mother who has no genetic link to the child85.
López Ribalda and Others v. Spain [GC]86 concerned employees’ right to respect for their private life in the
workplace and the limits of the employer’s right to conduct video-surveillance.
The applicants worked as cashiers and sales assistants in a supermarket. After having noted certain stock
losses, their employer installed surveillance cameras. Some of the cameras, positioned to film the shop’s
entrances and exits, were in plain sight, while others, directed towards the tills and the checkout areas, were
hidden. Domestic law provided a formal and explicit statutory framework which obliged a person responsible for
a video- surveillance system, even in a public place, to give prior information to the persons being monitored by
the system. However, the applicants were only notified about the cameras that were visible and not about those
that were hidden; some of the applicants could potentially have been filmed throughout their working day. The
video-surveillance lasted for ten days and ceased when video-footage showed that the applicants had been
stealing items. They were dismissed on the basis of the video-recordings.
The judgment transposed the principles set down in Bărbulescu v. Romania87 to an employer’s video-surveillance
in the workplace, some of those principles having been drawn from the decision in Köpke v. Germany88, a
factually similar case to the present one.
The Court listed the following factors to be taken into account when assessing the competing interests and
proportionality of such video-surveillance measures:
a. Whether the employee has been notified of video-surveillance measures adopted by the employer
and of the implementation of such measures.
b. The extent of the monitoring by the employer and the degree of intrusion into the employee‘s privacy
– any limitations in time and space and the number of people who have access to the results should
be taken into account, as well as the level of privacy in the area being monitored.
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c. Whether the employer has provided legitimate reasons to justify monitoring and the extent thereof
– the more intrusive the monitoring, the “weightier” the justification required.
d. Whether it would have been possible to set up a monitoring system based on less intrusive methods
and measures (whether the aim pursued by the employer could have been achieved through a lesser
degree of interference with the employee’s privacy).
e. The consequences of the monitoring for the employees – account should be taken, in particular,
of the use made by the employer, of the results of the monitoring and whether such results had been
used to achieve the stated aim of the measure.
f. Whether the employee has been provided with appropriate safeguards, especially where the
employer’s monitoring operations are of an intrusive nature – such safeguards may include the
provision of information regarding the installation and extent of the monitoring to the employees
concerned or staff representatives, a declaration of such a measure to an independent body or the
possibility of making a complaint.
The Court found that the intrusion into the applicants’ privacy had not attained a high degree of seriousness and
that the considerations justifying the video-surveillance had been weighty. Having regard also to the significant
safeguards provided by the Spanish legal framework, including other remedies that the applicants had not used,
the Court concluded that the national authorities had not failed to fulfil their positive obligations under Article 8
such as would overstep their margin of appreciation.
In Mifsud v. Malt 89, the Court examined the obligation to provide a genetic sample in paternity proceedings.
The applicant was approximately 88 years old, when a woman, approximately 55 years old, began a civil action
to obtain an order for a paternity test for moral and financial reasons. The civil courts transferred the matter to the
constitutional courts. Despite the mandatory nature of the domestic provision in question, those courts carried
out a detailed review of the facts and of the competing interests involved before deciding to order the test.
The applicant then took the test, which confirmed he was the father, and the court ordered the amendment of
the woman’s birth certificate. The applicant complained under Article 8 of being required to undergo the paternity
test. The Court found no violation.
In the present case, the Court dealt for the first time with a complaint by a defendant in domestic proceedings on
whom a paternity test was imposed. The Court accepted that one can be compelled to give a genetic sample in
disputed paternity proceedings.
The Court found that the domestic courts struck a fair balance between the competing interests involved (the
bodily integrity and privacy of the father versus the moral and financial interest of the child in knowing her
biological reality).
Given the existence in Maltese law of a mandatory requirement, the judgment did not address the question of
any positive obligation on States to put in place mandatory tests90. Nevertheless, the Court observed that Article
8 did not “as such prohibit recourse to a medical procedure in defiance of the will of a suspect, or in defiance of
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the will of a witness, in order to obtain evidence” and that such methods – including in the civil sphere – were
“not in themselves contrary to the rule of law and natural justice”. The Court also pointed out the “particular
importance” in such cases of the legitimate aim of fulfilling the State’s positive obligations arising under Article 8
vis-à-vis a child (seeking to discover the biological reality of his or her birth).
In Beghal v. the United Kingdom91 the Court ruled on the authorities’ stop, search and questioning powers at
border controls pursuant to terrorism legislation.
The applicant, a French national, resided in the United Kingdom. She visited her French husband in a prison in
Paris where he was awaiting trial on terrorism charges. On her return to the United Kingdom she was stopped
by border officials at the airport. Acting pursuant to powers granted under Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000,
exercisable in respect of persons passing through United Kingdom ports of entry and exit, the officials informed
the applicant that they needed to speak to her to establish if she might be “a person concerned in the commission,
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”. She was further informed that she was not suspected of being a
terrorist and that she was not under arrest. The applicant and her luggage were searched. The applicant refused
to answer most of the questions put to her. After two hours, she was told that she was “free to go”. The applicant
was subsequently charged with wilfully failing to comply with a duty under Schedule 7 by refusing to answer
questions. The Supreme Court ultimately rejected the applicant’s challenge to the measures applied to her.92
The applicant complained, inter alia, that the exercise of the above-mentioned Schedule 7 powers violated
Article 8. The Court agreed, finding that, in the absence of adequate safeguards, the interference with her rights
was not “in accordance with the law”.
The following points are noteworthy:
- Firstly, the Court accepted that there had been an interference with the applicant’s right to respect for her
private life, distinguishing the applicant’s situation from “the search to which passengers uncomplainingly
submit at airports”93 because the Schedule 7 powers exercised in the applicant’s case were clearly wider than
the immigration powers to which travellers might reasonably expect to be subjected.
- Secondly, the Court reiterated, in the context of the need of States to combat international terrorism, that
States enjoy a wide margin of appreciation as regards matter of national security.
- Thirdly, it found that the safeguards provided by domestic law were insufficient to curtail the Schedule 7
powers so as to offer adequate protection against arbitrary interference with the right to respect for private
life. It highlighted the very broad discretion afforded to the authorities in deciding if and when to exercise the
powers. Significantly, the Court did not consider that the absence of a requirement of reasonable suspicion
that a person was in some way involved in terrorism by itself rendered the exercise of the powers in the
applicant’s case unlawful within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.
Nevertheless, the Court found that the Schedule 7 scheme could not be considered Convention-compliant for
the following reasons:
1.
Persons could be examined for up to a maximum of nine hours and were compelled to answer
questions put to them without the right to have a lawyer present;
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2.
the absence of any obligation on the part of the examining officer to show “reasonable suspicion”
would appear to have made it difficult for persons to have the lawfulness of the decision to exercise the
Schedule 7 power judicially reviewed and
3.
although the use of the powers was subject to independent oversight by the Independent
Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, such oversight was not capable of compensating for the otherwise
insufficient safeguards applicable to the operation of the Schedule 7 regime.
Altay v. Turkey (no. 2)
In Altay v. Turkey (no. 2)94 the Court ruled that oral communication between lawyers and their clients falls within
the notion of “private life”95.
The Court found that the restriction of the privacy of the applicant’s consultations with his lawyer breached Article
8. It ruled for the first time that an individual’s oral communications with his or her lawyer in the context of legal
assistance falls within the scope of private life since the purpose of such interaction is to allow that individual to
make informed decisions about his or her life.
The Court referred to its earlier case-law under Article 8, in particular regarding the privileged nature of the
lawyer-client relationship in the context of correspondence between prisoners and their lawyers. Having regard
to Campbell v. the United Kingdom96, the Court observed that the principle not to distinguish between different
categories of correspondence with lawyers applied a fortiori to oral, face-to-face communication with a lawyer.
Therefore both oral communication and correspondence between a lawyer and an individual were privileged
under Article 8.
In the present case, the Court found that the impugned restriction failed to satisfy the “in accordance with the
law” test. It noted that the domestic court had imposed the restriction in response to the lawyer’s attempt to send
reading material to the applicant that was not related to the rights of the defence. However, the interception
of correspondence on the grounds that it did not relate to the rights of the defence was not provided for in the
domestic law. For the Court, the manner of interpretation and application of the relevant law to the circumstances
of the applicant’s case was manifestly unreasonable and thus not foreseeable within the meaning of Article 8 § 2.
Vučina v. Croatia (dec.)97 concerned the protection of private life in the case of misidentification of a person
shown in a photograph.
A lifestyle magazine with nationwide distribution published a photograph of the applicant attending a popular
music concert. The caption to the picture wrongly identified the applicant as the wife of the then mayor of the city
where the concert was taking place. The applicant brought a civil action against the publisher of the magazine,
seeking damages in respect of the erroneous labelling of her photograph. She argued, inter alia, that, given the
controversial public profile of the mayor, she had experienced a series of small but unpleasant incidents after the
publication. The domestic courts ultimately dismissed her claim, stating that the facts of the case were not such
as to warrant awarding pecuniary compensation. In particular, since the name of the mayor’s wife had not been
mentioned in a negative context, and since she was not perceived by the public as a controversial figure, the
impugned error in the caption to the photograph did not amount to a breach of the applicant’s personality rights.
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The case is noteworthy in two respects:
1.
It is the first case where the alleged violation of the positive obligations under Article 8 concerned
the misidentification of a person shown in a photograph published, rather than from the publication of the
picture itself98.
2.
In addition, the Court applied the threshold-of-seriousness test to the question of the applicability
of Article 8 ratione materiae and, notably, to the question of the consequences for the applicant’s privacy
and honour and reputation, an approach set down in Denisov v. Ukraine [GC]99. The Court listed the
factors to determine the effect on the present applicant: the manner in which the photograph was obtained;
the nature of the publication; the purpose for which the photograph was used and how it could be used
subsequently; and the consequences of publication of the photograph for the applicant. Then the Court
concluded that, while the erroneous misidentification might have caused some distress to the applicant,
the level of seriousness associated with the erroneous labelling of her photograph and the inconvenience
that she had suffered did not give rise to an issue under Article 8, whether in the context of the protection
of her image or her honour and reputation. Consequently, Article 8 did not apply and the application was
incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention.
c. Family life
Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway [GC]100 concerned shortcomings in the decision-making process that
resulted in the adoption of a vulnerable child by foster parents.
The applicants were a mother and her son. Four days after the son was born, both moved to a parent-child
institution. Three weeks later the mother withdrew her agreement to stay in the institution and, as a result of
serious concerns expressed by the institution as to her ability to provide basic care to her son, he was placed in
foster care as an emergency measure. When making a full care order, the courts limited the mother’s access to
her son to six two-hour visits every year, which was subsequently reduced to four two-hour visits. Approximately
three years later, and contrary to her wishes, the mother was deprived of her parental responsibility and the
foster parents were authorised to adopt her son. The domestic courts found that particularly weighty reasons
existed for consenting to the proposed adoption. While the mother’s general situation had improved (she had
married and had a baby daughter for whom she appeared to be able to care), she would not be sufficiently able
to understand the special-care needs of her son, whom several experts had described as a vulnerable child who
needed a lot of quiet, security and support, and adoption would give the son, who was attached to his foster
parents, a sense of security.
The Court found a violation of Article 8.
The Court ruled that the decision-making process, leading to the withdrawal of parental responsibility and to
adoption, had not ensured that all views and interests of the applicants were taken into account.
Firstly, the domestic authorities had not performed a genuine balancing exercise between the interests of the
child and those of his biological family, but rather focused on the child’s interests without seriously contemplating
any possibility of the child’s reunification with his biological family. For example, the contact sessions had been
intended as a means of keeping the child familiar with his roots rather than facilitating his future return to the care
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of his biological mother and the manner in which those contact arrangements had been organised was found not
to have been particularly conducive to allowing the applicants to bond freely with one another.
Secondly, the assessment of the mother’s caring skills was considered to have been flawed. The relevant expert
reports dated from two years previously when the impugned decision had been taken. Only one of those reports
had actually been based on observations of the interplay between the applicants, and then on only two occasions.
In any event, only limited evidence could be drawn from the sparse contact that had taken place between the
applicants during the child’s placement in foster care. In addition, the authorities had not considered the potential
significance of the mother’s new family situation (her marriage and the birth of her second child).
Thirdly, the domestic courts’ reasoning in respect of the child’s special needs and vulnerability had been
insufficient. In particular, it had not been explained how the son’s vulnerability still persisted although he had
lived in foster care since the age of three weeks. Moreover, there had been barely any analysis of the nature of
his vulnerability, beyond a brief description that he was easily stressed and needed a lot of quiet, security and
support.
Guimon v. France101 concerned the refusal to allow a prisoner convicted of terrorist offences to leave prison
under escort to attend her father’s funeral.
The applicant, a member of the terrorist organisation ETA, had been in detention for eleven years for serious
terrorist offences when she requested escorted leave to travel to a funeral home to pay her respects to her
recently deceased father. She had not seen him for five years, since the prison was very far away and he had
not been able to visit her due to his ill health. The applicant had submitted her request for prison leave promptly,
leaving the authorities six days in which to organise an escort. Her request was refused for logistical reasons, as
were all her appeals.
The Court found no violation of Article 8. It noted that, according to the judicial authorities, the escort arrangements
needed to be particularly robust, given the applicant’s criminal profile; the context in which the leave would have
to be organised (returning a convicted Basque activist to the Basque Country, where she had much support); and
factual considerations such as the geographical distance of almost 650 km.
The Court saw no reason to question the Government’s assertion that the time available had been insufficient
to arrange an escort comprising officers specially trained in the transfer and supervision of a prisoner convicted
of terrorist offences and to organise the prior inspection of the premises. Thus, the refusal had not been
disproportionate to the legitimate aims pursued.
2.

Right to respect for one’s private and family life, home and correspondence (Article 8)

a. Article 14 taken in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
J.D. and A v. the United Kingdom102 concerned the test to be applied as regards the justification for a measure
of social and economic policy (“very weighty reasons” or “manifestly without reasonable foundation”).
The two applicants were social-housing tenants. Following a change to the statutory scheme in 2012, the
housing benefit to which they were previously entitled to subsidise their rental costs was reduced because the
amended scheme categorised the two applicants as having an extra bedroom. The purpose of the change was
to save public funds by incentivising those with “extra” bedrooms in social housing to move to smaller homes.
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The applicants complained mainly under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 that these
changes put them in a more precarious position than others affected by the reduction because of their personal
circumstances which meant they had a particular need to remain in their homes: the first applicant cared for
her disabled child full time, and the second was housed under a “sanctuary scheme” to protect those who had
experienced and remained at risk of serious domestic violence.
The Court found no violation as regards the first applicant: while it would be undesirable for her to move,
the measure was proportionate as she could move to smaller, appropriately adapted accommodation, and a
discretionary housing benefit was available.
As regards the second applicant, the Court found a violation: the aim of reducing the housing benefit (incentivising
her to move to a smaller house) conflicted with the aim of the “sanctuary scheme” (to enable her to remain in her
home for her own safety), no weighty reasons had been given to justify the prioritisation of one legitimate aim
over the other and the availability of the discretionary benefit would not render the scheme proportionate.
In this judgment, the Court clarified the appropriate test to be applied for the justification of a measure of social
and economic policy in the context of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
1.
This issue had been a key one before the domestic courts, which had disagreed on the test for
justification to be applied in the present cases, in particular:
whether it had to be shown that the measure was “manifestly without reasonable
foundation”, a test drawn from Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and according a broad
margin of appreciation to the State; or
whether “weighty reasons” were required to justify the measure, a test drawn from
Article 14 of the Convention and according less of a margin of appreciation to the
State.
2.
The Court noted that, while the margin of appreciation in the context of general measures of an
economic or social policy was wide, such measures had nevertheless to be implemented in a manner that
did not violate the prohibition of discrimination and had to comply with the requirement of proportionality.
Consequently, even the wide margin in the sphere of economic or social policy would not justify laws or
practices that would violate the prohibition of discrimination, so that the following tests would be applied:
In the context of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court
confirmed that it had applied the “manifestly without reasonable foundation” test
only to circumstances where an alleged difference in treatment resulted from a
transitional measure designed to correct a historic inequality103.
Outside that context, and where the alleged discrimination was on the basis of
disability and gender, “very weighty reasons” would be required to justify the impugned
measure. The Court explained that, given the need to prevent discrimination against
people with disabilities and foster their full participation and integration in society,
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the States was considerably reduced and
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such treatment would require “very weighty reasons” to be justified104. In addition,
the advancement of gender equality being a major goal in the member States
of the Council of Europe, “very weighty reasons” would have to be put forward
before a difference in treatment based on gender could be compatible with the
Convention105. This test was expressed in terms of the facts of the present case
(alleged discrimination on grounds of disability and gender) although the judgment
did not expressly limit the application of the test thereto.

VI.

ADVISORY OPINIONS

The first request for an advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 to the Convention, from the French Court of
Cassation, dealt with the private life of a child born of surrogacy abroad and the recognition of the legal relationship
between that child and the intended genetic mother who had no genetic link to the child106.
The judgment in Mennesson v. France107 concerned children born in the United States of America through a
legal gestational surrogacy arrangement. Their biological father and intended mother, who were married, were
unable to obtain recognition in France of the parent-child relationship. In this case, the Court found a violation of
the children’s right to respect for their private life under Article 8 because France prevented both the recognition
and establishment under domestic law of their legal relationship with their biological father. In the wake of
that judgment, domestic law changed: registration of the details of the birth certificate of a child born through
surrogacy abroad became possible for the intended father where he was the biological father, and where the
intended mother was married to the biological father, it became possible to adopt the child. It was during the reexamination of the later appeal of the Mennessons that the Court of Cassation requested this Court to give an
advisory opinion under Protocol No. 16 on two questions concerning the intended mother:
1.
By refusing to enter in the register of births, marriages and deaths the details of the birth
certificate of a child born abroad as the result of a gestational surrogacy arrangement, in so far as the
certificate designates the “intended mother” as the “legal mother”, while accepting registration in so far
as the certificate designates the “intended father”, who is the child’s biological father, is a State Party
overstepping its margin of appreciation under Article 8 of the [Convention]? In this connection should a
distinction be drawn according to whether or not the child was conceived using the eggs of the “intended
mother”?
2.
In the event of an answer in the affirmative to either of the two questions above, would the
possibility for the intended mother to adopt the child of her spouse, the biological father, this being a
means of establishing the legal mother-child relationship, ensure compliance with the requirements of
Article 8 of the Convention?
a.
The Court defined the boundaries of advisory-opinion requests under
Protocol No. 16 and of the requests made in the present case. It confirmed that
the Court had no jurisdiction either to assess the facts of a case or to evaluate
the merits of the parties’ views on the interpretation of domestic law in the light of
Convention law, or to rule on the outcome of the domestic proceedings. Its role was
limited to furnishing an opinion on the questions submitted and the requesting court
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had to draw the conclusions for the relevant provisions of national law and for the
outcome of the case. Moreover, the opinion of the Court was to be confined to the
issues directly connected to the pending domestic proceedings.
The Court received several submissions, including from the Mennessons and their
children, the French and other Governments, as well as from certain organisations.
The Court made it clear that its role was not to reply to all the grounds and arguments
submitted, or to set out in detail the basis for its response or to rule in adversarial
proceedings on contentious applications by means of a binding judgment. Rather,
its role was “to provide the requesting court or tribunal with guidance enabling it to
ensure respect for Convention rights when determining the case before it”.
b.
In the present case, the Court developed its case-law under Article 8. The
Mennesson line of case-law108 required domestic law to provide for a possibility of
recognising the legal relationship between children born of surrogacy abroad and
their intended and biological father. The present opinion extended that requirement
to the intended mother who has no genetic link with the child, but to a more limited
extent: Domestic law should provide a possibility of recognition of a legal parentchild relationship with the intended mother, but this recognition does not have to
take the form of entry in the register of births, marriages and deaths. Another means,
such as adoption of the child by the intended mother, may be used, provided that
the procedure laid down by domestic law is prompt and effective.
Two factors were of key importance in reaching these conclusions. The best interests of the child being paramount,
the impact of not recognising a parent-child relationship on the private life of the child was a key factor in the
affirmative response to the first question and it also allowed the Court, in response to the second question, to
require that any alternative means of recognition had to be prompt and effective. The scope of the margin of
appreciation was also central, as was the existence of any common ground between the laws of Contracting
States. While the Court noted “a certain trend towards the possibility of legal recognition of the relationship
between children conceived through surrogacy abroad and the intended parents, there [was] no consensus in
Europe on this issue” and, where such recognition was possible, there was no consensus on the procedure used.
While the Court confirmed that opinions under Protocol No. 16 are to be confined to the scenario raised by the
requesting court, the present opinion may contain elements of broader application. Firstly, the Court noted that
it had placed some emphasis in its case-law on the biological link with at least one intended parent and that that
was the factual scenario before it: the Court made clear that “it may be called upon in the future to further develop
its case-law in this field, in particular in view of the evolution of the issue of surrogacy”. In addition, the Court also
confirmed that the necessity to provide the possibility of recognising a mother-child relationship would apply with
even greater force where the child was conceived using the eggs of the intended mother. Finally, and although
the couple in the present case were married, the Court observed that adoption was only available under French
law when the intended parents were married and that it was for the French courts to decide whether domestic
adoption law would satisfy Convention requirements, taking into account the vulnerable position of the children
concerned while adoption proceedings were pending.

VII.

JUST SATISFACTION (ARTICLE 41)

Georgia v. Russia (I) (just satisfaction) [GC]109 concerned the award of just satisfaction in an inter-State case.
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In its principal judgment110 of 3 July 2014 in the above-mentioned case, the Court held that in the autumn of
2006 a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian nationals had been put in place in the
Russian Federation which amounted to an administrative practice for the purposes of Convention case-law. It
also found a violation of, inter alia, Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the Convention, Article 5 §§ 1 and 4 and Article
3, and Article 13 taken in conjunction with Article 5 § 1 and Article 3. The Court assumed in its judgment that
“more than 4,600 expulsion orders were issued against Georgian nationals, of whom approximately 2,380 were
detained or expelled” (paragraph 135).
The application of Article 41 was reserved. The Court adopted the instant judgment after examining the parties’
written submissions on that question, notably on the number of Georgian nationals alleged by the applicant
Government to be victims of the violations established. Within the framework of an adversarial procedure, the
applicant Government submitted a list of 1,795 alleged and identifiable victims, the accuracy of which was
challenged by the respondent Government.
The judgment is interesting because this was the first time since the just-satisfaction judgment in Cyprus v.
Turkey [GC]111 that the Court examined the just satisfaction in an inter-State case. In Cyprus v. Turkey, the Court
concluded that Article 41 applied to inter-State cases, and set out three criteria for establishing whether awarding
just satisfaction was justified in an inter-State case, namely: (i) the type of complaint made by the applicant
Government, which had to concern the violation of basic human rights of its nationals (or other victims); (ii)
whether the victims could be identified; and (iii) the main purpose of bringing the proceedings.
The Court found that the criteria established in Cyprus v. Turkey [GC] had been satisfied. Therefore, the applicant
Government were entitled to submit a claim for just satisfaction. The key issue for the Court was to determine
the “sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable” group of people which it would use as the basis for the
purposes of making an award of just satisfaction. The Court rejected the applicant Government’s argument that it
should take the figure referred to in paragraph 135 of the principal judgment as a basis to award just satisfaction
because, among other matters, the Court stated that it had only assumed the number of victims in the former
judgment and had not established the identity of individual victims.
In contrast to Cyprus v. Turkey [GC]112 (multiple violations of the Convention following a military operation by the
respondent Government), the Court observed that in the instant case the existence of an administrative practice
contrary to the Convention was based on individual expulsion decisions, meaning that the parties must be able
to identify the Georgian nationals concerned. It had initiated an adversarial procedure to that end, underpinned
by the duty of both parties to cooperate with the Court113. In this procedure the applicant Government submitted
a list of 1,795 individual victims.
The Court’s treatment of the information supplied by the parties was noteworthy for the following reasons:
- Firstly, it rejected the respondent Government’s submission that the Court itself should identify each of the
individual victims of the violations. It observed in this connection “that it is not a court of first instance; it does
not have the capacity, nor is it appropriate to its function as an international court, to adjudicate on large
numbers of cases which require the finding of specific facts or the calculation of monetary compensation –
both of which should, as a matter of principle and effective practice, be the domain of domestic jurisdictions”.
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- Secondly, the Court carried out a preliminary examination of the list of 1,795 alleged victims submitted by the
applicant Government. It proceeded on the assumption that the individuals named in the applicant Government’s
list could be considered victims of violations and the burden of proof rested with the respondent Government
to rebut this. This enabled the Court to conclude that, for the purposes of awarding just satisfaction, it could
use as a basis a “sufficiently precise and objectively identifiable” group of at least 1,500 Georgian nationals
who were victims of a violation of Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, a certain number of whom were also victims of a
violation of Articles 5 § 1 and 3.
Ruling on an equitable basis, the Court deemed it reasonable to award the applicant Government a lump sum
of 10 million euros in respect of non-pecuniary damage sustained by this group of at least 1,500 Georgian
nationals, to be distributed to each of them in accordance with a number of criteria indicated in the judgment.

VIII. BINDING FORCE AND EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS (ARTICLE 46)
1.

Execution of judgments

Tomov and Others v. Russia114 concerned a structural problem relating to the inhuman conditions of transport of
prisoners and the Court found a violation of Articles 3 and 13115.
Having regard to the respondent State’s modest progress in the execution of its earlier judgments, the Court
engaged with the respondent State on the urgent need for remedial action to deal with what it found to be a
structural problem. It noted in its reasoning under Article 46 (paragraph 182) as follows:
Taking into account the recurrent and persistent nature of the problem, the large
number of people it has affected or is capable of affecting, and the urgent need to
grant them speedy and appropriate redress at domestic level, the Court considers
that repeating its findings in similar individual cases would not be the best way to
achieve the Convention’s purpose. It thus feels compelled to address the underlying
structural problems in greater depth, to examine the source of those problems and
to provide further assistance to the respondent State in finding appropriate solutions
and to the Committee of Ministers [of the Council of Europe] in supervising the
execution of the judgments (…)
In line with its previous judgments on inhuman conditions of detention116, the Court outlined the measures that
might help solve the structural problem, including the placement of prisoners as close to their home as possible
and the replacement or refitting of prison vans and railway carriages in order to bring, for example, seating space
into line with Article 3 requirements.
The Court also stressed the need for preventive and compensatory remedies to be put in place that would allow
all prisoners in the applicants’ position to complain of their transport conditions. Significantly, the Court ruled
that such remedies needed to take effect in the domestic legal system without undue delay, and not later than
eighteen months after the judgment became final.
In Marcello Viola v. Italy (no. 2)117 the Court indicated under Article 46 that Italy should provide for the possibility
114
Tomov and Others v. Russia, nos. 18255/10 and 5 others, 9 April 2019. See also under Article 3 (Inhuman or degrading treatment)
above.
115
For a summary of the case, see under Article 3 (Inhuman or degrading treatment) above.
116
See, for example, Varga and Others v. Hungary, nos. 14097/12 and 5 others, § 102, 10 March 2015.
117
Marcello Viola v. Italy (no. 2), no. 77633/16, 13 June 2019. See also under Article 3 (Inhuman or degrading punishment) above,
including a summary of the case.
71

of introducing a review of the life sentence imposed on individuals sentenced under the same regime as the
applicant. Such review should take account of the progress prisoners have made towards their rehabilitation.
The domestic authorities should assess whether or not a particular prisoner has severed his or her links with the
Mafia, rather than automatically equating a failure to cooperate with continuing dangerousness.
2.

Infringement proceedings

In Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC]118 the Court examined for the first time an application in the context of
infringement proceedings. In this procedure under Article 46 § 4 the Court determines whether a State has
fulfilled its obligation under Article 46 § 1 to abide by a final judgment of the Court.
In 2014 the Court delivered its first judgment in Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan119. It found a violation of, inter alia,
Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5, considering that the purpose of the charges against Mr Mammadov and of
his pre-trial detention had been to silence and punish him for his stance against the Government.120
From the outset of the process of execution of the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment, the Committee of Ministers
(“the CM”) considered that the above-described violation cast doubt on the later criminal proceedings and called
for Mr Mammadov’s release. Since he was not released, on 5 December 2017 the CM referred a question to
the Court under Article 46 § 4: whether the State had failed to abide by its obligations under Article 46 § 1. Later,
in August 2018, Mr Mammadov was released on probation for good behaviour by the court of appeal, having
served two-thirds of his sentence. In March 2019 the Supreme Court deemed the terms of his probation to have
been fulfilled and thus his sentence served in full.
The Court found that the respondent State did not fulfil its obligation under Article 46 § 1 to abide by the first Ilgar
Mammadov judgment.
The question of the institutional balance between the Court and the CM has been central to many cases before
the Court121 and the Court’s position is that a State’s compliance with a judgment falls outside of its jurisdiction,
unless it is raised in the infringement procedure under Article 46 § 4.122 As this is the first time the Court examined
a request under this infringement procedure, the first novel aspect of this case lies in how the Court frames its
role under this provision.
Firstly, the Court examined the extent to which it is to be guided by the findings of the CM in the prior execution
process. It confirmed that the infringement proceedings were not intended to upset the fundamental balance
between the CM and the Court. While the Court was required by Article 46 § 4 to make a de novo and definitive
legal assessment of compliance, it acknowledged the value of the extensive acquis of the CM in carrying out its
tasks under Article 46 § 2 and concluded that in infringement proceedings it would “take into consideration all
aspects of the procedure” before the CM, including the measures indicated by it and the CM’s conclusions in the
supervision process.
Secondly, the Court ruled on the point in time at which the infringement had occurred: it was found to be the date
on which the CM referred the question under Article 46 § 4 because the execution procedure was a process and
on that date the CM had considered that the State’s actions had not been “timely, adequate and sufficient”.
118
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan [GC], no. 15172/13, 29 May 2019.
119
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, no. 15172/13, 22 May 2014.
120
He was later convicted and proceedings were later found to violate Article 6 in Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 2), no.
919/15, 16 November 2017.
121
For example, Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (no. 2) [GC], no. 32772/02, ECHR 2009; and Burmych
and Others v. Ukraine (striking out) [GC], nos. 46852/13 et al., 12 October 2017 (extracts).
122
Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [GC], no. 19867/12, § 102, 11 July 2017.
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The Court outlined and applied its existing case-law as regards the content of the obligations to implement
a judgment contained in Article 46 § 1. In particular, the Court reaffirmed the obligation on the State to make
restitution to the individual, provided it is not “materially impossible” and does not “involve a burden out of all
proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of compensation”. These principles are reflected in the
International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts123, in
the practice of the CM, and in Rule 6 of the CM Rules for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of
the terms of friendly settlements.
The Court applied those principles to determine the key issue, namely the individual measures required to
abide by the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment. The Court observed that this violation had occurred because
the authorities were driven by improper reasons, namely, to silence or punish Mr. Mammadov. Consequently,
it considered that this violation of Article 18 in conjunction with Article 5 vitiated any later action resulting from
the pursuit of the abusive criminal charges (his conviction and imprisonment). Accordingly, the Court found that
to achieve restitution, the State had to eliminate the negative consequences of the abusive charges, including
ensuring Mr. Mammadov’s release. Such restitution was considered achievable.
Finally, the Court rejected the argument that any of the domestic proceedings, including those which eventually
led to Mr. Mammadov’s unconditional release, constituted restitution. The domestic courts had rejected the
findings of this Court in the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment and upheld his conviction based on the abusive
charges. As such, they did not eliminate the negative consequences of the imposition of the abusive charges: Mr.
Mammadov had served his prison sentence and remained convicted on the basis of those charges. In any event,
his release occurred after he had been detained for nearly four years and, importantly, after the CM had referred
the case to the Court under Article 46 § 4, that latter date being the relevant one for the Court’s examination. The
limited steps taken by the State did not permit it to find that the State Party had acted in “good faith”, in a manner
compatible with the “conclusions and spirit” of the first Ilgar Mammadov judgment, or in a way that would make
practical and effective the protection of the Convention rights which the Court had found to have been violated.

123
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of its 53rd Session (2001), UN Doc. A/56/10.
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Developments in the case law of Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Presentation
This chapter highlights some of the innovative developments in the Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence during
2019, as well as some of the criteria that reaffirms the jurisprudence already established by the Court. This
evolution of jurisprudence establishes important standards for domestic judicial organs and officials when they
carry out the control of conventionality within their respective spheres of competence.
In this regard, the Court recalls its awareness that domestic authorities are subject to the rule of law and,
consequently, obliged to apply the provisions in force under domestic law. However, when a State is a party to
an international treaty such as the American Convention, all its organs, including its judges, are also subject to
this legal instrument. This obliges States Parties to ensure that the effects of the provisions of the Convention
are not impaired by the application of norms that are contrary to its object and purpose. Thus, the Court has
established that all State authorities are obliged to exercise a “control of conventionality” ex officio to ensure
conformity between domestic law and the American Convention, evidently within their respective spheres
of competence and the corresponding procedural regulations. This relates to the analysis that the State’s
organs and agents must make (in particular, judges and other agents of justice) of the compatibility of domestic
norms and practices with the American Convention. In their specific decisions and actions, these organs and
agents must comply with the general obligation to safeguard the rights and freedoms protected by the American
Convention, ensuring that they do not apply domestic legal provisions that violate this treaty, and also that
they apply the treaty correctly, together with the jurisprudential standards developed by the Inter-American Court,
ultimate interpreter of the American Convention.
The year 2019 has been a busy year for the Inter-American Court, and this has been reflected in the fact that
this year has seen the greatest jurisdictional production in the history of the Court. We are referring to the
21 judgments on merits, and 4 on interpretation, as well as the record 51 orders on monitoring compliance
with judgment and 18 orders on provisional measures. The Inter-American Court has been able to reaffirm our
jurisprudence on several topics, such as limitations to the imposition of the death penalty and the guarantees of
due process. The Inter-American Court has also expanded the standards with regard to preventive detention,
as well as the guarantees of due process in cases relating to judges, and also the meaning and scope of the
principles of judicial independence and impartiality. It has also developed new and very important standards
in the area of freedom of expression and the protection of statements made by journalists when denouncing
irregularities in the public sphere. Inter-American also continued developing the economic, social, cultural and
environmental rights. In this regard, the Court had the occasion to rule on the right to social security; in particular,
the right to a pension as an autonomous and justiciable right, its specific content, and the specific violations it
could potentially suffer. The Court also reaffirmed its jurisprudence concerning the autonomy and justiciability of
the right to health, developing the content of this right, as well as its applicability to situations in which individuals
are deprived of their liberty.
Pablo Saavedra Alessandri
Registrar
Inter-American Court of Human Rights
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Right to life (article 4 of the American Convention)
The death penalty
Pro-abolition trend
In the Cases of Martínez Coronado, Ruiz Fuentes et al. and Girón et al, all against Guatemala, the Court
emphasized that Article 4 of the American Convention incorporates an inclination to abolish the death penalty in
its second paragraph, which prohibits imposing it on “crimes to which it does not presently apply,” and according
to paragraph 3, “[t]he death penalty shall not be reestablished in States that have abolished it”1. The Court recalls
that “the goal pursued is to advance towards a definitive prohibition of this type of criminal punishment, by a
gradual and irreversible process in States that have signed the American Convention,” so that the decision of a
State Party to the American Convention, whenever this was taken, to abolish the death penalty, “becomes, ipso
jure, a final and irrevocable decision. Furthermore, the Court observed that, to date, 13 States have signed the
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty and urged the States that
have not yet signed the Protocol to do so, and to proscribe this type of punishment2.
Expansion of the list of crimes punished by the death penalty
In the Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala, the Court observed that, when Guatemala ratified the American
Convention, Decree No. 17/73 (Criminal Code) was in force, and its article 201 imposed the death penalty on
kidnapping followed by the death of the person kidnapped. This provision was amended on several occasions,
and finally the victim in the case was applied the provisions established in Legislative Decree No. 81/96 of
September 25, 1996, which established the imposition of the death penalty for the masterminds and perpetrators
of the crime of abduction or kidnapping, eliminating the requirement of the subsequent death of the person
kidnapped. The Court indicated that, although the nomen iuris of abduction or kidnapping remained unaltered
from the time that Guatemala ratified the Convention, the factual assumptions contained in the corresponding
definitions of the crime changed substantially, making it possible to apply the death penalty for actions that had
not received this punishment previously. This signified the violation of Article 4(2) of the American Convention,
because, if the contrary interpretation were accepted, this would mean that a crime could be substituted or altered
with the inclusion of new factual assumptions, despite the express prohibition to extend capital punishment
contained in the said Article 4(2)3.
Automatic and compulsory imposition of the death penalty
Furthermore, the Court noted in the Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala that the regulation for the crime
of abduction or kidnapping in the Guatemalan Criminal Code ordered the application of the death penalty
automatically and, in general, to the authors of this wrongful act. As in the Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala,
the Court observed that article 201 of the Criminal Code, as it was drafted, had the effect of subjecting those
accused of the crime of abduction or kidnapping to criminal proceedings in which no consideration was ever given
to the specific circumstances of the crime and of the accused, such as the criminal record of the accused and
of the victim, the motive, the extent and intensity of the harm caused, the possible mitigating or aggravating
1
Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 10, 2019. Series C No. 376, para.
63, Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 10, 2019. Series
C No. 385, para. 80.
2
Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 10, 2019. Series C No. 376, para.
65, Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2019.
Series C No. 385, para. 80.
3
Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2019.
Series C No. 385, para. 86.
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circumstances, among other considerations regarding the perpetrator and the crime. The Court concluded
that when certain laws impose the obligation to apply the death penalty automatically, this does not allow
differentiating between the different degrees of severity or the particular circumstances of the specific crime,
which is incompatible with the limitation of the death penalty to the most egregious crimes, as established in
Article 4(2) of the Convention.4 The same reasoning was applied in the judgment in the Case of Girón et al.
v. Guatemala, in which the Court analyzed article 175 of the Criminal Code (regulating the crime of statutory
rape), which imposed the death penalty without taking into consideration the possible mitigating or aggravating
circumstances of the case5.
Use of the “future dangerousness” standard
The Court again ruled on the application of Article 132 of the Guatemalan Criminal Code and the concept of
“future dangerousness” under which the death penalty was applied “if the circumstances of the act, and of the
occasion, the way in which it was committed, and the determinant motives revealed a greater and particular
dangerousness of the agent.” The Court observed that the use of the standard of the dangerousness of the agent,
both in the definition of the facts of the wrongful act and in the determination of the corresponding punishment
was incompatible with the principle of legality established in the American Convention. The examination of the
dangerousness of the agent involved an assessment by the judge of a fact that had not occurred and, therefore,
involved a punishment based on an opinion about the offender’s personality and not about the criminal acts
he was accused of based on the definition of the crime6. 1Consequently, the Court found that the State was
responsible for the violation of Articles 4(2) and 9 of the American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2
of the Convention.
Principle of subsidiarity, reparation of the violation and control of conventionality
The Court recalled that, under the Inter-American System, there is a dynamic and complementary control
of the State’s treaty-based obligations to respect and to ensure human rights, that is exercised jointly by the
domestic authorities (those primarily obliged) and the international instances (in a complementary manner), so
that the decision criteria and the protection mechanisms, both national and international, may be brought into
conformity and adapted to each other7. In this regard, State responsibility under the Convention can only be
required at the international level after the State has had the opportunity to acknowledge a violation of a right, if
applicable, and to repair the harm caused by its own means8. The Court observed, in particular, in the Case of
Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala that the alleged violations that eventually resulted in the imposition of
the death penalty on Messrs. Rodríguez Revolorio and López Calo were acknowledged and redressed on July
2, 2012, the date on which the Supreme Court partially annulled the sentence imposed on them commuting the
death penalty for imprisonment. In particular, the Court noted that, on the said July 2, 2012, the Supreme Court
declared admissible the appeal for review filed by Messrs. Rodríguez Revolorio and López Calo and decided
to partially annul the sentence of capital punishment, and imposed the next most severe punishment which
was 30 years’ imprisonment non-commutable. The Court also noted that the Supreme Court had argued, inter
4
Case of Ruiz Fuentes et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 10, 2019.
Series C No. 385, para. 88.
5
Case of Girón et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. . Judgment of October 15, 2019.
Series C No. 390, para. 70.
6
Case of Martínez Coronado v. Guatemala. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 10, 2019. Series C No. 376, para.
70, Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 14,
2019. Series C No. 387, para. 64, and Case of Valenzuela Ávila v. Guatemala. Merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of October 11,
2019. Series C No. 386, para. 154.
7
Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October
14, 2019. Series C No. 387, para. 59.
8
Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October
14, 2019. Series C No. 387, para. 59.
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alia, that, following the judgment of the Inter-American Court in the Case of Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, it
was obliged “by mandate of the Constitution of the Republic and of the American Convention of Human Rights”
to admit the appeal that had been filed. Therefore, the Court noted that, owing to the said judgment of July 2,
2012, the violations caused by imposing the death penalty were acknowledged and the harm was repaired
adequately because the punishment was amended, which constituted an opportune and adequate control of
conventionality9. Consequently, and pursuant to the principle of complementarity, the Court concluded that the
State was not responsible for the alleged violations of the Convention that would have resulted from imposing
the death penalty on these victims.

Right to personal integrity (article 5 of the American Convention)
Right to personal integrity and deprivation of liberty
Right to personal integrity and the objective of the rehabilitation of those convicted
In the Case of López et al. v. Argentina, the Court indicated that, in addition to the right to personal liberty, an
unavoidable consequence of the deprivation of liberty was often the infringement of the enjoyment of other
human rights; for example, the rights to privacy and family life might also be restricted. However, this restriction
of rights, which results from the deprivation of liberty or is a collateral effect, must be rigorously limited because
any restriction of a human right can only be justified under international law when it is necessary in a democratic
society.10
Regarding Article 5 of the American Convention, the Court has affirmed that, among other guarantees, the State
must guarantee visiting rights in prison. Confinement with a restricted visiting regime may be contrary to personal
integrity, depending on the circumstances. Also, the restriction of visits may have effects on the personal integrity
of the individual deprived of liberty and on the members of his family. The purpose of Article 5(3) is precisely to
ensure that the effects of the deprivation of liberty do not needlessly extend to anyone other than the convicted
man, other than strictly necessary.11
Furthermore, regarding Article 5(6) of the Convention, in the Case of Mendoza et al. v. Argentina, the Court
established that “[s]entences to deprivation of liberty shall have the essential purpose of the reform and social
rehabilitation of those convicted.” Thus, the punishments imposed on children for committing offenses should
pursue the child’s reintegration into society. In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has understood
that maintaining family ties has an impact on the social rehabilitation of those in prison12.
Also, the Court recalled that in the Case of Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, the Court accepted the State’s
acknowledgement of responsibility with regard to the violation of Article 5(6) of the Convention because it had not
allowed some inmates to carry out productive activities. In this regard, the Court established that measures such
as permitting those deprived of liberty to work in prison is a form of guaranteeing Article 5(6), and that unjustified
or disproportionate restrictions to this could possibility result in a violation of the said article13.
9
Case of Rodríguez Revolorio et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October
14, 2019. Series C No. 387, para. 60.
10
Case of López et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019.
Series C No. 396, para. 92.
11
Case of López et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019.
Series C No. 396, para. 94.
12
Case of López et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 25, 2019.
Series C No. 396, para. 94.
13
Case of López et al. v. Argentina. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs.. Judgment of November 25, 2019.
Series C No. 396, para. 95.
79

Right to integrity and the death penalty
In the Case of Girón et al. v. Guatemala the Court reiterated that Article 5(1) of the American Convention
establishes, in general terms, the right to physical, mental and moral personal integrity14. Meanwhile, Article
5(2) establishes, specifically, the absolute prohibition of subjecting someone to torture or to cruel, inhuman
or degrading punishment or treatment. The Court understood that any violation of Article 5(2) of the American
Convention necessarily resulted in the violation of Article 5(1) thereof15. The violation of the right to physical and
mental integrity of the individual has different connotations of degree that range from torture to other types of
ill-treatment or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, the physical and mental effects of which vary in intensity
based on endogenous and exogenous factors (such as duration of the treatment, age, sex, health status, context
and vulnerability) which must be analyzed in each specific situation16.
The Court recalled that it had had occasion to rule on the so-called “phenomenon of death row” in the Case of
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago and in the Case of Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala.
In both these cases, the Court assessed the expert opinions provided concerning the specific detention conditions
of those condemned to death and victims in these cases, as well as the particular impact on them, which resulted
in a violation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) of the American Convention in relation to Article 1(1) of this instrument17.
In addition, the European Court of Human Rights, the universal system of human rights and some domestic
courts note that the so-called “death row” violates the right to personal integrity owing to the anguish suffered
by those condemned to death, a situation that results in psychological trauma owing to the ever-present and
increasing presence of the implementation of the maximum punishment; consequently, it is considered cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment. Therefore, to determine the existence of a violation of personal integrity as a
result of the “death row,” it is necessary to analyze the personal and particular circumstances of the case in order
to be able to assess whether remaining on death row achieves the level of severity to qualify as cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment18.
In addition, regarding the method used to carry out the death penalty, the Court notes that various specialized
bodies, as well as the criteria of the universal system and other regional systems for the protection of human
rights expressly prohibit the methods of carrying out capital punishment that cause the most pain and suffering.
In this regard, it is important to note that any method may inflict “pain” or “intense suffering” and, therefore, if
a State carries out the death penalty, it must do so in a way that causes the least suffering possible, because
whatever the method, the extinction of life entails physical pain.
Furthermore, various international bodies have indicated that methods of execution such as “stoning, injection
of untested lethal drugs, gas chambers, burning and burying alive, and public executions [together with …] other
painful and humiliating methods of execution”, constitute cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment that violates
the right to personal integrity.
In addition, the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has indicated that public
14
Case of Girón et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 15, 2019, para.
78.
15
Cf. Case of Yvon Neptune v. Haiti, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of May 6, 2008. Series C No. 180, para. 129, and
Case of Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of November 28, 2018. Series C No. 371, para. 177.
16
Cf. Case of Loayza Tamayo v. Peru. Merits. Judgment of September 17, 1997. Series C No. 33, paras. 57 and 58, and Case of
Women Victims of Sexual Torture in Atenco v. Mexico, supra, para. 177.
17
Cf. Case of Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, supra, paras. 167 to 172, and Case of Raxcacó
Reyes v. Guatemala supra, paras. 97 to 102.
18
Cf. Case of Caso Girón et al. v. Guatemala. Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 15,
2019, para. 78.
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executions constitute non-compliance with the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. Meanwhile,
the Commission on Human Rights Committee has indicated that “where capital punishment occurs, it shall […]
not be carried out in public or in any other degrading manner.” In this regard, the Human Rights Council has
urged States to refrain from carrying out public executions, because “public executions are […] incompatible with
human dignity”.

Forced disappearances (Right to personal liberty: Article 7, Personal integrity: Article 5,
right to life: Article 4, and the right to recognition of juridical personality: Article 3)
In the Case of Arrom Suhurt et al. v. Paraguay, the Inter-American Court considered that, to constitute a
violation of the American Convention, the acts or omissions that resulted in that violation must be attributable to
the respondent State. Such acts or omissions may have been by any of the State’s powers or organs, irrespective
of their rank. Taking into account the dispute that existed in this case, the Court analyzed whether the facts that
were alleged could be attributed to the State and, then, where necessary, determined whether they constituted
violations of the American Convention and the other international treaties mentioned19.
In the Case of Arrom Suhurt et al., where there was no direct evidence of the State’s action, the Court emphasized
that it was legitimate to use circumstantial evidence, indications and presumptions to substantiate a judgment,
provided that consistent conclusions about the facts could be inferred from them. In this regard, the Court has
indicated that, in principle, the plaintiff has the burden of proving the facts on which his allegations are based;
however, it has also underlined that, in proceedings on human rights violations, the State’s defense cannot rest
on the impossibility of the plaintiff presenting evidence when it is the State that controls the means to clarify facts
that occurred in its territory20.
The Court noted that in this case, contrary to other cases heard by this Court, the events did not take place
in a context of a systematic and generalized practice of forced disappearances, political persecution or other
human rights violations, so that it was not possible to use this to corroborate other elements of proof. In addition,
there was no evidence in this case that proved that the presumed victims were in the hands of State agents
before the alleged facts occurred. Therefore, a presumption that the State was involved in what happened is not
applicable. In this regard, contrary to the consideration of the Inter-American Commission, the State did not have
the obligation to present an alternative thesis about what happened to the presumed victims21.

The right to personal liberty (article 7 of the American Convention)
Preventive detentions
In the Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina, the Court recalled its case law on personal liberty and precautionary
measures involving deprivation of liberty. The Court recalled that, for a precautionary measure that restricts a
person’s freedom not to be arbitrary, it is necessary that: (i) substantive presumptions are presented regarding
the existence of a wrongful act and the connection to this act of the persons accused; (ii) the measures comply
with the four elements of the “proportionality test”; namely, that the purpose of the measures must be legitimate
(compatible with the American Convention), appropriate to comply with the purpose sought, necessary, and
strictly proportionate, and (iii) the decision taken contains sufficient reasoning to allow an evaluation of whether
it is in keeping with the said conditions22.
19
20
21
22
92.

Cf. Case of Arrom Suhurt et al. v. Paraguay. Merits. Judgment of May 13, 2019, para. 94.
Cf. Case of Arrom Suhurt et al. v. Paraguay. Merits. Judgment of May 13, 2019, para. 95.
Cf. Case of Arrom Suhurt et al. v. Paraguay. Merits. Judgment of May 13, 2019, para. 96.
Cf. Case of Romero Feris v. Argentina. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of October 15, 2019. Series C No. 391, para.
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Regarding the substantive presumptions regarding the existence of the wrongful act and the connection of the
person accused, the Court clarified that, in order to comply with the requirements to restrict the right to personal
liberty by a precautionary measure, such as preventive detention, there must be sufficient evidence that allowed
it to be reasonably supposed that a wrongful act had occurred and that the person accused and prosecuted
could have participated in that act23. On this point, the Court emphasized that the said presumption did not, in
itself, constitute a legitimate purpose for applying a precautionary measure that restricted freedom, nor could it
contravene the principle of the presumption of innocence contained in Article 8(2) of the Convention. Moreover,
as indicated in the comparative law of several countries, and as is the practice of international courts, the
presumption is additional to the other requirement concerning the legitimate purpose, appropriateness, necessity
and proportionality, and functions as a supplementary guarantee when proceeding to apply a precautionary
measure that restricts a person’s freedom24.
In addition, the Court underlined that this should be understood taking into account that, in principle and in
general, the decision should not have any effect for the judge as regards the responsibility of the accused,
because it is usually taken by different judge or judicial authority to the one who finally decides on the merits of
the case25.
Furthermore, regarding such presumptions, the Court has considered that the suspicion or sufficient indications,
which leads to a reasonable supposition that the person prosecuted could have participated in the wrongful act
that is investigated, must be founded and communicated based on specific facts; in other words, not on mere
conjectures or abstract intuitions. This means that the State should not detain someone and then investigate
them; to the contrary, it is only authorized to deprive a person of liberty when it has amassed sufficient information
to be able to commit them to trial. In this regard, the European Court has considered that the terms “suspicion
or reasonable indication” presupposes the existence of facts or information that an objective observer would
consider provided sufficient indication that the person accused could have committed the crime26.
Verification of the legitimate purposes for ordering and maintaining the precautionary measure
The Court reiterated its consistent case law according to which the legitimate purposes for preventive detention
are only those that are directly linked to the efficient implementation of the proceedings; in other words, that
are related to the risk that the accused might abscond, as directly established in Article 7(5) of the American
Convention, or that seek to avoid the accused obstructing the course of justice27. In addition, the Court has
asserted that the gravity of the offense involved is not, in itself, sufficient justification for preventive detention28.
The Court added that, based on the principle of the presumption of innocence, the elements that reveal the
existence of the legitimate purposes cannot be presumed; rather the judge must base his decision on wellfounded and objective circumstances of the specific case, and these must be proved by the person instituting
the criminal prosecution and not the accused, who must be allowed to exercise the right of defense and be duly
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assisted by a lawyer29.
Citing the European Court of Human Rights, the Court also referred to the way in which the elements that
constitute legitimate purposes must be assessed. In particular it asserted that the risk that an accused might
abscond cannot be assessed taking into consideration only the gravity of the possible punishment. It must also
be evaluated in relation to a series of other relevant factors that may confirm the existence of a risk of flight, such
as those related to the home, occupation, possessions, family ties, and other kinds of ties with the country in
which the accused is being prosecuted. It has also indicated that the risk of the accused obstructing the course
of justice cannot be inferred in abstracto, and must be supported by objective evidence30.
In addition, the Court recalled that the analysis of the use of force necessarily entails a determination of whether
this has a legitimate purpose. On this point, the Court recalled that the United Nations Basic Principles on the
Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials clearly state that law enforcement officials shall not use
firearms against persons except (a) in self-defense or defence of other against the imminent threat of death or
serious injury, or (b) to prevent the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving grave threat to life, (c) to
arrest a person presenting such a danger and resisting their authority, or (d) to prevent his or her escape, and
only when less extreme means are insufficient to achieve these objectives31.
The Court also indicated that, in order to analyze the legitimacy of the use of force, it was irrelevant to determine
where the action of the police occurred in a situation of in flagrante delicto in order to arrest the author of the
offense, which, at that time, did not represent a serious threat for someone’s life. The only relevant aspect
consisted in determining whether or not that use of force took place during a confrontation and, if applicable,
whether it was in keeping with the principles of necessity and strict proportionality32.

Right to judicial guarantees (Article 8 of the American Convention)
Judicial independence and autonomy
Due process in cases that entail the removal from office of judges
In the Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador the Court reiterated that Article 8 of the Convention
establishes the guidelines for due process of law, which consist of a series of requirements that must be observed
by the procedural instances to ensure that individuals are able to defend their rights adequately vis-à-vis any act
of the State that may affect them33.
According to Article 8(1) of the Convention, every person has the right to a hearing, “with due guarantees”, for the
determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fiscal, or any other nature, that ensure the right to due
process of law whatever the procedure involved. Non-compliance with those guarantees results in a violation of
this article of the Convention34.
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In this regard, the Court has indicated that the guarantees established in Article 8(1) of the Convention are also
applicable to the situation in which a non-judicial authority adopts decisions that affect the determination
of an individual’s rights, bearing in mind that the guarantees required of a jurisdictional organ cannot be required
of such authorities; however, they must comply with those guarantees aimed at ensuring that their decisions are
not arbitrary35.
In the Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador, the Court considered that the dismissal of the victim in
this specific case involved a determination of his rights, because it resulted in his immediate removal from his
office as a justice. Therefore, the Court examined whether the proceedings held by the Legislative Assembly
conformed to the guarantees of due process established in Article 8(1) of the American Convention36.
According to the Court’s case law, in proceedings against judges, the scope of the judicial guarantees and
effective judicial protection of judges must be analyzed in relation to the standards on judicial independence. The
Court has stipulated that judges have specific guarantees owing to the necessary independence of the Judiciary,
which the Court has understood as “essential for the exercise of the judicial function”37. The following guarantees
arise from the need for judicial independence: an adequate appointment procedure, tenure, and the guarantee
against external pressure38.
Specifically, regarding the guarantee of the stability or tenure of judges, the Court has established that this means
that: (i) removal from office is the result, exclusively, of the permitted causes, through either a procedure that
complies with judicial guarantees, or because the mandate has terminated; (ii) judges may only be dismissed
owing to serious disciplinary offenses or incompetence, and (iii) any procedure against a judge must be decided
pursuant to the established standards of judicial conduct and by fair proceedings that ensure objectivity and
impartiality pursuant to the Constitution or the law39.

Right of judges to remain in office under general conditions of equality (article 23 of the
American Convention)
In the Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador, the Court reiterated that Article 23(1)(c) of the Convention
established the right to have access, under general conditions of equality, to public service. The Court has
interpreted that this access, under conditions of equality, would constitute an insufficient guarantee unless it was
accompanied by the effective protection of stability or tenure in office40.
In cases of the arbitrary removal of judges, the Court has considered that this right relates to the judge’s guarantee
of stability or tenure. The respect and guarantee of this right is complied with when the criteria and procedures for
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the appointment, promotion, suspension and dismissal are reasonable and objective, and when judges are not
discriminated against when exercising this right. In this regard, the Court has indicated that equal opportunities
in access to, and stability in, office guarantee freedom from any political pressure or interference41.
In the Case of Colindres Schonenberg v. El Salvador, the Court considered that the victim’s dismissal constituted
an arbitrary removal because it was decided by an incompetent body and by a procedure that was not established
by law. Therefore, this arbitrary removal unduly affected the right to tenure, under conditions of equality, in
violation of Article 23(1)(c) of the American Convention42.
Guarantee of judicial independence against external pressure
In the Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala, the Court indicated that “the guarantee of judicial
independence includes the guarantee against external pressure. Thus, the State must refrain from any undue
interference with the Judiciary or its members and adopt actions to avoid such interference being committed by
persons or organs external to the Judiciary”43.
Based on the circumstances, the repetition and continuation of different acts, even when, individually, not all of
them need to be investigated, may reveal an “intimidating or related continuity of acts” that cause the authorities
to consider “the need to exhaust efforts to individualize the sources and motivation”. In this regard, States must
prevent external pressures on judicial activities and investigate and punish those who exert them44. This is
true even if the acts in question were presumably committed by private individuals. Conducting investigations
and providing security may be pertinent to guarantee a judge’s rights in cases of external pressure that could
affect judicial independence45. Regarding the link between the obligation to guarantee rights and the obligation
to investigate, “in the circumstances of the case, in which a series of acts indicated a situation of risk that
continued over time, the opportune implementation of the obligation to investigate could result in determining the
circumstances of the alleged risk or, eventually, to its decrease or cessation46.
In cases such as the Case of Villaseñor Velarde et al. v. Guatemala in which, presumably, there were a series
of intimidating acts against a judge in relation to his function, the obligation to investigate was related not only to
the rights to judicial guarantees and protection of the judge who was the victim of the acts, but was relevant to
guarantee substantive rights and judicial independence, a matter that exceeded individual interests47.
Regarding the way in which the investigation should be conducted, “since the acts probably related to the judge’s
activity, the State must take into account this activity to identify the interests that might be affected in the exercise
of the judge’s work, conducting a thorough search for all relevant information, and designing and executing an
investigation that leads to the correct analysis of the theories of authorship, by act or omission, at different levels,
exploring all pertinent lines of investigation to identify the authors”48.
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Political trials
Political trials and judicial guarantees
The Court recalled that it was not possible to affirm, in the abstract, that the mechanism for the removal of
judges by a political trial was contrary to the American Convention and, in particular, to the principle of judicial
independence. It was necessary to analyze to what extent the factual circumstances constituted violations of the
guarantees of due process. In this regard, the Court indicated that political trials in which the removal of members
of the Judiciary were examined were not contrary to the Convention, per se, provided they complied with the
guarantees of Article 8 and respected criteria limiting the discretionality of the adjudicator so as to protect the
guarantee of independence49.
In the Case of Rico v. Argentina the Court found that it was not possible to affirm that the proceeding before
a Trial Jury did not provide procedural mechanisms to ensure the guarantees of due process, owing to the
composition of the jury. To the contrary, in the Court’s opinion, it could be maintained that the functions of the
jury were not exercised subjectively or based on political discretionality because the law and the provincial
Constitution contained prior, clear and objective criteria that limited the activity of the jury and strengthened the
control exercised50.
Reasoning of jurisdictional decisions and trials by jury
In the Case of Rico v. Argentina, the Court reiterated the case law developed in the Case of V.R.P., V.P.C. et al.
v. Nicaragua that the verdict of the jury, in the classic sense, did not require a reasoning or articulation of the
grounds. The Court considered that the absence of the articulation of the grounds for the verdict did not, in itself,
violate the guarantee of a reasoned decision, because any verdict has a reason even if, as in the case of a jury,
this was not expressed51.
The Court also indicated that the system of a decision taken by firm belief or conviction did not, in itself, violate
the right to a fair trial, provided that, based on all the actions executed during the proceedings, the interested
party could understand the reasons for the decision. It also recalled that firm belief is not an arbitrary standard.
The free assessment of the facts made by the jury is not substantially different from the assessment that the
professional judicial authority could make, only it is not expressed52.

Freedom of expression (Article 13)
The incompatibility of the use of criminal law against the dissemination of a note of public interest
regarding a public official
In the Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, the Inter-American Court reiterated its consistent case law that
the right to freedom of thought and expression is established in Article 13 of the Convention. Also, Article 4 of
the Inter- American Democratic Charter, an instrument that interprets the OAS Charter and the Convention itself,
considers this a fundamental component of democracy53.
The Court has indicated previously, with regard to the content of freedom of thought and expression, that those
49
Cf. Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383, para. 57.
50
Cf. Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383, para. 66.
51
Cf. Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383, para. 76
52
Cf. Case of Rico v. Argentina. Preliminary Objection and Merits. Judgment of September 2, 2019. Series C No. 383, para. 77.
53
Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela. Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 30, 2019,
para. 91.
86

who are protected by the Convention have the right to seek, receive and impart ideas and information of all kinds,
as well as to receive and learn about the information and ideas of others. Consequently, freedom of expression
has both an individual and a social dimension:
- It requires, on the one hand, that no one be arbitrarily limited or impeded in expressing his own thoughts. In
that sense, it is a right that belongs to each individual. Its second aspect, on the other hand, implies a collective
right to receive any information whatsoever and to have access to the opinions expressed by others54.
In addition, the Court reiterated that:
- The different regional systems for the protection of human rights and the universal system agree on the
essential role played by freedom of expression in the consolidation and dynamics of a democratic society.
Without effective freedom of expression, exercised in all its forms, democracy is enervated, pluralism and
tolerance start to deteriorate, the mechanisms for control and complaint by the individual become ineffectual
and, above all, a fertile ground is created for authoritarian systems to take root in society55.
- In this regard, the Court has indicated that the first dimension of freedom of expression “is not exhausted
with the theoretical recognition of the right to speak or write, but also includes, inseparably, the right to use any
appropriate medium to impart ideas so that they reach the greatest possible number of recipients”56. Thus, the
expression and dissemination of thought and ideas are indivisible, so that a restriction of the possibilities of
dissemination represents directly, and to the same extent, a limit on the right to express oneself freely57.
- Regarding the second dimension of the right to freedom of expression; that is, the social dimension, it
should be pointed out that freedom of expression is a means of exchanging ideas and information between
individuals; it includes the right to try and communicate one’s own opinions to others, but also involves the
right of everyone to
know the opinions, information and news disseminated by others. For the man on the
street it is as important to know the opinion of others or the information they have as the right to impart his
own58.
- The American Convention guarantees this right to everyone, regardless of any other consideration, so that it
cannot be considered that it is restricted to a specific profession or group of individuals. Freedom of expression
is an essential component of freedom of the press, without their being synonymous or the exercise of the
former being conditional on the latter 59.
- Given the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, the State should not only
minimize the restrictions to the circulation of information, but should also balance, insofar as possible, the
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participation of the different sources of information circulating in public discussions, promoting the pluralism
of information. Consequently, fairness should govern the flow of information60.
- The Court has also understood that both dimensions possess equal importance and should be guaranteed
simultaneously to ensure the total effectiveness of the right to freedom of thought and expression as established
in Article 13 of the Convention 61.
The permitted restrictions to freedom of expression and subsequent imposition of liability
The Court has reiterated that freedom of expression is not an absolute right. Article 13(2) of the Convention,
which prohibits prior censorship, also establishes the possibility of the subsequent imposition of liability due to
the abusive exercise of this right, to the extent necessary to ensure “respect for the rights or reputation of others”
(Article 13(2) (a)). Such restrictions are exceptional and should not limit the full exercise of freedom of expression
more than strictly necessary and become a direct or indirect mechanism of prior censorship. In this regard, the
Court has established that such subsequent liabilities can be imposed, if the right to honor and reputation has
been violated 62.
Indeed, Article 11 of the Convention establishes that everyone has the right to have his honor respected and
his dignity recognized. The Court has indicated that the right to honor “recognizes that everyone has the right
to respect for his honor, prohibits any unlawful attack on honor or reputation, and imposes on States the duty to
provide legal protection against such attacks. In general, the Court has indicated that the right to honor is related
to self-esteem and self-worth, while reputation refers to the opinion that other have of a person” 63.
In this regard, the Court has affirmed that “both freedom of expression and the right to honor – rights protected
by the Convention – are extremely important and it is therefore necessary to guarantee both these rights so
that they coexist harmoniously.” Each fundamental right must be exercised respecting and safeguarding the
other fundamental rights. Consequently, the Court has indicated that “the solution of a conflict between these
two rights requires weighing the merits of each one, and to this end, each case must be examined based on its
characteristics and circumstances in order to appreciate the existence and intensity of the elements on which a
decision is taken”64.
In this regard, the Court has reiterated in its case law that Article 13(2) of the American Convention establishes
that subsequent liability for the exercise of freedom of expression must comply with the following requirements
concurrently: (i) it shall be previously established by law, formally and substantively; (ii) respond to a purpose
permitted by the American Convention (“respect for the rights or reputations of others” or the protection of
national security, public order, or public health or morals), and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society (and to
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this end it must comply with the requirements of appropriateness, necessity and proportionality)65.
In the case of the first requirement, strict legality, the Court has established that any restrictions must be previously
established by law as a way to ensure that they are not imposed at the discretion of the public powers. To this
end, the definition of the conduct in law must be clear and precise, especially in the case of criminal rather than
civil offenses66.
Regarding the second factor, that is, permitted or legitimate purposes, these are set out in Article 13(2) of the
Convention. Since the Case of Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela dealt with the limitation of the right to freedom of
expression based on an accusation made by a private individual, the Court only developed the purpose found in
paragraph (a) of the said article; namely, respects for the rights or reputations of others67.
The Court has found that when this legitimate purpose is sought, the State must weigh the right to freedom
of expression of the communicator and the right to honor of the person affected. To this is added the State’s
obligation to provide judicial remedies so that anyone whose honor has been affected may claim its protection68 .
Finally, in relation to the proportionality and necessity of the measure, the Court has understood that restrictions
imposed on the right to freedom of expression must be proportionate to the interest that justify them and closely
adapted to the achievement of this objective, interfering as little as possible in the effective enjoyment of the right.
Thus, it is not sufficient that it has a legitimate purpose, but the measure in question must respect proportionality
and necessity when affecting freedom of expression. In other words, “in this last stage of the analysis, it is
necessary to consider whether the restriction is strictly proportionate, so that the sacrifice inherent in it is not
exaggerated or disproportionate in relation to the advantages obtained by this limitation” 69.
That said, having determined the content of the right to freedom of thought and expression, the Court stressed
the importance of freedom of expression in a democratic society, and established the requirements to ensure
that any restrictions that may be imposed on this right are compatible with the American Convention, the Court
analyzed the facts of the case70.
In this case, criminal proceedings were filed against Mr. Álvarez to protect the honor and reputation of a public
official who had resorted to the courts to defend himself. The Court has ruled on this situation in previous cases,
indicating that the fact that freedom of expression has a greater margin of appreciation in relation to issues that
are part of the public debate does not mean in any way that the honor of public officials or public persons should
not be legally protected 71.
Article 13(2) of the American Convention indicates that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression cannot
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be subject to prior censorship, but shall be subject to subsequent imposition of liability. That said, this precept
does not establish the nature of the liability that can be required, but this Court’s case law has indicated that
criminal prosecution is the most restrictive measure for freedom of expression; therefore, its use in a democratic
society should be exceptional and reserved for those eventualities in which it is strictly necessary to protect
fundamental rights from attacks that harm them or endanger them, because, to the contrary, this would suppose
an abusive use of the State’s punitive powers72.
In other words, of the range of possible measures to claim subsequent liability for the possible abusive exercise
of the right to freedom of expression, criminal prosecution will only be admissible in those exceptional cases
when it is strictly necessary to protect an essential social need73.
It is understood that, in the case of a statement that is protected owing to its public interest, such as one that
relates to conducts of public officials in the exercise of their functions, the State’s punitive response to protect the
honor of the official by means of criminal law is not admissible under the Convention74.
Indeed, the use of criminal law to respond to the dissemination of information of this nature would produce,
directly or indirectly, an intimidating effect that, definitively, would limit freedom of expression and, also, prevent
conducts that infringe the legal order, such as corruption, abuse of authority etc., from being held up to public
scrutiny. Ultimately, this would weaken the public’s control over the powers of the State, with evident prejudice for
democratic pluralism. In other words, the protection of honor by criminal law, which might be legitimate in other
cases, does not conform to the Convention in the situation described above75.
In this regard, the Court understood that, in the case of accusations against journalists, offenses of crimes
against honor call for careful interpretation. Thus, it is necessary to emphasize that the definition of every offense
stipulates a prohibitive norm, which logically determines a prohibited social sphere. However, the simple norm
inferred from the definition of the offense is not sufficient to establish this sphere, because the prohibitive norms
form part of a legal order or, at least, they must be understood in this way by the judges.
A basic principle of interpretive rationale stipulate that one norm cannot prohibit what another norm orders
because, in that case, the individual would have no legal guidance. However, it cannot be ignored that numerous
norms exist that promote conducts – for example, regarding sporting activities or the practice of medicine – that
can potentially conflict with other norms that prohibit activities that are harmful to safety or health. In that situation,
it would be irrational to understand that those norms prohibit what other norms promote. The activities that are
promoted include the exercise of freedom of expression because this is an essential activity in a pluralistic
society for public control over the acts of the Government and the administration. Consequently, in cases such
as Álvarez Ramos v. Venezuela, involving criticism of the public conduct of officials, the control of which is of
public interest, this relates to the exercise of an activity expressly protected by the American Convention and,
consequently, it cannot be considered that it conforms to conduct defined by criminal law76.
This does not mean that, eventually, the actions of journalists cannot lead to liability in another legal sphere,
such as under civil law, or rectification or a public apology, for example, in cases of possible abuses or excesses
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in bad faith. In any case, since this is an activity protected by the Convention, its definition under criminal law is
excluded and, consequently, the possibility that it be considered a crime and the subject of punishment. In this
regard, it should be made clear that this does not refer to an exclusion of the prohibition based on justification
or a special permission, but rather to the free exercise of an activity that the Convention protects because it is
essential to safeguard democracy77.
In addition, the Court considered that it was not admissible that a public official whose honor was supposedly
affected by the exercise of freedom of expression by a journalist, file a lawsuit as a private citizen in order to
avoid the provisions of the Convention and the Court’s case law. What was at issue in this case was not the
application of Article 11 of the Convention, concerning the protection of honor and dignity, but the contents of its
Article 13 concerning freedom of thought and expression78.

The Right to Property (article 21 of the American Convention)
In its case law79, the Court has developed a wide-ranging concept of private property that encompasses,
among other matters, the use and enjoyment of property, defined as material possessions or intangible objects,
as well as any right that may form part of a person’s patrimony80. The Court ruled on the concept of property in
the Case of Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, in which it define this as “material possessions, as well as any right that may
form part of the a person’s patrimony” and considered that “this concept includes all the movable and immovable
assets, the tangible and intangible elements, and any other intangible object that has a value81”.
In the Cases of the “Five Pensioners” v. Peru and Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees
of the Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru, the Court declared the violation of the right to property owing to
patrimonial effects resulting from non-compliance with judgments that were aimed at protecting the right to a
pension, which the victims had acquired pursuant to domestic law. In the Case of the “Five Pensioners,” the
Court indicated that, from the moment that a pensioner has paid his contributions to a pension fund and ceases
to work for the institution concerned in order to accede to the legally-established pension regime, he acquires
the right to his pension being regulated under the terms and conditions established in that law. In addition, in the
Case of Acevedo Buendía et al. (“Dismissed and Retired Employees of the Office of the Comptroller) v. Peru82,
it declared that the right to a pension acquired by this person had “patrimonial effects,” which were protected by
Article 21 of the Convention83.
Also, in the Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, the Court underscored and agreed with the expert opinion provided by
Christian Courtis that “[t]he benefits derived from social security, including the right to an old age pension, form
part of the right to property and, therefore, must be protected against the arbitrary interference of the State. The
right to property may even encompass the legitimate expectations of the holder of the right, in particular when he
has paid the quotas of a contributive system. With even more reason, it encompasses acquired rights once the
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conditions have been met to obtain a benefit such as an old age pension, especially when that right has been
recognized by a court judgment. Furthermore, among the range of interests protected by the right to property,
the benefits of social security are particularly important owing to their nature as a substitute for the wage and to
provide alimentation”84.

Economic, Social, Cultural, and Environmental Rights (article 26 of the American
Convention)
The right to social Security
In the Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru85 the Court considered that the legal problem related to the scope of the
right to social security understood as an autonomous right derived from Article 26 of the American Convention.
In this case, the Court followed the approach it had taken starting with the Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru,
and continued in sub86 sequent decisions87. In this regard, the Court recalled that, already, in the Case of Poblete
Vilches et al. v. Chile it had indicated the following:
- Thus, it should clearly be interpreted that the American Convention incorporated the so-called economic,
social, cultural and environmental rights (ESCER) into the list of rights it protects, derived from the norms
recognized in the Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as from the rules of interpretation
established in Article 29 of the Convention. And, particularly, that they prevent limiting or excluding the
enjoyment of the rights established in the American Declaration and even those recognized domestically. Also,
based on a systematic, teleological and evolutive interpretation, the Court has had recourse to the national
and international corpus iuris in this area to give specific content to the scope of the rights protected by the
Convention in order to derive the scope of the specific obligations relating to each right88.
- In the Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, the Court ruled, for the first time, on the right to social security and, in
particular, on the right to a pension, autonomously, as an integral part of the ESCER and, to this end, made
the following analysis: (a) the right to social security as an autonomous and justiciable right; (b) the content
of the right to security, and (c) the violation of the right to social security in this case89.
Right to social security as an autonomous and justiciable right
To identify those rights that may be derived, by interpretation, from Article 26, it should be considered that this
article refers directly to the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural norms contained in the OAS
Charter. From examining that instrument, the Court notes that it recognizes social security in its Article 3(j)90
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when it indicates that “[s]ocial justice and social security are bases of lasting peace”. In addition, Article 45(b)91
of the OAS Charter establishes that “[w]ork is a right and a social duty, it gives dignity to the one who performs
it, and it should be performed under conditions, including a system of fair wages, that ensure life, health, and a
decent standard of living for the worker and his family, both during his working years and in his old age, or when
any circumstance deprives him of the possibility of working,” and Article 45(h)92 of the Charter establishes that
“[t]he Member States, convinced that man can only achieve the full realization of his aspirations within a just
social order, along with economic development and true peace, agree to dedicate every effort to the application
of the following principles and mechanisms: (h) Development of an efficient social security policy.” Meanwhile, in
Article 46 of the Charter, the States recognize that “in order to facilitate the process of Latin American regional
integration, it is necessary to harmonize the social legislation of the developing countries, especially in the labor
and social security fields, so that the rights of the workers shall be equally protected, and they agree to make the
greatest efforts possible to achieve this goal”93.
In this way, the Court considered that the references to the right to social security were sufficiently specific to
derive its existence and implicit recognition in the OAS Charter. In particular, from the different references, it
can be inferred that the purpose of the right to social security is to ensure life, health, and a decent standard
of living for people in their old age, or in the case of events that deprive them of the possibility of working; that
is, in relation to future events that could affect the conditions and quality of their lives. Consequently, the Court
considered that the right to social security was a right protected by Article 26 of the Convention94.
The Court also determined the scope of the right to social security, in particular the right to a pension in the
context of the facts of the Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru, in light of the international corpus iuris in this area.
The Court recalled that the obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention are the
definitive grounds for determining the international responsibility of a State for violations of the rights recognized
in the Convention95, including those recognized pursuant to Article 26. However, the Convention itself refers
expressly to the general provisions of international law for its interpretation and application, specifically in Article
29, which establishes the pro persona principle96. Thus, as has been the Court’s consistent practice97, when
determining the compatibility of the acts and omissions of the State, or of its norms with the Convention or other
treaties for which it has jurisdiction, the Court is able to interpret the obligations and rights they contain in light of
other pertinent treaties and provisions98.
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In this way, the Court used the sources, principles and criteria of the international corpus iuris as special law
applicable to determine the content of the right to social security. The Court indicated that this special law to
determine the right in question should be used as a complement to the provisions of the Convention. In this
regard, the Court affirmed that it was not assuming jurisdiction over treaties for which it did not have jurisdiction,
or granting an equal rank to the provisions of the Convention to provisions contained in other national or
international instruments in the area of the ESCER99. To the contrary, the Court made an interpretation pursuant
to the standards established by Article 29, and to its jurisprudential practice, which has updated the meaning
of the rights derived from the OAS Charter that are recognized in Article 26 of the Convention. To determine the
right to social security the Court gave special emphasis to the American Declaration, because as this Court has
established:
[…] The States Members have understood that the Declaration contains and defines those essential
human rights referred to in the Charter; thus, it is not possible to interpret and apply the Charter
of the Organization in relation to human rights without integrating its pertinent provisions with the
corresponding provisions of the Declaration, as a result of the practice followed by the OAS organs100.
The Court has also indicated on other occasions that human rights treaties are living instruments, and their
interpretation must evolve with the times and actual living conditions. This evolutive interpretation is consequent
with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American Convention and in the Vienna
Convention101. In addition, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention authorizes the use of means of interpretation
such as agreements or practice or relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the
parties, which are some of the methods related to an evolutive perspective of the treaty. Thus, in order to
determine the scope of the right to social security and, in particular, the right to a pension in the context of a
system of State contributive pensions, as derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural
rights of the OAS Charter, the Court referred to the relevant instruments of the international corpus iuris102.
The content of the right to social security
As indicated above, Article 45(b) of the OAS Charter expressly indicates that work should be performed under
conditions, including a system of fair wages, that ensure life, health, and a decent standard of living for the
worker and his family, both during his working years and in his old age, or when any circumstance deprives him
of the possibility of working103.
Furthermore, Article XVI of the American Declaration identifies the right to social security when establishing that
“[e[very person has the right to social security which will protect him from the consequences of unemployment,
old age, and any disabilities arising from causes beyond his control that make it physically or mentally impossible
for him to earn a living”104.
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Similarly, Article 9 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador” establishes that: “(1) Everyone shall have the
right to social security protecting him from the consequences of old age and of disability which prevents him,
physically or mentally, from securing the means for a dignified and decent existence. In the event of the death
of a beneficiary, social security benefits shall be applied to his dependents. (2) In the case of persons who are
employed, the right to social security shall cover at least medical care and an allowance or retirement benefit in
the case of work accidents or occupational disease and, in the case of women, paid maternity leave before and
after childbirth”105.
In the universal sphere, Article 22 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that: “[e]veryone,
as a member of society has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through national effort
and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of each State, of the
economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free development of his personality.”
While, Article 25 emphasizes that “[e] very one has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and his family […] and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control”. And, Article 9 of
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights also recognizes “the right of everyone to
social security, including social insurance”106.
That said, from Article 45 of the OAS Charter, interpreted in light of the American Declaration and the other
previously mentioned instruments, it is possible to derive elements that constitute the right to social security,
such as that it is a right that seeks to protect the individual from future events which, if they occur, would have
harmful consequences for that person, so that measures to protect him must be taken. In particular, and in
the case in hand, the right to social security seeks to protect the individual from situations that occur when he
reaches a certain age and is unable, either physically or mentally, to obtain the necessary means of subsistence
to have adequate living conditions, which could also deprive him of his ability to exercise his other rights fully.
This also reflects one of the elements of the right, because social security must be exercised so that it guarantees
conditions that ensure life, health and a decent standard of living107.
Although the right to social security is widely recognized in the international corpus iuris, both the International
Labour Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
following the main instruments adopted by the ILO, have developed the content of the right to social security
more clearly and this allowed the Court to interpret the content of the right and the State obligations based on the
facts of the Case of Muelle Flores v. Peru.108
In general, the ILO has referred to the right to social security as “the protection that a society provides to
individuals and households to ensure access to health care and to guarantee income security, particularly in
cases of old age, unemployment, sickness, invalidity, work injury, maternity or loss of a breadwinner”109. In the
specific case of the retirement pension derived from a system of contributions or quotas, it is a component of
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social security that seeks to meet the need for financial subsistence that persists for the person who stops
working, for any of the above reasons, based on surviving beyond the prescribed age. In those cases, the old
age pension is a type of deferred wage for the worker, an acquired right after having paid the quotas and worked
for the required number of years110.
In its General Comment No. 19 on the right to social security, the CESCR established that this right encompassed
the right to access and maintain benefits, whether in cash or in kind, without discrimination in order to secure
protection, in different circumstances, in particular, due to the lack of work-related income owing to old age111.
Similarly, the CESCR General Comment No. 19 established the legal content of the right to social security and
stressed that it includes the right not to be subjected to arbitrary and unreasonable restrictions of existing social
security coverage, whether obtained publicly or privately, as well as the right to equal enjoyment of adequate
protection from social risks and contingencies. Regarding its fundamental elements, it underscored the following:
a)		
Availability: The right to social security requires, for its implementation, that a system,
whether composed of a single scheme or variety of schemes, is available and in place to ensure
that benefits are provided for the relevant social risks and contingencies. The system should be
established under domestic law, and public authorities must take responsibility for the effective
administration or supervision of the system. The schemes should also be sustainable, including those
concerning provision of pensions, in order to ensure that the right can be realized for present and
future generations.
b)		
Social risks and contingencies: The social security system should provide for the coverage
of the following nine principal branches: (a) health care. (b) sickness; (c) old age; (d) unemployment;
(e) employment injury; (f) family and child support; (g) maternity; (h) disability, and (i) survivors and
orphans. In the area of health care, States parties have an obligation to guarantee that health
systems are established to provide adequate access to health services for all. And, with regard to
old age, States parties should take appropriate measures to establish social security schemes that
provide benefits to older persons, starting at a specific age, to be prescribed by national law.
c)
Adequacy: Benefits, whether in cash or in kind, must be adequate in amount and duration
in order that everyone may realize his or her rights to family protection and assistance, an adequate
standard of living and adequate access to health care. States parties must also pay full respect to the
principle of human dignity, and the principle of non-discrimination, so as to avoid any adverse effect
on the levels of benefits and the form in which they are provided. Methods applied should ensure the
adequacy of benefits. The adequacy criteria should be monitored regularly to ensure that beneficiaries
are able to afford the goods and services they require to realize their Covenant rights. When a person
makes contributions to a social security scheme that provides benefits to cover lack of income, there
should be a reasonable relationship between earnings, paid contributions, and the amount of relevant
benefit.
d)		
Accessibility: This includes: (i) Coverage: all persons should be covered by the social security
system, without discrimination. In order to ensure universal coverage, non-contributory schemes will
be necessary. (ii) Eligibility. Qualifying conditions for benefits must be reasonable, proportionate and
transparent. (iii) Affordability: if a social security scheme requires contributions, those contributions
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should be stipulated in advance. The direct and indirect costs and charges associated with making
contributions must be affordable for all, and must not compromise the realization of other rights. (iv)
Participation and information: beneficiaries of social security schemes must be able to participate in
the administration of the social security system. The system should be established under national
law and ensure the right of individuals and organizations to seek, receive and impart information on
all social security entitlements in a clear and transparent manner, and (v) Physical access: benefits
should be provided in a timely manner and beneficiaries should have physical access to the social
security services in order to access benefits and information, and make contributions where relevant
[…].
e)
Relationship with other rights: The right to social security plays an important role in supporting
the realization of many of the economic, social and cultural rights. In addition, General Comment No.
19 has established that the right of access to justice forms part of the right to social security, so any
persons or groups who have experienced violations of their right to social security should have access
to effective judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels, as well as
to adequate reparation112.
Furthermore, States have the obligation to facilitate the exercise of the right to social security by adopting positive
measures to assist individuals and communities to enjoy the right to social security. Not only must they facilitate
the exercise of this right, but also guarantee that “before any action is carried out by the State party, or by any
other third party, that interferes with the right of an individual to social security the relevant authorities must ensure
that such actions are performed in a manner warranted by law, compatible with the Covenant, and include:
(a) an opportunity for genuine consultation with those affected; (b) timely and full disclosure of information on
the proposed measures; (c) reasonable notice of proposed actions; (d) legal recourse and remedies for those
affected; and (e) legal assistance for obtaining legal remedies[…]”113.
That said, the Court considered that the nature and scope of the obligations derived from the protection
of social security include aspects that are of immediate effect, as well as aspects that have a progressive nature
114
. In this regard, the Court recalls that, with regard to the former (immediate obligations), States must adopt
effective measures to ensure access without discrimination to the benefits recognized for the right to social
security, and that men and women have equal rights, among other matters. Regarding the latter (progressive
obligations), progressive realization means that States Parties have the specific and constant obligation to
advance as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full implementation of this right, to the extent of
available resources, by legislative or other appropriate means. Also, there is an obligation of non-retrogressivity
in relation to the rights achieved. Consequently, the treaty-based obligations of respect and guarantee, as well
as to adopt domestic legal provisions (Article 1(1) and 2) are essential in order to achieve their effectiveness115.
Despite the foregoing, the Court noted that this case did not relate to the progressive obligations derived from
Article 26 of the Convention, but referred to the failure to implement the right to a pension as an integral part of
the right to social security of Mr. Muelle Flores, owing to failure to comply with and execute judgments delivered
in his favor in the domestic sphere in the context of the privatization of a State company following his retirement.
Mr. Muelle Flores acquired his right to a pension under a contributive regime administered by the State; thus,
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he acquired the right to receive a pension after making contributions during several years. The legality of his
incorporation into this regime was confirmed at the domestic level116.
In this regard, based on the criteria and elements that constitute the right to social security, and taking into
account the facts and particularities of this case, the State obligations in relation to the right to a pension are:
(a) to ensure the right to a pension after attaining the legal age and meeting the requirements
established in domestic law, which presumes that a functioning system of social security exists that
guarantees the benefits. This system must be administered by the State or supervised and monitored
by the State (if it is administered by the private sector); (b) it must ensure that the benefits are sufficient
in amount and duration to allow the pensioner to enjoy adequate living conditions and sufficient access
to health care services, without discrimination; (c) obtaining a pension should be accessible; that is,
the State should provide reasonable, proportionate and transparent conditions to access it. Also,
the amount of the contributions should be affordable and the beneficiaries should receive clear
and transparent information on the right, especially if a measure is taken that can affect it, such
as the privatization of a company; (d) the benefits of a retirement pension should be guaranteed
opportunely and without delays, taking into consideration the importance of this aspect for elderly
people, and (e) the State must provide effective complaint mechanisms in cases of a violation of the
right to social security, in order to ensure access to justice and effective judicial protection, which
also encompasses the materialization of the right by the effective execution of favorable decisions
delivered in the domestic sphere117.
Violation of social security and the right to a decent life
In the Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired Employees of the National Tax Administration
Superintendence (ANCEJUB-SUNAT) v. Peru, the Court reiterated that those persons or groups who have been
victims of a violation of their right to social security should have access to judicial or other effective remedies,
as well as to the corresponding reparation. In the Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired
Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUB-SUNAT), the Inter-American Court
recognized that the simple acknowledgement of the victims’ right to receive their linked pensions and the
corresponding reimbursements did not mean that their right had been realized or implemented. To make it
effective, it was essential that the domestic judgments handed down in their favor be executed and the pending
amounts paid. Consequently, the Court concluded that the State had violated the right to social security118.
The Court also reiterated that, in this particular case, almost 18 years had elapsed since the Constitutional Court’s
judgment of August 9, 2011, before the State established, finally and as res judicata, the employment regime and
remuneration to which the victim’s pensions would be linked. This meant that, during all that time, the material
content of the right to a linked pension was uncertain, because the State had not determined the mechanism to
be used and, subsequently, what this represented financially. The failure to determine the method to implement
the linking, resulted in the failure to determine the amount of the victim’s pensions. These facts constituted a
violation of the victims’ right to social security because the Court considered that one of the State’s immediate
obligations for the full exercise of this right was that people must be able to know the financial resources they can
count on to have a dignified life in their old age119.
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The Court also noted that one of the elements that forms part of social security is accessibility, which includes ‘the
right of individuals and organizations to seek, receive and impart information on all social security entitlements
in a clear and transparent manner”120.
Third, the Court underlined that another of the fundamental elements of social security was its relationship
to the guarantee of other rights because, “to a great extent, it contributes to reinforce the exercise of many
of the economic, social and cultural rights”121. In this regard, the Court has indicated that the pension derived
from a system of contributions or quotas is a component of social security. Furthermore, States must provide
special services for older persons because the retirement pension is the only salary substitute they receive to
supply their basic necessities. Ultimately, the pension and, in general, social security, constitutes a measure of
protection to enjoy a decent life122.
Accordingly, the Court considered that, in the Case of the National Association of Discharged and Retired
Employees of the National Tax Administration Superintendence (ANCEJUB-SUNAT) v. Peru, the rights to social
security and to a decent life were interrelated, a situation that was increased in the case of older persons.
The Court has indicated that the absence of economic resources resulting from the failure to pay the monthly
pension amounts directly impairs the dignity of older persons, because at that stage of their life, the pension
constitutes the main source of financial resources to pay for their primary and basic necessities as human
beings. The same could be said of other concepts that are directly related to the pension, such as the payment
of the reimbursement owed. In this way, the violation of the right to social security owing to the failure to pay
those reimbursement creates anguish, insecurity and uncertainty about the future for older persons owing to the
possible lack of financial resources for their subsistence, because the deprivation of an income evidently leads
to the deprivation of the development and improvement of their quality of life and personal integrity123.
The Court recalled that the right to life is fundamental in the American Convention because the realization of the
other rights depends on its safeguard. If this right is not respected, all the other rights disappear because the
person entitled to rights is no longer. Owing to its fundamental nature, the Court has affirmed that strategies that
restrict the right to life are not admissible and that this right includes not only the right of every human being not to
be deprived of life arbitrarily, but also the right that conditions will not be imposed that prevent or obstruct access
to a dignified existence. Hence, one of the obligations that the State must assume to protect and ensure the right
to life, in its capacity as guarantor, is to create basic living conditions that are compatible with the dignity of the
individual and not to establish conditions that obstruct or impede this. Consequently, the State has the obligation
to adopt positive measures aimed at satisfying the right to a decent life, especially in the case of persons in a
situation of vulnerability and risk, who require priority attention124, such as older persons125.
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The Court also considered that the scope of the positive obligations of the State in relation to the protection of the
right to a decent life of the older person should be understood in light of the relevant international corpus juris.
In this way, the content of those obligations consisted of the contents of Article 4 of the American Convention,
in relation to the general obligation of guarantee contained in Article 1(1) and to the obligation of progressive
development contained in Article 26 of this instrument, and of Articles 9 (Right to Social Security), 10 (Right to
Health), and 13 (Right to Education) of the Protocol of San Salvador. In addition, Article 11 of the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes the right of everyone to “an adequate standard of
living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement
of living conditions”126. In keeping with this, the Court noted that the United Nations Principles for Older Persons
have established that States must incorporate into their national programmes principles that guarantee “[o]lder
persons […] access to adequate food, water, shelter, clothing and health care through the provision of income,
family and community support and self-help”127.
The right to health
In the Case of Hernández v. Argentina, the Court addressed the issue of the right to health as an autonomous
right derived from Article 26 of the American Convention. In this regard, the Court took the same approach as the
one adopted in the Case of Lagos del Campo v. Peru128, and continued in subsequent decisions.129 Thus, the
Court recalled that, already in the Case of Poblete Vilches et al. v. Chile it had indicated the following:
Hence, it is evident to interpret that the American Convention incorporated in its list of protected rights the socalled economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, by derivation from the standards recognized in the
Charter of the Organization of American States (OAS), as well as from the rules of interpretation established
in Article 29 of the Convention; in particular, those that prevent limiting or excluding the enjoyment of the rights
established in the American Declaration and even those recognized in domestic law. In addition, based on a
systematic, teleological and evolutive interpretation, the Court has had recourse to the national and international
corpus iuris in this matter to provide specific content to the scope of the rights protected by the Convention in
order to derive the scope of the specific obligations that relate to each right.
•

The right to health as an autonomous and justiciable right

To identify those rights that may be derived by interpretation from Article 26, it is necessary to consider that this
article remits directly to the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural standards contained in the OAS
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Charter. From a reading of the latter, the Court notes that it recognizes health in Article 34(i)130 and 34(i)131 and
establishes, among other basic objectives of integral development, that of the “[p]rotection of man’s potential
through the extension and application of modern medical science” and also “conditions that offer the opportunity
for a healthful, productive, and full life”. Meanwhile, Article 45(h)132 emphasizes that “man can only achieve the
full realization of his aspirations within a just social order,” so that the States “agree to dedicate every effort to
the application of these principles, including: (h) [d]evelopment of an efficient social security policy”. Accordingly,
the Court reiterated that this reference had the sufficient degree of specificity to derive the existence of the right
to health recognized by the OAS Charter. Consequently, the Court considered that the right to health was a right
protected by Article 26 of the Convention.
The Court reiterated the scope of the right to health; in particular the right to health of persons deprived of
liberty in the context of the facts of this case, in light of the international corpus iuris on this matter. The Court
recalledthat, ultimately, the obligations contained in Articles 1(1) and 2 of the American Convention constitute
the basis for determining the State’s international responsibility for violations of the rights recognized in the
Convention, including those recognized pursuant to Article 26. However, the Convention itself explicitly mentions
“the generally recognized principles of international law” for its interpretation and application, specifically in
Article 29 which establishes the pro persona principle. Hence, as has been the consistent practice of the Court
when determining the compatibility of the State’s acts and omissions, or its laws, with the Convention or other
treaties for which it has jurisdiction, the Court is able to interpret the obligations and rights contained in them in
light of other pertinent treaties and norms133.
In this way, the Court reiterated the sources, principles and criteria of the international corpus iuris as special
law applicable in the determination of the content of the right to health. The Court indicated that it was using this
law to determine the right in question to supplement the provisions of the Convention. In this regard, the Court
affirmed that it was not assuming jurisdiction over treaties for which it did not have competence, or granting
the principles contained in other national and international instruments relating to the ESCER equal rank to the
Convention. To the contrary, the Court made an interpretation pursuant to the standards established in Article 29,
and in conformity with its case law, that updated the meaning of the rights derived from the OAS Charter that are
recognized in Article 26 of the Convention. The determination of the right to health gave special emphasis to the
American Declaration, because as the Court has established134:
[…] the member states of the Organization have signaled their agreement that the Declaration
contains and defines the fundamental human rights referred to in the Charter. Thus the Charter of the
Organization cannot be interpreted and applied as far as human rights are concerned without relating
its norms, consistent with the practice of the organs of the OAS, to the corresponding provisions of
the Declaration.
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Likewise, on other occasions, the Court has indicated that human rights treaties are living instruments and their
interpretation must evolve with the times and current living conditions. This evolutive interpretation is consequent
with the general rules of interpretation established in Article 29 of the American Convention, and also in the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Furthermore, Article 31(3) of the Vienna Convention authorizes the
use of means of interpretation such as agreements or practice or relevant rules of international law that the States
have agreed to regarding the application of the provisions of a treaty, which are some of the methods related to
an evolutive vision of the treaty. Thus, in order to determine the scope of the right to health, in particular the right
to health of persons deprived of liberty, as derived from the economic, social, educational, scientific and cultural
standards of the OAS Charter, the Court referred to the relevant instruments of the international corpus iuris135.
•

The content of the right to health

As previously indicated, Article 34(i) and 34(l) of the OAS Charter establish, among the basic objectives of
integral development, that of the “[p]rotection of man’s potential through the extension and application of modern
medical science,” as well as “conditions that offer the opportunity for a healthful, productive, and full life.” Also,
Article 45(h) underlines that “man can only achieve the full realization of his aspirations within a just social order,”
so that the States agree to dedicate every effort to the application of principles including: (h) Development of an
efficient social security policy”136.
In addition, Article XI of the American Declaration allows the right to health to be identified when it establishes
that “every persons has the right to the preservation of his health through sanitary and social measures relating
to […] medical care, to the extent permitted by public and community resources”137.
Similarly, Article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador establishes that everyone has the right to health, understood
to mean the enjoyment of the highest level of physical, mental and social well-being, and indicates that health
is a public good.138 The same article establishes that the measures States must adopt to ensure the right to
health include: “[u] niversal immunization against the principal infectious diseases,” “[p]revention and treatment
of endemic, occupational and other diseases,” and “[s]atisfaction of the health needs of the highest risk groups
and of those whose poverty makes them the most vulnerable”139.
In the universal sphere, Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes that “[e]veryone
has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including
food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of
unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control.” Meanwhile, Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes
the right of everyone to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family,
including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in
the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances
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beyond his control.140
Additionally, the right to health is recognized in Article 5(e) of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination; Article 12(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women; Article 24(1) of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; Article 28 of the International
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, and Article 25
of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. This right is also established in several regional
human rights instruments, such as in Article 17 of the Social Charter of the Americas; Article 11 of the revised
edition of the 1961 European Social Charter; Article 16 of the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights
and, recently, in the Inter-American Convention on Protecting the Human Rights of Older Persons. In addition,
the right to health has been recognized in Section II, paragraph 41 of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of
Action, and in other international instruments and decisions141.
Furthermore, the right to health is recognized at the constitutional level in Argentina (in article 42 of its Constitution),
and the Court has observed a broad regional consensus to consolidate the right to health, which is explicitly
recognized in different Constitutions and the domestic law of the States of the region, including: Barbados, Bolivia,
Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela142.
•

Standards for the right to health

The Court has already recognized that health is a fundamental and essential human right for the adequate
exercise of the other human rights and that everyone has the right to enjoy the highest possible level of health
that allows him to have a decent life, understanding health not only as the absence of disease or infirmity, but
as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being, derived from a lifestyle that enables everyone to
achieve overall balance. The Court has clarified that the general obligation to protect health results in the duty of
the State to ensure that everyone has access to essential health services, guaranteeing the quality and efficiency
of medical services, and to facilitate the improvement of the health of the whole population143.
Similarly, the Court has established that the implementation of this obligation begins with the duty to regulate it,
and has indicated that States are responsible for establishing a permanent regulation of health services (both
public and private) and executing national programs to achieve quality health services. The Court has taken
into account General Comment No. 14 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights on the right
to the highest attainable standard of health. In particular, this Comment emphasized that this right includes
opportune and appropriate health care, as well as the following interrelated and essential elements of availability,
accessibility acceptability and quality, the precise application of which will depend on the conditions prevailing in
each State144:
a)		
Availability. Functioning public health and health-care facilities, goods and services, as well
as programmes, have to be available in sufficient quantity within the State party. The precise nature of
the facilities, goods and services will vary depending on numerous factors, including the State party’s
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developmental level. They will include, however, the underlying determinants of health, such as safe
and potable drinking water and adequate sanitation facilities, hospitals, clinics and other health-related
buildings, trained medical and professional personnel receiving domestically competitive salaries, and
essential drugs, as defined by the WHO Action Programme on Essential Drugs.
b)		
Accessibility. Health facilities, goods and services have to be accessible to everyone without
discrimination, within the jurisdiction of the State party. Accessibility has four overlapping dimensions:
i)		
Non-discrimination: health facilities, goods and services must be
accessible to all, especially
the most vulnerable or marginalized sections of
the population, in law and in fact, without discrimination on any of the prohibited
grounds.
ii)
Physical accessibility: health facilities, goods and services must be within
safe physical reach
for all sections of the population, especially vulnerable or
marginalized groups, such as ethnic minorities and indigenous populations, women,
children, adolescents, older persons, persons with disabilities and persons with
HIV/AIDS. Accessibility also implies that medical services and underlying
determinants of health, such as safe and potable water and adequate sanitation
facilities, are within safe physical reach, including in rural areas. Accessibility further
includes adequate access to buildings for persons with disabilities.
iii)
Economic accessibility (affordability): health facilities, goods and services
must be affordable for all. Payment for health-care services, as well as services
related to the underlying determinants of health, has to be based on the principle
of equity, ensuring that these services, whether privately or publicly provided,
are affordable for all, including socially disadvantaged groups. Equity demands that
poorer households should not be disproportionately burdened with health expenses
as compared to richer households.
iv)
Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive
and impart information and ideas concerning health issues. However, accessibility
of information should not impair the right to have personal health data treated with
confidentiality.
c)		
Acceptability. All health facilities, goods and services must be respectful of medical ethics and
culturally appropriate, i.e. respectful of the culture of individuals, minorities, peoples and communities,
sensitive to gender and life-cycle requirements, as well as being designed to respect confidentiality
and improve the health status of those concerned.
d)		
Quality. As well as being culturally acceptable, health facilities, goods and services must
also be scientifically and medically appropriate and of good quality. This requires, inter alia, skilled
medical personnel, scientifically approved and unexpired drugs and hospital equipment, safe and
potable water, and adequate sanitation.
In this regard, the Court concluded that the right to health referred to the right of everyone to enjoy the highest
attainable level of physical, mental and social well-being. This right includes opportune and appropriate health
care, provided in keeping with the principles of availability, accessibility, acceptability and quality. When complying
with the obligation to respect and ensure this right, the State must pay special attention to vulnerable and
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marginalized groups, and care must be provided progressively based on available resources and the applicable
domestic law. Referring to the specific obligations that arise in the case of individuals suffering from tuberculosis,
the Court noted that the concepts mentioned had been taken from diverse responsible sources, but that medical
science is continually advancing in this regard and, consequently, the citations included as examples did not
contradict or call into question more recent findings. Moreover, the Court does not take a stand in matters and
discussions in the field of medical and biological sciences145.
Thus, regarding the medical care that should be guaranteed to those with tuberculosis, the Court considered
that the International Standards for Tuberculosis Care published by the Tuberculosis Coalition for Technical
Assistance (hereinafter “TCTA) constituted an authoritative reference to clarify some of the State’s international
obligations in this regard. In general, these standards establish that the basic principles of care for persons
with tuberculosis are the same worldwide: (a) a diagnosis should be established promptly and accurately; (b)
standardized treatment regimens of proven efficacy should be used with appropriate treatment support and
supervision; the response to treatment should be monitored; and the essential public health responsibilities must
be carried out. In particular, the TCTA indicated that an effective response to tuberculosis called for a series of
actions in the area of diagnosis, treatment and public health responsibilities146.
First, adequate diagnosis requires that all persons with otherwise unexplained productive cough lasting two–
three weeks or more should be evaluated for tuberculosis. Second, the treatment of tuberculosis required that all
patients (including those with HIV infection) who have not been treated previously should receive an internationally
accepted first-line treatment regimen using drugs of known bioavailability. The doses of antituberculosis drugs
used should conform to international recommendations. All patients should be monitored for response to therapy.
Third, regarding standards for public health responsibilities all providers of care for patients with tuberculosis
should ensure that persons (especially children under 5 years of age and persons with HIV infection) who are in
close contact with patients who have infectious tuberculosis are evaluated and managed in line with international
recommendations147.
As it has reiterated in its recent case law, the Court considered that the nature and scope of the obligations
derived from the protection of the right to health included aspects that must be enforced immediately, as well
as aspects of a progressive nature. In this regard, the Court recalled that, regarding the former (obligations that
are immediately enforceable), States must take effective measures to ensure access without discrimination to
the services recognized by the right to health, guarantee that men and women have equal rights and in general,
advance towards the full effectiveness of the ESCER. Regarding the latter (obligations of a progressive nature),
progressive realization means that States Parties have the specific and constant obligation to move as rapidly
and efficiently as possible towards the full effectiveness of the said right, based on available resources, and by
legislative or other appropriate means. Furthermore, there is an obligation of non-retrogressivity with regard
to the rights that have been realized. Consequently, the obligations to respect and ensure rights imposed by
the Convention, as well as the adoption of measures under domestic law (Articles 1(1) and 2), are essential to
achieve its effectiveness148.
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